By investigating the dynamics of Chinese diplomacy, Dr Loh shows how China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) gradually became the main interface of Beijing’s foreign policy and the primary vehicle through which the idea of ‘China’ is produced and represented on the world stage.
Read MoreWritten by Jiachen Shi
Resorting to military build-up consistently emerges as a rational choice for Chinese policymakers who perceive the country as entangled in a series of ‘internal troubles’ such as social instability and ‘external threats’ such as provocations from the United States.
Read MoreWritten by Dr Mor Sobol
In the last few years, amid escalating tensions between Taiwan and China, and the heightened geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing, there has been a noticeable surge in interest from the Taiwanese side — both at official and ‘academic’ levels — in learning from the Israeli experience regarding security and defence.
Read MoreWritten by Michael Lostumbo
Taiwan should assess its existing force and all future investments and evaluate them from the lens of their warfighting potential, which should be the primary focus for their military.
Read MoreWritten by Satvik Pendyala and Nathaniel Sher
As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Read MoreWritten by Sankaran Krishna and Aditi Malhotra
If the other members of the Quad harden their stance against the Chinese, India will find it increasingly difficult to continue its balancing act of being part of a group hostile to the very country on which its own economic survival depends.
Read MoreWritten by Manoj Kewalramani and Megha Pardhi
Ahead of the 20th Party Congress, and given the importance of the military in solidifying the CCP’s power, tracking changes in the representation of the People's Liberation Army in the Party Central Committee is important to understand Xi Jinping’s power base.
Read MoreWritten by Francesca Ghiretti and Rebecca Arcesati
Mario Draghi’s new unit to screen FDI in strategic sectors should be concerned with more than inbound investments. Particularly, the new division should consider turning its attention towards research and innovation (R&I) exchanges.
Read MoreWritten by Zachary Abuza
Thailand’s submarine deal with China has been put on hold, not due to the public backlash, parliamentary scrutiny, or a lack of strategic rationale; the Gulf of Siam is too shallow for submarines to operate effectively. But since the military coup of 2014, the Thai military usually gets its way regardless of strategic rationale.
Read MoreWritten by Thomas Chan
The acutely partisan nature and resentment between pan-Blue and pan-Green politicians could render it a continuous shouting contest and ultimately desensitise the population from any genuine concerns and escalation.
Read MoreOn one hand, there is a China that is complex, runs on different drivers depending on the issue one is talking about and is often poor at communicating, or resentful that it needs to communicate and do things that it sees everyone else doing without the need to explain themselves.
Read MoreWritten by Corey Wallace
Kishida’s increasingly muscular security stances also reflect toughening attitudes towards China within Japan’s political elites and public opinion throughout the spectrum. Ultimately, it is very likely that the Chinese government will be disappointed that Kishida is not a sheep in wolf’ clothing.
Written by John Pollock
Should it transpire in the coming years that Chinese villages or roads are being constructed in Sakteng, alongside those on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, it is conceivable that Indian mountain troops from IV Corps would intervene as at Doklam in 2017, thus placing Bhutan at the centre of a future Sino-Indian standoff.
Read MoreWritten by Gerald C. Brown
If China adopts a launch-on-warning posture that could cause substantial damage to the United States regardless of arsenal size, nuclear weapons are also unlikely to be enough to deter conventional conflicts outside the United States.
Read MoreWritten by Kunal Singh
A New Delhi which is less interested in balancing China will be less useful to its partners in the Quad, and India is indeed the only Quad country to have engaged China in military combat for many years.
Read MoreWritten by Suyash Desai
As visible from the ongoing stand-off, it’s difficult to restore the status quo ante once it is changed by force as the two sides evenly match up. Thus India needs to be cautious about the changing nature of China’s military operations and its manifestation on the Sino-Indian border.
Read MoreWritten by Rohan Mukherjee
ASEAN can then continue to hold together and take a middle path, offering security cooperation to the Quad, economic cooperation to China, and institutionalised opportunities for diplomacy all around. The Quad for its part can continue growing its footprint without maintaining the pretence of ASEAN centrality and the need to convince smaller regional states to irrationally become the tip of the spear aimed at China.
Read MoreWritten by John Pollock
The continuing presence of the PLA throughout Ladakh, with the pressure being applied on the Depsang Plains and the refusal to withdraw from Gogra and Hot Springs, indicates Beijing is not yet finished eroding India’s tactical position in the Himalayas for its strategic gain.
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