The People’s Liberation Army: Xi’s power base in the Communist Party Central Committee

WRITTEN BY MANOJ KEWALRAMANI AND MEGHA PARDHI

2 August 2022

Mao's often-quoted expression “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” remains as critical to understanding the dynamics of power in China today as it was in the late 1920s. Xi Jinping, soon after assuming the position of Party General Secretary in late 2012, moved quickly to exert his control over the ‘gun’ — i.e., the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He has spent the past decade reshaping the PLA and forging loyalty, from the military-political work conference in Gutian in 2014 and an anti-corruption campaign (which targeted some of the highest-ranking PLA officials), to initiating major structural reforms.

With the 20th Party Congress later this year likely to elect Xi as General Secretary for an unprecedented third term since Mao Zedong, tracking changes in the representation of PLA members in the Party Central Committee offers a crucial data point for understanding Xi’s power base. In addition, such an assessment can also shed light on the dynamics among different service branches in the PLA and the security policy priorities of the Chinese leadership.

The importance of tracking PLA members

Tracking personnel changes, particularly at such a politically sensitive time, offers some insights into the process through which individuals are selected for key positions, as well as the factors that influence their selection. This is an extremely challenging exercise fraught with analytical risks, given the opacity of the Chinese political system. Conventionally, for the election of delegates to its quinquennial National Congress, the Party is reported to have followed a process of recommendation and nomination, after which the polling took place. In the past, this has included conducting straw polls for the highest Party bodies. However, in 2017, state media reported that for the 19th Party Congress, Xi had done away with straw polls. Instead, he set up a task force in mid-2016 to assess potential candidates and personally spoke to 57 incumbent and retired Party leaders about the individuals who should be promoted. So far, there is no indication that something similar has been done for the 20th Party Congress.

Ahead of the 20th Party Congress, and given the importance of the military in solidifying the CCP’s power, tracking changes in the representation of the People's Liberation Army in the Party Central Committee is important to understand Xi Jinping’s power base.

In November 2021, the CCP’s Organisation Department announced the beginning of the election process for the 20th Party Congress. The statement said that delegates should be elected from among over 15 per cent more candidates (meaning more than the required number of delegates) via competitive elections. This restricts the number of people who can be nominated to contest the election. Before the vote, these individuals must go through a recommendation and nomination process. For this process, the department highlighted that: “political standards must be prioritized when selecting candidates” and that “candidates’ commitment to ideals and convictions should be considered first, as well as their political character and moral traits”.

It added that candidates must “firmly uphold General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core position in both the Party’s Central Committee and the Party as a whole, and respect the Party central’s authority and its centralized and unified leadership”. The circular also talked about the need to veto the “politically unqualified”, focus on “outstanding candidates” and “model workers”, and select “high caliber delegates” while improving the “composition of delegates” to represent a “broad spectrum” of society. Historically, factional jostling, norms around age, professional experience, performance, and regional and institutional representation have played an important role in the promotion of individuals. While these factors still matter, it appears that political loyalty is likely to be the key determinant for candidates heading into the 20th Party Congress.

Tracking PLA members in the 19th CPC Central Committee

So far, the importance of political loyalty has been amply evident in the progress of the election of candidates to represent China’s armed forces in the Central Committee. For instance, on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress meeting in March this year, key members of the powerful Central Military Commission came out in unanimous support of the ‘Two Establishments’. This framework, which emerged after the 6th Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, refers to the establishment of Xi Jinping’s position as the core of the Party and the establishment of the guiding position of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’.

In April, state media informed that the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) had demanded certain requirements for being elected as delegates to the 20th Party Congress. These requirements include that candidates: 1) resolutely defend the ‘Two Establishments’, 2) strengthen the ‘four consciousnesses’ and the ‘four self-confidences’, 3) achieve the ‘two safeguards’, 4) implement the Chairman Responsibility System, 5) concentrate on combat readiness, and 6) have accomplished outstanding achievements in carrying out major tasks.

In late May, state media wrote that the recommendation and nomination process within the armed forces had been completed. Candidates would be chosen from 25 electoral units across the PLA and the PAP. Leading cadres accounted for 59.12 per cent of the shortlisted candidates, while the remaining 40.88 per cent were grassroots cadres. These individuals have reportedly undergone comprehensive inspections to assess “ideals, beliefs, political character, moral cultivation, and integrity”. The official news release added that the process of selecting the candidates was in itself an effort to engage in in-depth study and the implementation of ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ and ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Army’.

Currently, PLA and PAP delegates account for 66 and 17 per cent, respectively, of Central Committee members (both full and alternate members). This percentage is largely consistent with the historic trend. Conventionally, armed forces personnel have occupied 17 to 20 per cent of seats in the Central Committee. For example, in the 18th Central Committee, the PLA and the PAP accounted for 67 members or 17.8 per cent of the total number of members. In addition, there is also a historic trend of selecting three members with military and security backgrounds to the Politburo as seen in the 17th, 18th, and 19th Central Committees. As Alice Miller notes in her analysis for the China Leadership Monitor, this consistency is maintained to balance the influence of institutional blocs in the Politburo. It is worth watching whether these trends hold for the 20th Central Committee.

It is clear that individuals promoted under Xi Jinping, who today occupy senior positions in the hierarchy of the armed forces, will be among the leading candidates for Central Committee positions. Around 36.36 per cent (24 out of 66) of PLA members in the 19th Central Committee are aged 65 and above. The retirement age for PLA officers, when it comes to active service, is 65 years. This means that if the age norm is adhered to, there will be significant vacancies for new PLA members in the 20th Central Committee. It is little surprise then that Xi Jinping has been fast-tracking PLA promotions over the past few years.

Since the 19th Party Congress, Xi has promoted 39 individuals to the rank of general — the highest rank for officers in active service in China. A significant number of PLA commanders across China’s five theatre commands and branches are aged below 60 today. In addition, by looking at the backgrounds of these individuals, one can gauge the potential focus of future policies related to the modernisation of the PLA. For example, Xi Jinping promoted Chang Dingqiu, Commander of the PLA Air Force, in September 2021. He is not only the youngest active PLA General but is reported to have experience in joint operations between the Air Force and the Navy.

This is in line with Xi’s stated vision for the PLA to modernise while enhancing joint operational capacities. Likewise, out of the seven officers promoted to the rank of general in January 2022, five were political commissars across various services. Political commissars are tasked with consolidating the Party’s control over the military and matters concerning ideology and the Party line. Recent studies have also indicated that commissars in the PLA Navy tend to enjoy “authority parallel to [that of a] military commander”. Despite this, the promotion of these individuals again underscores the continued emphasis on political work and the likely continued dominance of Xi’s ideological agenda across the armed forces.

Representation of PLA service branches in the 19th Central Committee

Finally, another data point to assess the priorities for the PLA’s modernisation can be acquired by examining the distribution of PLA members in the Central Committee based on the representation of different services and theatre commands. So far, in terms of services, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) (also known as PLA Army or PLAA) dominates the 19th Central Committee. Out of the 66 armed forces members in the 19th Central Committee, 23 belong to the PLAGF. This number includes senior members who are also part of the Politburo and in different positions of importance at the theatre level. The PLAAF and PLAN account for nine members each, while the PLARF accounts for 10 members. The newly formed PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) also has seven members in the 19th Central Committee.

A consistent trend or changes in the number of high-ranking officials from a certain service could be one way to assess the priorities of the PLA. For example, an increase in the number of PLASSF officers might point to an emphasis on modernisation in favour of intelligentised warfare. The distribution across theatres is far trickier, given that the process of ‘theatrisation’ began from late 2015 onwards and that military personnel tend to move across theatres. However, it might be worth noting the distribution of Central Committee members across theatres after the 20th Party Congress to assess whether there is a new norm that can be established.

The upcoming 20th Party Congress is likely to be historic for both Xi Jinping and the CCP. Given the importance of the military in solidifying the CCP’s power, tracking changes in the representation of PLA members in the Party Central Committee is important to understand Xi’s power base. Moreover, analysing the PLA’s representation in the Central Committee can also shed light on the dynamics among different service branches in the PLA, the security policy priorities of the Chinese leadership, and hint toward the direction of modernisation of the PLA.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

Manoj Kewalramani is the chair of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution.

Megha Pardhi is a Research Analyst (China Studies) at The Takshashila Institution. Image credit: Flickr/Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.