Russia adds to India’s strategic drag in the Indo-Pacific

Written by Chetan Rana

As India navigates this new geopolitical landscape, it must critically reassess the touted advantages of its relationship with Russia and ensure that its foreign policy adapts to contemporary realities.

Faultlines9DLJuly 24, 2024Chetan Rana, 9DASHLINE, Russia adds to India’s strategic drag in the Indo-Pacific, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Moscow, July 2024 visit to Moscow, Vladimir Putin, Russian forces bombed a children’s hospital in Kyiv, 22nd India-Russia annual summit, India and Russia, Modi was conferred Russia's highest civilian honour, the Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle, Indo-Russian ties, Historical nostalgia, New Delhi’, Indo-Pacific security architecture, Sino-Soviet split, Nixon-Kissinger, post-American world order, joint statement, Ukrainian President Zelensky, Indo-Pacific, Russia as a hedge against China, UN resolutions regarding Gaza, Israel’s genocide in Gaza, Putin's invasion of Ukraine, financing Russian aggression, supplying arms to Israel, Cold War history, S-400 missile systems, Sukhoi, Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets, 65 per cent of India's weapon purchases, COMCASA, LEMOA, Russian technology, Eurasia, Arctic, International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Northern Sea Route, Russian crude oil, Arctic territories, Post-Ukraine invasion, Rajesh Rajagopalan, Donald Trump, White House, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, Quad, Modi’s visit to Moscow, Soviet Union, multipolar world, geographical access to Eurasia and the Arctic

Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China

Written by Dr Sari Arho Havrén

China has already made considerable progress in planting the seeds of an international order that would make the future safe for its one-party rule at home by insulating it from outside threats.

NATO’s future in the Indo-Pacific: Tilt or jilt?

Written by Mathieu Droin

The limitations of what NATO can offer or execute in the Indo-Pacific raise the question of whether there may be other more appropriate frameworks to publicly tackle shared security challenges between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.

Europe and the Indo-Pacific9DLSeptember 8, 20239DashLine, NATO’s future in the Indo-Pacific: Tilt or jilt?, Mathieu Droin, NATO, Indo-Pacific, Europe, Chinese Foreign Ministry, NATO Summit, Lithuania, AP4, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, south korea, transatlandopacific, alliance, hegemon, NATO’s partnership, NATO partnerships, Allies, Vilnius Summit Communiqué, dialogue, Washington DC, People’s Republic of China (PRC), NATO’s agenda, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Euro-Atlantic security, military alliance, legacy of the Cold War, Cold War, blocs, bloc building, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, United Kingdom, Indo-Pacific tilt, 2021 Integrated Review, France, AUKUS, AUKUS crisis, Paris, President Macron, Emmanuel Macron, NATO’s global partnerships, Canada, Denmark, Western Europe, Germany, Italy, North Korea, Russia, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, NATO liaison office, NATO International Staff, President Yoon Suk-yeol, Five Eyes intelligence alliance, Five Eyes, India, New Delhi, Indonesia, honest broker, Jakarta, Non-alignment, Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), Philippines, Myanmar, pro-China, pro-US, critical infrastructure, telecommunications, port facilities, military threat, no limits partnership, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, autocratic, Russo-Chinese alignment, Moscow, military posture, deter, deterrence, historical revisionism, spheres of influence, NATO’s eastward expansion, the West, Georgia, 2008 Bucharest Summit, Ukraine, Beijing, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Individually Tailored Partnership Programs (ITPP), cybersecurity, interoperability, Article 5, Ukrainian Armed Forces, Sanctions, humanitarian aid, European Union, Ramstein Group, G7, Taiwan Strait, Senkaku Islands, contingency, signalling, Eastern flank, trade, foreign direct investments, Brussels, anti-coercion instrument, critical raw materials, Sweden, EU Indo-Pacific Forum, Strategic Partnership, systemic rival, de-risking, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, leverage, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Quad, Global Combat Air Programme, Franco-Indian-UAE initiative, UAE, flexilateral

China’s uncertain future as a global security provider

Written by Lukas Fiala

The key question is whether Xi’s growing assertiveness and inadequacy of existing means to ensure the security of Chinese entities abroad will lead to a more pronounced security footprint over the coming decade, featuring new military base arrangements and, potentially, institutionalised security guarantees.

Faultlines9DLAugust 11, 2023China’s uncertain future as a global security provider, Lukas Fiala, 9DashLine, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Beijing, Global South, security, mediator, Riyadh, Tehran, Middle East, Washington, diplomacy, isolation, COVID-19, pandemic, United States, China’s overseas security strategy, strategy, foreign policy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, mediation, peace and security, peace broker, non-state actors, intrastate conflicts, statist approach, Ukraine, Russia, Israel, Palestine, security and defence cooperation, Hu Jintao, United Nations peacekeeping (UNPK) missions, South Sudan, Mali, Africa, Latin America, multilateral, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), military base in Djibouti, Global Security Initiative (GSI), security actor, US-led global security order, global security governance, UN Charter, indivisible security, sovereignty, 1975 Helsinki Accords, Vladimir Putin, NATO expansion, NATO, Russia’s war in Ukraine, Western imperialism, imperial history, Western colonial powers, century of national humiliation, Soviet Union, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Western hegemony, principle of non-interference, non-aligned movement, Cold War, non-intervention, 干涉, 干预, security provider, Sudan, Libya, ‘Go Out Strategy’ (走出去战略), Chinese state-owned enterprises, natural resources, raw materials, multilateral lenders, development finance, human rights, good governance, 2008 Beijing Olympics, al-Bashir regime, African Union, Darfur, Libyan civil war, People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA), Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, Chinese interests, power projection, security-development nexus, liberal peace, developmental peace, Ethiopia, civil war, Pakistan, South Asia, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Islamic extremism, Islamabad, sovereign lender, arbiter, Abiy Ahmed, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Saudi-Iran rapprochement, Iraq, Afghanistan, global war on terror, piracy, Gulf of Aden, 9dashline

Why China is an unlikely mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war

Written by Dr Eva Seiwert

Despite China’s interest in increasing its involvement in crisis resolution, it remains unclear whether Beijing is willing to mediate, and whether it can be a fair broker, in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Guns before butter? Multi-dimensional diplomacy in China-Europe relations

Written by Dr William Hurst

The bet that security fears could be addressed to allow the resumption of progress on trade did not pay off. China lost a significant opportunity to re-open more fully to the world and deepen its economic ties with arguably its most important trading partner (the Eurozone).

Europe and the Indo-Pacific9DLMay 31, 20239DashLine, Guns before butter? Multi-dimensional diplomacy in China-Europe relations, William Hurst, China, EU, China-Europe relations, diplomacy, French President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, UK, Lu Shaye, sovereignty, post-Soviet states, Ukraine, Chinese National Chairman Xi Jinping, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, trade, most favoured nation, human rights, President Bill Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, Democrats, policy of de-linking, decoupling, de-risking, United States, Taiwan, North Korea, ideology, values, global power, security interests, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine war, NATO, neutrality, Vladimir Putin, Japan, balance of power, India, the West, aircraft carrier, China-Ukraine relations, Beijing, Brussels, strategic signalling, Paris, US State Department, President Biden, Moscow, Kyiv, peace negotiations, peace talks, sanctions, de-escalation, Eurozone

’We’re going through changes’ – What Xi meant when he spoke to Putin

Written by Dr Kerry Brown

In this context, the one positive Russia offers to China is that it does not belong to the Western bloc. Xi’s seemingly warm words to Putin are an acknowledgement that his enemy’s enemy is his friend.

Editor's Picks9DLMay 11, 20239DashLine, ’We’re going through changes’ – What Xi meant when he spoke to Putin, Kerry Brown, President Xi Jinping, China, Russia, Vladimir Putin, Moscow, geopolitics, Chinese elite, America, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian, China-Russia alignment, Beijing, autocratic norm, democracy, common destiny, Community of Common Destiny, community of common destiny for mankind, win-win, Belt and Road Initiative, Qing, Republican, People’s Republic, Winston Churchill, Second World War, Great Powers, UK, middle-income, sense of destiny, Western hegemony, multipolarity, Western bloc, NATO, Soviet, Middle East, Africa, Latin America, peace plan, nuclear weapons, ‘WE’RE GOING THROUGH CHANGES’ – WHAT XI MEANT WHEN HE SPOKE TO PUTIN, Xi Jinping, Putin, Ukraine, Nuclear, United Kingdom, US, WW2, WWII, Lau China Institute, Kings College London, Centro Studi Sulla Cina Contemporanea Summer School

Why India won’t break from Russia.. yet

Written by Ian Hall

New Delhi clearly believes — rightly — that India’s relationship with the United States, underpinned by a shared interest in better managing China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, is sufficiently robust to weather disagreement over this war.

Pacific9DLNovember 7, 20229DashLine, Ian Hall, Why India won’t break from Russia… yet, India, Russia, Ukraine, Russia-China bloc, Russia's aggression, Russian gas, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukraine war, Narendra Modi, Prime Minister Modi, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), SCO Summit, Vladimir Putin, India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Russia’s invasion, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, inflation, Food Prices, UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution, annexation, UN General Assembly (UNGA), COVID-19, post-pandemic recovery, Indian economy, Sino-Indian border, Himalayas, New Delhi, Moscow, Kremlin, Beijing, United States, Indo-Pacific, China’s coercion, humanitarian crisis, Indian students, media, diplomacy, Soviet, military hardware, S-400 air defence systems, Pakistan, Alliance, allies, multipolar order, bloc, nuclear, geopolitics, China challenge, nuclear submarine, South Asia, Indian Ocean, client state

Alignment without alliance: China’s growing ambivalence to Putin’s war

Written by Lunting Wu and Kamil Matusiewicz

Functional, strategic and normative factors have shaped Beijing’s growing ambivalence towards the war, and despite the absence of outright condemnation, a subtle shift and distancing can be discerned.

Faultlines9DLNovember 4, 20229DashLine, Lunting Wu, Kamil Matusiewicz, Alignment without alliance: China’s growing ambivalence to Putin’s war, China, Russia, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jingping, Xi Jinping, SCO, SCO Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Samarkand, Ukraine, Ukraine war, military, Moscow, Beijing, Russia's aggression, cooperation, economic partners, Russian oil, gas, and coal, Saudi Arabia, trade, decoupling, US, NATO, security, Taiwan, AUKUS, Quad, Li Zhanshu, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, State Duma, NATO allies, liberal hegemony, Liberal International Order, liberal internationalism, Orange Revolution, colour revolutions, 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, Yang Jiechi, Foreign Affairs Commission, US hegemony, Western powers, liberal democracy, US interests, Western sanctions, Sinopec, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB), Huawei, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Arctic LNG 2 project, EU sanctions, Xiaomi Corp., Lenovo Group Ltd., Power of Siberia 2, zero-covid, secondary sanctions, food security, food insecurity, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Wang Yi, Kremlin, social media, Ukraine's counter-offensives, Weibo, Central Asian states, Belt and Road Initiative, humanitarian aid, Central and Eastern European countries, 17+1, People’s Liberation Army, indivisible security, Global Security Initiative, Cold War, sovereignty, Nuclear weapons, autonomous regions

Russia’s self-inflicted annus horribilis

Written by Joe Varner

The strategic importance of the Russian Pacific Fleet has never been greater to Moscow than it is now as the key means to engage and support Chinese foreign policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Most Popular, Pacific9DLNovember 2, 2022Russia, Russian Armed Forces, Vladimir Putin, Putin, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Federation, Kyiv, Ukraine, Ukraine war, military, Black Sea Fleet, Moskva, cruiser Moskva, Russian Navy, Snake Island, nuclear weapons, sanctions, Admiral Gorshkov, Soviet, aircraft carrier, cruisers, destroyers, China, Russia’s Pacific Command, Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District Headquarters, Khabarovsk, Russia’s Pacific fleet, nuclear deterrence, naval diplomacy, Indo-Pacific region, Mediterranean, International Institute of Strategic Studie, Borey-class, Delta III nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), Oscar II and Yasen-class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN), Akula and Akula II attack submarines (SSN), conventional-powered Kilo and improved Kilo patrol submarines (SSK), Slava-class guided missile cruiser, Udaloy I and Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, Steregushchiy-class frigates, corvettes, mine warfare ships, amphibious vessels, anti-ship missile brigades, fighter squadron, attack helicopter squadrons, squadron of Tu-142 Bear strategic bombers, electronic warfare, Russia’s nuclear deterrent, Soviet-era, Borey-class submarines, Delta III submarine, Steregushchiy-class corvettes, Eastern Military District’s Naval Infantry, Second World War, geography, geostrategic, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, Finland, Sweden, NATO, Russia’s Baltic Fleet, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Turkey, Moscow, Norway, Russia’s Northern Fleet, Kola peninsula, Russia’s Pacific Fleet, Sea of Okhotsk, ballistic missile submarines, forgotten Pacific power, Chinese Civil War, Korean War, North Korea, Indo-Pacific, the West, Beijing, Baltic region, Central Europe, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping, US, allies, Japan, Taiwan, Sea of Japan, East China Sea, Pacific Ocean, Tsushima Strait, South Korea, La Pérouse Strait, Russian Ministry of Defence, Russian war games, Vostok 2022, Russia’s Far East, India, Laos, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Syria, United States Coast Guard, Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, United States Exclusive Economic Zone, Cape Soya, Hokkaido, Hokkaidō, green-water navy, Russia’s self-inflicted annus horribilis, Joe Varner, Black Sea, Pacific, International Institute of Strategic Studies, SSBN, Ukraine War, Xi Jingping

Samarkand 2022 — the ‘China Dream’ of SCO Summits

Written by Giulia Sciorati

As the SCO opens to other Asian sub-regions and even the African continent, Central Asia risks losing its centrality and becoming a minor geographical area compared to the Gulf or Southeast Asia, where the national interests of SCO member states (and China, above all) are prominent.

Editor's Picks9DLOctober 12, 20229DashLine, Samarkand 2022 — the ‘China Dream’ of SCO Summits, Giulia Sciorati, Samarkand, SCO, SCO Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China, Russia, Ukraine, Russo-Ukrainian war, sphere of influence, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Uzbekistan, Eurasian, Samarkand Declaration, non-interference, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping, harmonious coexistence of man and nature, bilateral, trilateral, multilateral, multilateralism, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Wang Yi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Narendra Modi, India, SCO member states, observer states, Central Asia, India-China border dispute, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Putin, COVID-19 pandemic, COVID-19, China-Kazakhstan joint statement, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Sadyr Japarov, Iran, Belarus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Maldives, Kuwait, UAE, myanmar, the Gulf, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, economy, China Dream, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), CSTO, Peacekeeping, peacekeepers, Beijing, Moscow, post-Soviet space

South Korea eyes Europe for its future

Written by Eunwoo Lee

South Korea, whose external engagement has so far revolved around the intractable security stances of the US and China, can surely hedge its security interests by embracing Europe.

Bitcoin to bombs: Illicit money and the preservation of Kim Jong-un

Written by Casey Babb

If he is going to be compelled to behave differently, or if regime change is the end goal, policymakers, practitioners, and cyber experts need to cut off North Korea’s digital “bank robbers”.

The rationale behind Beijing’s position on the war in Ukraine

Written by Wang Li

Beijing believes that even if Moscow’s reputation as a formidable military power has suffered a serious blow during its war in Ukraine it will be able to re-emerge as a stronger power in a short time.

Six months on: Cambodia as ASEAN chair

Written by Kimkong Heng

Although there is speculation that US President Joe Biden will attend the East Asia Summit, will he be willing to sit for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin or his substitute? Cambodia will have to balance multiple pressures while hosting these high-level meetings.

The RS-28 Sarmat: Russia’s Satan II

Written by Joe Varner

When asking whether it is a deterrence game-changer in the short and long run, the answer is likely no. To counter the Sarmat, Washington can move more and more of its vulnerable land-based deterrent to the US sea-based portion of the triad and onto submarines.

As the focus on Myanmar fades Ukraine takes the spotlight

Written by Kristina Kironska

The military regime is worried that the Russian supply of hardware to Myanmar could slow down as it is now needed elsewhere. Moreover, Western financial sanctions on Russia are worrying for the junta as many generals and Myanmar’s arms dealers have bank accounts in Russia.

Why China will not cooperate with the United States on North Korea

Written by Anny Boc

China’s public support in February for Russia’s position on opposing further NATO expansion reflects its own long harboured concern about US’ intent to establish an Asian version of NATO.