In Conversation: Julia Gurol on The EU-China Security Paradox

IN CONVERSATION WITH JULIA GUROL

16 February 2022

We recently sat down with Dr Julia Gurol to discuss her latest book ‘The EU-China Security Paradox’.

A fascinating read, this book investigates the complex security relations between the EU and China — one of the world’s most important, yet complicated, security relationships.

Your book zeroes in on EU-China relations, focusing particularly on security issues. What drew you to this topic, and given the emphasis on Sino-US strategic competition, why do you believe EU-China relations to be so important now?

When I started doing research for the book, we were two years into the Trump presidency and already witnessing significant changes regarding the US’s behaviour on the international stage. There were first hints of a certain degree of withdrawal from global governance, especially in the security realm, which is a tendency that deepened in the following years of his presidency. Well-known examples of this withdrawal were the United States’ unilateral exit from multilateral agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and the Paris Agreement.

This brought to the fore questions regarding the EU and China and their respective position vis-à-vis each other, also beyond economic and trade issues. While the Europeans long preferred to play the middle between Washington and Beijing — and are still reluctant to be squeezed between two geopolitical elephants — the changing global role of the US under former President Donald Trump forced them to reconsider their China policy. Yet, there was little academic research on EU-China relations beyond the economic realm, so I wanted to explore the modes and mechanisms of their interactions in terms of security, which is a component that has grown in their bilateral relationship over the past 15-20 years but that has gone largely unnoticed.

How do the EU and China manage to cooperate on security issues despite the striking differences in their foreign policy principles and ambitions, and separately, what are the major factors driving their respective interest in cooperation in the security field?

In the book, I claim that EU-China security cooperation is not so much a normative agenda but rather an empirical matter. Yet, since I first started doing research for the book five years ago, the points of convergence between the EU and China on security matters have definitely become smaller and cooperation has become extremely difficult. I do not think it is possible to say that the EU and China are cooperating in the policy field of ‘security’ as such.

It is not even the case to generalise on which ‘security issues’ they cooperate. Instead, cooperation takes place on a very small scale, an ad-hoc basis, if you will, and the conditions and mechanisms are different in each case. Of course, generally speaking, cost-benefit calculations and growing interdependences and entanglements play an important role, but it is very difficult to generalise the EU’s and China’s respective interests in the security field.

You note that China-EU cooperation in maritime security is enabled by the fact that “counter-piracy measures do not necessarily touch upon ideological or political issues and do not require convergence on ideational interests”. Yet, are more long-term solutions to the piracy problem — say, through governmental capacity-building in Somalia — in order? In this light, could EU-Chinese cooperation survive attempts to more fundamentally counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden?

Yes and no. I completely agree, cooperation in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) seems primarily like ad-hoc self-help that tackles the symptoms rather than the causes of piracy. Long-term solutions, capacity-building or strengthening local law enforcement authorities would certainly be a much more sustainable solution. Yet, the reason why EU-China cooperation in the GoA is working at all is that it does not touch upon any kind of political principles.

Trying to build governmental capacities in Somalia would not work in cooperation with China because it would most certainly bring to the fore contradicting principles and values. For example, the Chinese model of state-led development that it is exporting to the region often clashes with norms such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, and free-market capitalism, which the EU believes are necessary conditions for stability. Also, different understandings of governance would hinder cooperation above the level of joint maritime anti-piracy exercises and training missions that we term ‘anti-piracy cooperation’.

You state, “China frames climate and energy security as a global problem, yet it embeds adequate response mechanisms to it in its homeland security policy, treating climate and energy security as issues of global importance, but also overtly domestic concern”. The EU, in turn, “is more likely to discuss climate and energy topics in multilateral fora and bilateral cooperation dialogues”. However, is this not mostly a consequence of the different types of international actors — sovereign state versus international organisation — that China and the EU are? Is this necessarily a problem for mitigating climate change?

Of course, when we look at EU-China relations, we must acknowledge the fundamentally different nature of both actors. But I do not consider this a problem for mitigating climate change. In fact, EU-China relations on climate change showcase successful cooperation and especially the EU’s approach to green finance are praised by Chinese observers. Other European measures such as attempts towards achieving carbon neutrality and decisions on green growth are also closely observed by government-affiliated analysts and experts in China and seem to have resonance in the PRC. This opens a window of opportunity for the EU to seek enhanced cooperation and to motivate China to strive for accelerated climate action.

Therefore, the challenging task for the EU is to manage the competitive aspects of climate and energy relations with China — such as competition over access to raw materials or technological competition — while strengthening and updating multilateral environmental governance frameworks such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Embedding climate relations within these rule-based environments helps to ease potential tensions between the EU and China and elevate cooperation from bilateral climate action to seeking common ground on the more contentious elements of global climate governance.

How has the change of administration in the US, from Trump to Biden, altered dynamics in the ‘strategic EU-US-China triangle’? Has the Biden administration made it easier for Brussels to negotiate its relationship with Beijing, or does having a more trusted president in the White House put additional strain on the EU to choose sides?

I think a lot of the developments in EU-China relations that we have seen during the Trump administration will be revoked to a certain degree under Biden. The first year of his administration already showed that the US is wary of a headlong clash with China that might get out of hand. At the same time, Biden has put great emphasis on mending relations with his European partners. Certainly, the US is still more inclined to confront China than Europe is, not least because, contrary to the US, Europe does not have much at stake in the Asia-Pacific.

But at the same time, the Biden administration has moved away from the aggressive Trump rhetoric on countering China to a more nuanced policy approach that is also aimed at building a broader international coalition of support around them. This is a very decisive moment for the EU to advocate its own interests — both in its transatlantic relationship and in its China policy.

You also write that “the EU remains caught between a rock and a hard place, struggling to balance its relations with Washington and Beijing”. But does Brussels not derive many benefits from this hedging position; it can continue reaping economic benefits of close trade ties with China as well as security assurances from the US? What could the EU do better to ensure that it no longer “struggles” to hedge between the two, but instead has a far more stable and beneficial position?

The Biden administration has made it quite clear that it will not shift away from its tough approach to China. But the latest sanctions row has shown that Europe is not without agency in the US-China confrontation and indeed has some ‘hedging potential’. When Biden announced his attempt to build a more robust multilateral coalition with like-minded partners to address the challenges China poses to the liberal world order, it was expected that the EU would immediately follow.

Instead, European policymakers have so far refrained from following the US in its strategy to decouple from China, preferring to seek more cooperation on issues of mutual interest. I think this is a good way to go. Bandwagoning with the US may not necessarily be the best long-term strategy for the EU. Instead, the EU must strike a pragmatic balance between its values and interests. The first step towards achieving this would be to find a more unified position within the EU towards China.

How do you view the role of Taiwan within the US-China-EU triangle? Will recent moves by several Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to edge closer to Taipei have a wider effect on EU policy? And how do you think the EU would respond if Beijing does attempt to invade Taiwan — could that force the EU to radically alter its position on China?

We are definitely seeing an EU-Taiwan moment. The EU’s stance on the One-China Policy has started to crumble in the aftermath of the Lithuania-China fallout over the opening of a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, and several EU member states are starting to embrace the idea of deepening engagement with Taiwan. The CEE countries have been paving the way for reinforcing cooperation with Taiwan. Taiwan is not only a fundamental trade partner for the EU, especially regarding semiconductors but also an important counterpart in discussions on democratic resilience and the consequences of the pressure Beijing is exerting on Hong Kong and beyond.

But at the same time, neither Brussels nor Taipei have an interest in provoking Beijing too much. Escalating political tensions with Beijing would increase the price tag of EU-Taiwan cooperation and thereby impede the positive momentum their bilateral ties are experiencing. This is also why I think that the EU drastically altering its position on China is very unlikely. All in all, we might witness positive developments regarding EU-Taiwan ties in the future, but on a small scale.

You indicate that EU-China security relations are “clearly at a crossroads”. How do you expect EU-China security cooperation to evolve in the next few years and what will be the major hindrances to closer security cooperation between them? In addition where might there be opportunities?

As I have stressed before, I think that the EU’s future stance toward China will be determined by two factors. One is the development of transatlantic relations, and the other is the degree of coherence and unity the EU can reach in its China policy. I am convinced that, in the near future, Brussels will keep its ambivalent approach towards China, as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival all at the same time. Besides this, the EU will face the challenge of balancing different forces that pull from multiple directions: the allure of greater economic integration with China, its own interests, restoring the indispensable transatlantic axis, and upholding core European values. While economic ties will remain stable, I expect that political relations will worsen.

In general, I have become more pessimistic regarding the possibilities for cooperation between the EU and China, not only in the field of security but also more generally. Over the past five years already, the points of convergence have become smaller, and when cooperation does take place, its then on a very low scale and in an ad-hoc manner.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Biography

Julia Gurol is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair for International Relations at Freiburg University and an Associate Fellow at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO). Her research focuses on China’s international politics and political economy, global authoritarianism, connectivity and infrastructure politics with a regional focus on EU-China and China-MENA relations.

Her latest book ‘The EU-China Security Paradox’ is available here.