Why China will not cooperate with the United States on North Korea

30 March 2022

In January, North Korea (DPRK) tested seven missiles including its first intermediate-range ballistic missile since 2017. The timing of the tests was unfavourable to China as the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing were right around the corner. Remarkably, the CCP regime remained completely silent: no criticism, condemnation, or even the usual call for exercising restraint. There was not much reporting in the Chinese media, let alone any controversial debates among Chinese academics. This is very different from what was observed five years ago when North Korea’s provocative actions on the Korean Peninsula sparked lively public debates in China on the costs and benefits of sustaining the regime in Pyongyang. Since North Korea is a sensitive foreign policy issue in China, many interpreted the openness and greater freedom of expression back then as a sign of Beijing possibly rethinking its strategy towards North Korea.

However, Trump’s sudden diplomatic engagement with Kim Jong-un prompted an unexpected shift in Beijing’s policy toward Pyongyang. After years of icy relations, Xi Jinping seemed keen to move Kim closer to China, resulting in five summits between the two leaders so far. These developments certainly have influenced Chinese calculations regarding its policy on the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, the reset of China-North Korea relations is not a decisive factor in Beijing’s reluctance to cooperate with Washington on the North Korea nuclear issue. For China, the United States has always been the greatest geostrategic concern. Beijing’s reactions to the recent release of the US Indo-Pacific strategy and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly show that prospects for securing Chinese cooperation on North Korea have never been darker.

Rising China-US tensions

Since the Sino-DPRK relationship started taking a positive turn in March 2018, the Chinese authorities’ tolerance of open discussion on North Korea has waned. Critical voices have almost fallen silent in China, and the position of those who prioritise cooperation with the United States on the Korean Peninsula over supporting Pyongyang has been significantly weakened. Domestic support for cooperation with the US has also substantially dwindled. Instead, the dominant narrative of the US hyping the North Korean threat to legitimise its military expansion in the region circulates widely in China. Rather than problematising Pyongyang’s missile launches, the Chinese first and foremost blame the Americans for triggering a regional arms race.

China’s public support in February for Russia’s position on opposing further NATO expansion reflects its own long harboured concern about US’ intent to establish an Asian version of NATO.

The Trump administration’s confrontational China policy triggered a downward spiral in US-China relations. To the surprise of many in Beijing, Joe Biden has largely followed Trump’s policy on China, most strikingly his trade policy. Much like his predecessor, Biden regards China as a “strategic competitor” and does not shy away from criticising the CCP regime on a wide range of issues such as its genocide and crimes against Uyghurs, the crackdown on Hong Kong's democratic institutions, and aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region.

The increasing competition has overshadowed cooperation between the two countries, including on North Korea. While the United States views China as a vital player in any effort to curtail North Korea’s nuclear programme and expects Beijing to cooperate in pressuring Pyongyang, the Chinese are unwilling to deliver on US expectations. To be sure, gaining China’s support for punitive measures against North Korea has always been difficult. Although Beijing and Washington share a mutual interest in solving the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, differing priorities have hindered the two countries from working together successfully on convincing Pyongyang to give up its nukes. From the Chinese perspective, denuclearisation is a long-term goal, which should never outrank peace and stability in the region. Thus, Beijing is reluctant to take any measures that might seriously destabilise the Kim regime.

Clash over sanctions

For years, Washington has repeatedly criticised China for not fully abiding by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on North Korea and consequently undermining the international community’s efforts to punish Pyongyang for conducting nuclear weapons and missile tests. It was only in 2017-2018 that China unprecedentedly curbed bilateral trade with North Korea and adopted measures against its neighbour that went even beyond UN sanctions. Beijing’s tougher approach towards Pyongyang was spurred by escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea’s successive missile tests and strong pressure from the United States. Trump had stepped up economic pressure on China and offered Beijing a “trade deal” in exchange for doing more to combat the North Korean nuclear threat. China cooperated on implementing a series of UN sanctions forcefully, only to realise that it was not rewarded. On the contrary, the Chinese had continued to face Trump’s hardline policy which further strained their bilateral relationship.

As soon as tensions on the Korean Peninsula eased and the spectre of war was averted in 2018, China returned to its familiar playbook: relaxing its sanctions, resuming informal trade, and repeatedly calling for sanctions relief for North Korea. Unsurprisingly, Beijing has been joined in its efforts by Moscow; both autocracies find common ground in countering the US’ global dominance and have stepped up efforts to challenge the US stance on regional flashpoints including North Korea. Since April 2018, China and Russia have repeatedly called for easing sanctions on Pyongyang and their respective joint draft proposals to the UNSC in 2019 and 2021 reflected their coordinated approach. Together, they have also blocked the US’ attempts to impose further international sanctions on Pyongyang following several missile launches in January this year.

Unlike the United States, China has always opposed sanctions as a means to achieve denuclearisation. Rather, it regards them as a tool to prevent North Korea from further provocations and a way to bring it back to the negotiation table. Beijing’s rigorous enforcement of sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017-2018 was clearly an exception and is unlikely to happen again any time soon, particularly now that China-North Korea relations have significantly improved and China-US strategic rivalry deepens.

Fear of US-led containment

One should also not forget that Beijing has always sided with Pyongyang and regarded Washington as part of the nuclear conflict’s root cause by ignoring North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns”. Likewise, the Chinese regime blames the US for the ongoing stalemate between North Korea and the United States. In a recent remark, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi again emphasised that Kim Jong-un has taken “positive measures” to promote dialogue, but has not received any “adequate rewards”. This was a thinly-veiled critique of Washington’s refusal to make any concessions despite Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing.

What was even more striking was Wang’s comment that the path to a solution will depend on “whether the United States continue to use the (Korean) Peninsula issue as a geostrategic bargaining chip”. While in the past, many unofficial voices have raised concerns that Washington is not truly interested in solving the North Korean conflict, this is the first time a Chinese foreign minister has made such a direct statement and publicly accused Washington of pursuing geostrategic aims in the region rather than working towards denuclearisation. From the Chinese perspective, the US uses North Korea as a pretext for expanding its military presence and reinforcing its alliances in the region. The deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea in 2016 is a case in point. The move was a response to the increasing threats from North Korea, but Beijing still is convinced that THAAD is part of a broader US strategy to contain China.

Wang’s bold remark follows the US’ newly released Indo-Pacific strategy and increased bilateral tensions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although these are separate issues playing out in different parts of the world, for Beijing, they share a common aspect: NATO’s role under Washington’s leadership. Rather than condemning Vladimir Putin for his war of aggression, the CCP regime blames the US-led NATO for “pushing the Russia-Ukraine tension to the breaking point”. Furthermore, China’s public support in February for Russia’s position on opposing further NATO expansion reflects its own long harboured concern about US’ intent to establish an Asian version of NATO.

In this regard, it is not surprising that Beijing views Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which explicitly includes Northeast Asia, as a further attempt to establish a NATO-style military alliance in the region. China’s immediate neighbours Japan and South Korea play a prominent role in the US security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region and as the United States’ two most important allies they unsurprisingly feature prominently in its Indo-Pacific strategy. The expansion of US-Japan-ROK cooperation is explicitly mentioned, including close cooperation on North Korea through trilateral channels. Although Washington’s alliances with Tokyo and Seoul have been primarily tailored to counter threats from North Korea, for Beijing these recent developments only confirm its long-held assumptions that it is the target of encirclement and containment by the US and its allies.

No cooperation in sight

As the Chinese leadership believes that the United States prioritises cementing its predominance in Asia over North Korean denuclearisation, it will certainly refrain from any move that could put North Korea in the US orbit or lead to an American advantage in China’s backyard. Given the current global tensions due to the Ukraine war, it has become highly unlikely that China, together with Russia, will be willing to cooperate with the United States to impose tougher sanctions on North Korea unlike in 2017.

Even after North Korea’s most recent and what appears to be its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile launch, Beijing and Moscow refrained from criticising Pyongyang and continue to blame Washington for the unresolved conflict. As further missile tests are expected to follow this year, the Biden administration must come to terms with the fact that the United States’ decades-long strategy of leaning on China’s influence over North Korea will not bring any tangible results toward peace on the Korean Peninsula.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Anny Boc is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies (GEAS) at the Freie Universität Berlin. Her research focuses on China-US relations and the North Korea conflict. Image credit: Flickr/North Korea China.