Three hawks and a dove: Defence issues and the 2021 LDP election

27 October 2021

Steeped in the language of crisis, it was hard to ignore the prominence of national security issues and China-related strategic concerns in the recent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership race. The significance of this development certainly did not escape the attention of the Chinese government. In early September, Chinese government spokesperson Zhao Lijian decried the “senseless political hype-up” of China by the candidates. The Global Times later noted the “unprecedented” and “intense wave of hard-line rhetoric” that resembled “an anti-China propaganda campaign”.

Certainly, former Foreign Minister Kono Taro, former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Takaichi Sanae, and new Prime Minister Kishida Fumio all positioned themselves as hawkish on national defence during the campaign. Only the distant fourth-placed candidate, former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Noda Seiko pushed back against the need to toughen Japan’s security posture. Five topics debated by the candidates deserve greater attention given the potential implications for regional security.

Intermediate-range missiles

Over the last decade, China has accelerated the deployment of numerous, cost-effective, mobile, and difficult to intercept land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could greatly hinder the US military’s ability to operate from bases throughout the Western Pacific. US military planners have identified Japan, and particularly Okinawa, as ideal locations for future land-based missile deployments. They anticipate that this would restore regional balance and enhance deterrence by undermining Chinese confidence that the PLA could operate its air and naval forces freely in the East China Sea and around Taiwan simply by neutralising regional American bases at the onset of a conflict. Indeed, China has explicitly warned Japan and others against hosting American intermediate-range missiles under development following the United States’ 2019 withdrawal from the INF Treaty.

Kishida’s increasingly muscular security stances also reflect toughening attitudes towards China within Japan’s political elites and public opinion throughout the spectrum.

When asked whether Japan should host American intermediate-range missiles, only third-place getter Takaichi Sanae responded affirmatively saying such an arrangement would be “absolutely necessary to protect the lives and territory of the Japanese people”. Eventual winner Prime Minister Kishida Fumio did say he would not “outright oppose” a deployment but joined runner-up Kono Taro in demurring on giving a definite answer, citing the lack of a specific proposal from the United States.

Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the issue was mentioned at all. Such a deployment could further exacerbate tensions surrounding the concentration of American military forces in Okinawa. While other locations could be considered as part of flexible basing arrangements, recent local controversies surrounding the failed deployment of the ‘defensive’ Aegis Ashore system in Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures points to this remaining an uncomfortable issue for Japan’s leaders. However, the regional military balance for the US-Japan alliance continues to deteriorate, and it seems only a matter of time before this issue is raised again.

Overseas strike capability

The top-three candidates were more forthright on whether Japan needed to enhance its ability to attack overseas military targets to supplement ballistic missile defence. This mission is not constitutionally proscribed and has in fact been debated with increasing vigour since the early 2000s. Takaichi was again clearest, saying Japan needed the ability to retaliate and prevent follow-up attacks. Takaichi not only advocated deploying longer-range guided missiles to attack foreign military bases but also said Japan should look at electromagnetic pulse weapons and cyber-attacks to neutralise missile attacks. Prime Minister Kishida underwent a conversion on this issue, describing attacks on foreign bases as a potent option for Japan during the campaign.

Kono did not rule it out, but, alongside Noda Seiko, (correctly) noted that Japan lacks an autonomous ability to detect, identify and target mobile North Korean and Chinese missile platforms, suppress enemy air defences, and sustain in-theatre operations even after an initial attack. Furthermore, acquiring these extremely expensive capabilities would by no means guarantee mission success. Kono instead emphasised that deterring missile attacks from the Asian mainland would be best addressed in collaboration with the United States and other allies.

Maritime security

The candidates also trumpeted the need to better equip the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to push back against Chinese attempts to undermine Japan’s effective control of the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese Coast Guard has stepped up its presence in contiguous and territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands over the last two years, including pursuing Japanese fishing boats. Following the passage of Beijing’s February 2021 new maritime police legislation, a former JCG chief warned that “the JCG must now also consider the possibility of weapons being used against them as they attempt to shadow Chinese government vessels”.

While the Japanese government already plans to construct much larger vessels for the JCG (up to 3,500 tonnes) and deploy UAVs for surveillance, the candidates went further by arguing for legislative revision that would enable Japan’s navy to support JCG ships should they be overwhelmed by PRC government vessels using weapons.

Taiwan

Taiwan featured more in this LDP contest than it has for over 50 years, coming as it did on the back of a recent online LDP-DPP ‘two-plus-two’ Japan-Taiwan ruling parties’ dialogue. Takaichi again stood out, saying that the possibility of a Taiwan conflict was high and raised the possibility of Japan deploying its military to support a US response to such an emergency — something which Japanese officials in the last year said could be done under the 2015 security legislation. Takaichi also benefitted from an opportunity during the campaign to have an online discussion with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. Takaichi and Tsai agreed on the importance of promoting exchanges between Japan and Taiwan in such areas as the economy and security.

Kishida and Kono reaffirmed during the race their previous concerns about the threat China poses to Taiwan and the importance of Taiwan to Japan’s defence. Kishida in particular identified Taiwan as the “next big problem”, noting the need to cooperate with “countries and regions” with shared values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law to constrain authoritarian countries increasingly wielding their power. Furthermore, one of the few foreign policy issues that all four candidates did agree on was the importance of supporting Taiwan’s entry into the CPTPP.

Defence spending

The need to increase defence spending also featured prominently. Takaichi raised the most eyebrows by suggesting that Japan would need to double its defence spending to bring it in line with Western nations. Kishida also said that he would not concern himself with keeping Japan with the informal 1 per cent of GDP spending limit that has hitherto loomed large in Japan’s defence spending debate. Kishida also committed to reviewing Japan’s 2019-2023 Mid-Term Defence Plan ahead of schedule and better resource it. Runner-up Kono Taro argued that while strategy should drive spending decisions, it was inevitable that Japan would need to spend considerably more on developing and deploying game-changing technologies to offset the military advantages China has recently built up over Japan.

Kishida’s true colours?

Is Japan’s new prime minister likely to turn these hawkish sentiments into policy? While forgotten during the LDP race, the ‘peace-loving’ Komeito remains the LDP’s coalition partner. Kishida himself was for many years also considered a dove on defence policy. He is therefore unlikely to invest as much political capital in controversial national security issues as former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

However, Kishida was also Abe's foreign minister for almost five years and is therefore quite invested in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad, the US-Japan alliance, and even Taiwan outreach. He owes a debt to the more hawkish members of the LDP for his elevation to the premiership. Kishida’s increasingly muscular security stances also reflect toughening attitudes towards China within Japan’s political elites and public opinion throughout the spectrum. Ultimately, it is very likely that the Chinese government will be disappointed that Kishida is not a sheep in wolf’ clothing.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Corey Wallace is an assistant professor at Kanagawa University in Japan. Before that he spent 4 years in the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at Freie Universitat Berlin as an Einstein Foundation Berlin-funded postdoctoral fellow. Originally from New Zealand, Corey worked at the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology from 2007-2010 as a policy adviser in the innovation system policy team before earning his PhD in International Relations and Politics from the University of Auckland in 2015. He tweets @coreyjwallace. Image credit: Wikimedia/DVIDSHUB.