Russia adds to India’s strategic drag in the Indo-Pacific
RUSSIA ADDS TO INDIA’S STRATEGIC DRAG IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
WRITTEN BY CHETAN RANA
24 July 2024
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s July 2024 visit to Moscow, where he embraced his counterpart Vladimir Putin while Russian forces bombed a children’s hospital in Kyiv, has captured global attention. This visit, however, was less about strategic chess moves with profound implications and more about maintaining tradition and honouring the historic ties between India and Russia. It marked the 22nd India-Russia annual summit, during which Modi was conferred Russia's highest civilian honour, the Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle. For both leaders, this summit served as a media opportunity: Putin aimed to dispel notions of international isolation, while Modi bolstered his image of being a global leader with friendships across the world.
Yet the visit has reignited the debate over the utility and nature of the Indo-Russian ties. Some believe there is merit in continuing to deepen the relationship with Moscow. Historical nostalgia aside, proponents suggest that India can use the Russia card in its attempt to balance China. Further, a great material value is associated with the defence partnership, crude trade, and geographical access provided through Russia. New Delhi’s continuous engagement with Moscow is also painted as India’s exercise of its strategic autonomy. But these arguments fail to capture the reality of the Manichean nature of great power politics. Crucially, such calculations put India’s position in the Indo-Pacific security architecture in precarity.
The fool’s wedge
The notion that India can drive a strategic wedge between Russia and China as a masterstroke in 21st-century geopolitics is neither new nor particularly innovative. Historical parallels are often drawn with the American rapprochement of China during the Cold War, which aimed to solidify the Sino-Soviet split. Then, China was dissatisfied with its junior partner status and there were significant ideological rifts regarding communist leadership. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy succeeded largely because the Sino-Soviet relationship was already strained.
However, today, the ideological contest is not a deciding factor. If anything, Russia and China are united in their vision of a post-American world order, finding significant synergies in this shared goal. Despite India's significant dependencies on Russia, the strategic convergence is notably lacking, and India holds little leverage over Russia. Despite its intent, New Delhi overestimates its ability to use Russia as a hedge against China.
As India navigates this new geopolitical landscape, it must critically reassess the touted advantages of its relationship with Russia and ensure that its foreign policy adapts to contemporary realities.
This lack of leverage was evident in the joint statement released during Modi's visit, which reflected India's adherence to Russia's stance on Ukraine and advocated for a diplomatic solution, drawing criticism from Ukrainian President Zelensky. More disappointingly, the statement even skirted around using the term 'Indo-Pacific,' calling it a rather cumbersome ‘regions of Indian and Pacific oceans’. The decision to avoid ‘Indo-Pacific’ falls in line with the Chinese discourse.
The joint statement's emphasis on adhering to UN resolutions regarding Gaza seemed more a rhetorical device to criticise the West than a substantive policy position. At the high table of international politics, no side holds the moral high ground. While Putin's invasion of Ukraine continues, the West is fuelling Israel’s genocide in Gaza. India's position, financing Russian aggression through oil purchases and allegedly supplying arms to Israel, implicates it in both conflicts. Statements on these issues, therefore, are largely non-statements.
Guns, geography, and gasoline
India's ties with Russia are deeply rooted in Cold War history, particularly in the realm of defence. India has relied heavily on Russian arms and defence technology, importing S-400 missile systems, Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets, and various naval platforms. Over the decades, this relationship has evolved into a dependency, with Russia supplying over 65 per cent of India's weapon purchases in the past two decades.
The Indian government has only slowly begun to realise the risks of this overdependence, partly due to sanctions against Russia which have delayed deliveries, such as the S-400s. However, India is now gradually diversifying its defence procurement by promoting domestic production and looking to Western sources for next-generation weapons. The historic advantage Russia offered — willingness to share cutting-edge technology — is diminishing. Moreover, the integration of Indian and American defence systems through agreements like COMCASA and LEMOA creates pressure to move away from Russian technology to avoid operational and logistical incompatibilities.
Another frequently cited rationale for close India-Russia relations is geographical access to Eurasia and the Arctic. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), initiated in 2000 and ratified in 2002 is often promoted as a key to India's presence in Eurasia, and the first shipment via the route arrived in India in July 2022. However, geopolitical instability in transit countries, compounded by sanctions (particularly on Iran and Russia) and broader regional volatility, poses significant risks to the reliability and security of these routes.
Arctic cooperation, involving access to the Northern Sea Route and joint exploration of Arctic oil and gas reserves, appears promising but remains largely aspirational. Russia’s stringent control over its Arctic territories and resources limits India's strategic and economic leverage in the region.
Bilateral trade between India and Russia has historically been modest, amounting to just over USD 10 billion until a few years ago. Post-Ukraine invasion sanctions have boosted this figure to USD 65 billion, with ambitions to reach USD 100 billion. However, this growth is driven primarily by India’s purchase of Russian crude oil, making the trade highly asymmetric. The conditions driving this boost — primarily the geopolitical fallout from the Ukraine invasion — are temporary and unlikely to sustain long-term trade growth.
From strategic autonomy to strategic paralysis
Rajesh Rajagopalan argues that India's ties with Russia could drive a wedge between India and its Indo-Pacific partners. While Indo-Russian ties will continue to be an irritant in India’s relations with the West, Rajagopalan’s claim that it will drive a wedge between India and the others is overstated. Yes, the Modi-Putin embrace has not been well-received in Washington, but it is a situation that can be managed, especially if (when) Donald Trump were to return to the White House as he is expected to soften the US’ stance on Russia.
This situation, however, perpetuates the illusion of strategic autonomy in New Delhi. India's inability to establish clear lines and terms of engagement risks relegating it to a secondary partner in all its alliances. For example, platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS are still evolving, and their future direction will significantly depend on great power politics. India's leadership role in these platforms appears to be diminishing as they become increasingly dominated by Russia and China.
Furthermore, the diversification of security architecture away from the Quad in the Indo-Pacific should be a major concern. While regional actors are eager to engage with New Delhi, there is a growing realisation that they might not be able to rely on it fully. India finds itself in a unique position, courted by all major powers, but this advantage should not be taken for granted.
Away from Russia with love
While Modi’s visit to Moscow and the symbolic gestures of camaraderie with Putin may have short-term diplomatic value, they do little to address the underlying strategic challenges. The current international landscape demands a more pragmatic approach, where India can leverage its unique position without over-relying on any single partnership.
In evaluating the oft-touted advantages of India-Russia ties, it becomes clear that the relationship, while historically significant, faces numerous challenges and limitations in the contemporary geopolitical context. The deep defence ties, geographical access to Eurasia and the Arctic, and the recent surge in bilateral trade are all underpinned by complexities that necessitate a critical reassessment.
The Soviet Union was a reliable partner for India in many ways, but the Cold War relationship, built on mutual admiration and solidified through defence and scientific partnerships, is not suited for today's complex and multipolar world. As India navigates this new geopolitical landscape, it must critically reassess the touted advantages of its relationship with Russia and ensure that its foreign policy adapts to contemporary realities.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Chetan Rana is a PhD candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation, and Disarmament (CIPOD) at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Associate Editor at 9DASHLINE. He also holds a master's degree in Politics with specialisation in International Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He writes on issues concerning the Indo-Pacific, populism, Indian foreign policy, and Myanmar. Image credit: Kremlin.ru.