8 August 2022

IN DIALOGUE WITH SANKARAN KRISHNA AND ADITI MALHOTRA

In this month's ‘In Dialogue’, we invite Sankaran Krishna and Aditi Malhotra to examine India’s position within the current geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

For many, India fails to receive the kind of attention generated by China, Russia or Japan when it comes to the region, which may, in part, be due to New Delhi’s careful positioning. While the human rights record of Narendra Modi’s government remains far from impeccable, Western leaders continue to talk up India’s role as a more ‘democratic’ and ‘human-rights based’ regional partner (mainly in opposition to China).

Together, Sankaran Krishna and Aditi Malhotra discuss the following question: Should India enhance its geopolitical footing in global and regional political affairs?

Yes, India should enhance its footing in global and regional political affairs. India’s conduct in the Indo-Pacific has been subject to ongoing debate, especially considering its weakness in actively shaping regional geopolitics. Yet, undoubtedly, New Delhi has come a long way compared to its South Asia-centric outlook of the 1990s. It remains a relevant regional actor today and continues to attract unprecedented attention from external actors (particularly the US and its allies) for its potential to balance Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region and eventually assume a more global role. Since the turn of the century, India has been viewed as an alternate model to China in Asia, with special mention of its democratic credentials and economic potential. Even New Delhi declares itself as a major power with prominent geopolitical, economic, and security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite that, India’s role in the Indo-Pacific’s contemporary geopolitical scenario remains far from being an effective regional actor. This is not to suggest that New Delhi should involve itself in all headline-grabbing issues or seek to become the rule-maker or dominant leader. However, to live up to its self-conceived role as a leading/major power, it is incumbent on the Indian leadership to shape regional developments in a more involved, consistent and constructive manner.

The question facing us is: “should India enhance its geopolitical footing in global and regional political affairs?” — Dr. Malhotra has offered a compelling case in affirmation. My immediate thought when I read the question is this: does it make any sense to ask “should India ….” when we really ought to be asking “can India enhance its geopolitical footing in global and regional affairs?”

Since its independence in August 1947, India’s ambitions and rhetoric in the domain of international affairs have been vastly disproportionate compared to its material capabilities. This has lent a dangerous degree of idealism and a distorted sense of reality to its policies and actions. India has often exemplified the complete opposite of the adage “talk softly and carry a big stick” — we have been all talk and no stick. The reasons for this distorted sense of reality in regional and global affairs are complex and have to do with the evolution of a postcolonial, anglophone middle class that was and is unable to transition out of economic underdevelopment — I will not go there for now, except to signpost it.

In recent years, there has been a widening gap between India’s political rhetoric and its political actions, whether to do with its role in the Quad arrangement, its conduct as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific, or its credentials as a thriving democracy. New Delhi has stuck to issue-based alignment in regional security affairs, effectively trying to play both sides of the fence. While the current disposition may benefit New Delhi in the near term, it has inherent risks. If not managed effectively, it will erode the country’s credibility as a dependable partner in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, to cater to Russian sensitivities, New Delhi rejected Japan’s request to land a Self-Defence Forces aircraft in Mumbai to transport humanitarian aid to Ukrainians; Indian authorities specified that it would allow Japanese commercial planes instead. While there is some merit to India’s nuanced stand on the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the rejection of the Japanese request on a relatively less contentious issue only raises questions over India’s dependability as a Quad partner. It also gives credence to the argument of India being a ‘bystander’ or the ‘weakest link’ in the Quad arrangement. New Delhi cannot continue to demand ‘more’ from its partners while not committing or delivering on some areas of shared security interests.

The romanticism related to India’s geopolitical potential and democratic credentials is somewhat intact. Still, it may evaporate if Indian actions do not align with its public declarations or rhetoric on these subjects. Given the uninspiring trajectory of India’s democracy indices, the political leadership needs to course-correct at home. It also needs to enhance its geopolitical footing to be considered a crucial stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region in the medium and long term, lest it should be relatively side-lined or dubbed as a mere ‘bystander’.

When I look at the Quad agreement (comprising the United States, Japan, Australia and India), and consider the country they wish to counter (China), the most obvious facts that stare back at me are the following. The other three members of the Quad dwarf India in terms of nearly every indicator — economic wealth, human quality of life, per capita income, and military staying power. We are not even in the same ballpark, let alone playing the same game. This leads me to wonder: what exactly does India bring to the table, and why would the other three members regard India’s views with the same seriousness they award each other? A comparison of India and China on economic and military capabilities readily indicates that we are no counter-weight to them, with or without the support of the other three powers. Moreover, the gap between us is widening. In past times, India’s status as a democratic outlier in a largely authoritarian ‘third world’ gave it a certain degree of ‘soft’ power or standing. (I have always regarded ‘soft’ power as meaningful if and only if it is accompanied by credible hard power).

As Dr Malhotra observes, that claim of democracy is difficult to sustain today. In fact, in my view, India is no longer a democracy in any substantive sense of the term. In other words, the one asset that India brought to the Quad (its third-world-democracy status in contrast with authoritarian China) has also disappeared. For India to enhance its geopolitical footing in global and regional affairs, it first needs to do what countries like China and South Korea have done in recent decades: provide for health, education, employment and nutrition for the vast majority of their populations. Until then, it may be prudent to prioritise economic development and a narrowly defined idea of national security while keeping a low profile in global affairs.

Dr Krishna addresses some very pertinent aspects of the debate and sparks a crucial conversation when he asks, “can India enhance its geopolitical footing in global and regional affairs?” Indeed, for most nation-states, security policies are hardly a matter of choice but more a response to a realistic assessment of national security and geopolitical setting. This leaves political leaderships with little choice but to pursue policies that cater to countries’ security interests. Likewise, New Delhi’s security outlook in the Indo-Pacific is a response to the growing security imperatives and strategic flux due to the rise of China, the diminishing influence of the US as a security actor, and the resurgence of Asian countries such as Japan.

As highlighted by Dr Krishna, India is, unlike China, lagging in the security domain and does not have the luxury of focusing solely on domestic non-security growth parameters at the expense of national security investments. I agree with Dr Krishna that no country can face up to China’s accumulated military and economic prowess alone. India intends to secure its interest instead of trying to overcome China. Therein lies the benefit of combining the strength of groupings like the Quad arrangement that can potentially offer the region an alternative to a Sinocentric regional order.

Even today, like most countries, the Indian leadership experiences the ‘guns versus butter dilemma’. However, with the precarious security situation in the Indo-Pacific due to China’s military rise, its increasing belligerence, its increasing security activities in the Indian Ocean region, and its active border standoff with India, the regional security situation demands greater Indian attention. Given this scenario, it is incumbent on the leadership to find a balance between developmental priorities at home and national security investments. It is equally essential to address systemic problems that make it challenging to effectively utilise the limited resources at hand.

Other societies may have the luxury of weighing trade-offs between “guns and butter”, but that phrase sounds oddly inappropriate in a country that, forget butter, routinely leaves hundreds of millions un- or underfed every day. Also, while China is India’s largest or second-largest trading partner, and the volume of bilateral trade is growing rapidly, we barely make their top ten. We attend BRICS parleys chaired by China, we are seeking to deepen our cooperation with China on space research, but our exports and manufacturing would collapse without Chinese investments, raw materials, technology, and products. Amidst all this, Prime Minister Modi cannot even bring himself to mention China by name, let alone address the fact that the PLA has occupied about 23 square miles of territory that India considers its own. Epitomising our weakness in the real world, the Indian government has engaged in shadow boxing, banning inconsequential mobile phone applications from China or grandstanding for domestic audiences in a pliant media.

China is poised to be the next global hegemon on the back of a phenomenal surge of economic growth spanning the period from approximately 1976 to the present — growth that was relatively egalitarian in class terms, geographically spread through much of the country and built on a base of widespread literacy, public health and gender equality. If the other members of the Quad harden their stance against the Chinese, India will find it increasingly difficult to continue its balancing act of being part of a group hostile to the very country on which its own economic survival depends.

Dr Krishna deftly points out that Indian ambitions in international affairs “have been vastly disproportionate in comparison to its material capabilities”. Undoubtedly, given the resource constraints at hand since independence, New Delhi has periodically attempted to utilise a range of policies (non-alignment, multi-alignment, or issue-based alignment) and adjusted its external policies to extract the best out of the evolving regional or global order. While some approaches have incurred expected results, others have not performed as anticipated. I agree that India’s rhetoric has often been louder than its actions, hence my scepticism regarding India’s relative back-sliding from its positive trajectory in the initial response.

I also concur with Dr Krishna that India dwarfs in a number of parameters when compared to other Quad partners, but that does not take away what India brings to the table. The very motivation for such an arrangement emerged after India’s effective Humanitarian Relief and Disaster Relief (HADR) response to the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Since then, India has periodically offered HADR and Search and Rescue Operations support in the region. It has also played a crucial role in the Quad Vaccine Partnership and the capacity-building programme related to regional maritime domain awareness and cybersecurity. India also coordinates its geo-economic strategies with Quad partners like Japan in the region and in Africa.

I fear my differences with Dr Malhotra on India’s ideal role in the region and the world remain profound and are possibly intractable. Whatever India’s performance when it came to the tsunami of 2004, or her initiatives on the vaccine or cyber security front, the reality that faces us today is a regime whose handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has been nothing short of horrendous; whose data on casualties is questioned by the World Health Organisation and other independent bodies; and which has just pushed an additional 80 million people back below the poverty line, making us the world’s largest repository of the destitute.

As I ponder an over-extended and deeply divided US that will be forced into greater isolationism over the next decade or so, and an ageing Japan and distant Australia that have never regarded India as central to their strategic calculus, the Quad arrangement reminds me of Mohandas Gandhi’s quip about one of the British colonial administration’s measly concessions to the rising movement for independence: he called it a “post-dated cheque on a foreclosed bank”. India’s ability to protect its own borders (let us for now set aside ambitions at regional or global power status) might be enhanced by prioritising a developmental agenda that produces meaningful growth for a billion people. Until then it might be prudent to eschew all talk about enhancing our geopolitical footing in regional or global affairs.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

Dr Sankaran Krishna teaches international relations and comparative politics at the University of Hawaii at Manoa in Honolulu, HI. He has published on race and international relations; the political economy of development in India and the third world; and on nation-building, ethnic conflict and foreign policy in the context of India and Sri Lanka.

Dr Aditi Malhotra is the Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ). She is the author of the book, India in the Indo-Pacific (Barbara Budrich, 2022). Before joining CAJ, she was the co-editor of the Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (Austria). Malhotra holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Münster, Germany. She has formerly held appointments at the National Institute of Advanced Studies and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (India). Image credit: Flickr/Rajesh_India.

In Dialogue: India's presence in the Indo-Pacific