The Galwan Valley one year on: What's changed with China and the PLA ?

16 June 2021

This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi.

The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. In the days that followed, both sides deployed over two army divisions, battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers and surface to air missiles to Ladakh. Both sides also deployed fighter, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and drones at forward bases near the border. In August 2020, India carried out a “pre-emptive” operation on Pangong Tso’s south bank to strengthen its on-ground position and create leverage while negotiating a Chinese withdrawal.

Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso. The stand-off in Ladakh continues at other friction points. In his recent interview, India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen MM. Naravane highlighted that India continues to maintain a significant troop presence along the entire border. Heightened tensions and a forward Sino-Indian military presence on the LAC seem to be the new status quo. But four specific developments on the Chinese side since the Galwan incident could further impact the LAC dispute in the future. Some are a direct result of the ongoing military stand-off, while others are a part of the broader PLA restructuring and China’s evolving military strategy.

Newer weapons systems

First, China has commissioned newer weapon systems in the Tibet Military District (TMD) and Xinjiang Military Districts (XMD). As documented in my previous article for 9DASHLINE published last summer, newer weapons like the Type 15 light tank, PCL-181 laser-guided vehicle-mounted howitzers, Z-20 utility rotary-wing aircraft and GJ-2 attack drones were commissioned with the TMD after the 2017 Doklam stand-off in Bhutan. The latest analysis and reports indicate that this weaponry is fully integrated within the TMD. Recent reports also reveal that the XMD is the subject of greater attention by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The area opposite Ladakh, including the occupied Aksai Chin region and the ongoing China-India stand-off, is under the South Xinjiang Military District’s jurisdiction. Historically, the CMC has prioritised the TMD over XMD for military modernisation.

As visible from the ongoing stand-off, it’s difficult to restore the status quo ante once it is changed by force as the two sides evenly match up. Thus India needs to be cautious about the changing nature of China’s military operations and its manifestation on the Sino-Indian border.

The ongoing China-India stand-off, however, has elevated the XMD’s importance. The region is reportedly being reequipped with advanced weaponry like the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, T-15 tanks, PHL-03 rocket launchers, PCL-181 and PCL-161 howitzers and ZBL-09 infantry fighting vehicles. There looks to be direct causation between the ongoing stand-off and equipment directed towards the XMD. India needs to be mindful of these developments in the present and future.

Greater emphasis on Tibet in the latest Five-Year Plan

Second, in March 2021 China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) formally adopted the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP). Since 2001, China has prioritised infrastructure development in Tibet with the adoption of the 10th FYP. However, Tibet’s significance has visibly increased in China’s latest plan. The 14th FYP, which is only available in Mandarin, emphasises the construction of strategic roads and railways, the up-gradation of existing highways, and constructing feeder roads and infrastructure hubs in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). These projects aim to connect Tibet to the mainland and the Tibetan capital Lhasa to the Sino-Indian border near Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. It also aims to increase Lhasa’s connectivity with the Sino-Nepal and Sino-Bhutan borders.

Furthermore, the 14th FYP pushes for establishing strategic corridors between the restive Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous regions. It also stresses the construction of new hydroelectric projects at the great bend on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo (known in India as the Bramhaputra River). These are all dual-use projects and have strategic implications on the border dispute with India. The all-weather civilian infrastructure helps the PLA to mobilise faster and throughout the year. Thus, China could mobilise more force, heavier equipment and maintain logistics supply lines even during harsh winters. For instance, the Sichuan-Tibet railway line connects Chengdu to Lhasa and runs dangerously close to the Indian border near Nyingchi.

On completion, it will enable faster infantry mobilisation from the 77th Group Army units located in Chengdu and Chongqing during escalation. This is a huge tactical advantage as India still has limited all-weather roads reaching border areas with China and relies on strategic airlift and advance stockpiling tactics for the winters. Although some projects were initiated earlier, the 14th FYP demands the completion of old and the initiation of newer projects. Since the NPC accepted the latest plan in March 2021, it can be argued that a greater emphasis on developing Tibetan infrastructure correlates with tensions on the border.

The changing nature of military operations

Third, in August 2020 China’s National Defence University (NDU), PLA’s academic organisation, published a revised edition of the Science of Military Strategy. The Academy of Military Science, a PLA research centre, and NDU both published their versions of the Science of Military Strategy, authoritative textbooks to understand the PLA and China’s defence strategies. Joel Wuthnow documents that the NDU’s 2020 revision emphasises ‘increased intelligentisation’ and “multi-domain integrated joint operations”. Increased intelligentisation refers to informatised local wars with informatised systems and intelligentised equipment. Put simply, it means the application of advanced information technology in military warfare to support command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. The formation of the PLA Strategic Support Force in 2015 and the establishment of its tracking, telemetry and command station in Pakistan, which the Pentagon uncovered in its 2020 China Military Power report, should further ring alarm bells for India.

Similarly, Wuthnow explains “multi-domain integrated joint operations” as an advanced stage of joint operations consisting of a high level of operational coordination across domains, including land, sea, air, space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum, and also the cognitive domain. Since 2012, the PLA has only conducted eighty joint military exercises domestically. Just seven per cent of the one hundred military exercises that the PLA conducted with other countries were joint operations. The new military guidelines, which went into effect in 2020, alter this situation as it demands the PLA focus more on joint operations. For instance, ZHANLAN 2021 the PLA Navy’s annual military exercises placed joint operations in the centre of activities.

Although such training efforts are yet to be seen in China’s Western Theatre Command, reports indicate that the PLA has inducted the Army’s air defence units in the Air Force’s command chain to form combined air defence systems in certain areas bordering India. These are initial steps in joint combat training. In the future, India needs to be wary of joint operations between two or a combination of multiple PLA forces, especially the Air Force, Army, Rocket Force and Strategic Support Forces. Given the unresolved border issues between the two countries, joint military operations using two or more forces could produce outcomes possibly in China’s favour, at least in the initial stages of an escalation. As visible from the ongoing stand-off, it’s difficult to restore the status quo ante once it is changed by force as the two sides evenly match up. Thus India needs to be cautious about the changing nature of China’s military operations and its manifestation on the Sino-Indian border.

Improved logistics on the border

Finally, PLA’s Joint Logistics Support Force (PLA JLSF), which was formed in 2016 as a part of Xi’s military reforms, made an operational debut in the PLA’s response to COVID-19 and the ongoing stand-off with India. Reportedly, the force played an instrumental role in managing logistics in the Tibetan Plateau during the military stand-off. The force seeks to integrate the military’s joint logistics functions with the PRC’s advanced civilian logistics, infrastructure, and delivery service companies to provide the PLA with modern transportation and distribution, warehousing, information sharing, and other types of support during peace and wartime. It is still too early to judge the JLSF’s work, but it will undoubtedly play a significant role in theatres like Tibet and Xinjiang, where logistics are stretched. India needs to be mindful of China’s evolving logistical delivery capabilities under JLSF as the establishment of logistics centres and oil depots in Tibet and Xinjiang (along with the improved infrastructure) will enhance the PLA’s capabilities for rapid mobilisation and strengthen their capacity to sustain their forces in border areas for extended periods.

In addition to these four developments, the construction of military villages along the China-India and China-Bhutan borders should also impact India’s security calculations. Xi spelt out this new security architecture model Xiaokang at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. It strengthens the current security architecture and also creates additional watch posts on the border. Some of these actions predate the Galwan Valley incident. Direct causation can be established with the Galwan Valley incident and force modernisation in the Southern Xinjiang Military District. However, the driver for the changing nature of China’s military operations or increased securitisation and connectivity in Tibet cannot only be the ongoing border tensions with India. Without a doubt, these actions have collectively developed a sense of urgency since the beginning of the military stand-off, and will certainly impact the India-China border dispute into the future.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Suyash Desai is a Research Associate for the China Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, Bangalore, India. He works on China's defence and foreign policies and writes a weekly newsletter on the People’s Liberation Army called The PLA Insight. Image credit: Wikimedia.