Mending trilateral cooperation amid differences: Japan-ROK-China

Written by Daria Kurushina

Whether the driver is counterbalancing China’s influence in the region, addressing economic unfairness and trade barriers, criticising the expansion of the US trilateral alliance systems in the region, or improving diplomatic ties, the three countries have too much in common to neglect their interdependence.

East Asia9DLJuly 18, 20249DASHLINE, Daria Kurushina, Mending trilateral cooperation amid differences: Japan-ROK-China, Japan, ROK, South Korea, CHina, Trilateral, centre of gravity, geostrategic competition, Republic of Korea, regional dynamism, regional dynamics, Japan-ROK-China Trilateral Summit, Trilateral Summit, security, economy, military, US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, United States, Taiwan Strait, Northeast Asia, historic grievances, wastewater, Fukushima’s wastewater, wastewater release, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, trade dependencies, Free Trade Agreement, FTA, wartime forced labour compensation, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Korea-China 2+2 Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, Korea-China Export Control Dialogue, 2023 Camp David summit, united states, tariffs, Chinese EV, solar panels, and battery industries, standards, non-discriminatory regional trade, Korean Peninsula, peace, prosperity, North Korea, nuclear, spy satellite, Russia-North Korea partnership pact, Moscow, Pyongyang, US allies, Japanese seafood products, seafood imports, trilateral diplomacy, free trade negotiations, people-to-people exchange, public health, ageing society, population control, low fertility trap, population halving by 2100, demographic shifts, childcare support, parental leave, healthcare, demographic national emergency, nuclear threats, North Korean missile and nuclear threats, defence spending, Ministry of Population Strategy Planning, dependency ratio, eldery, New Dimension, counterbalancing, olive branch, overcapacity issues

Germany’s Indo-Pacific aspirations and realities

Written by Dr Rafal Ulatowski

Germany is too weak militarily to change the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Its military presence satisfies the expectations of the regional middle powers and of the United States while having only a minor adverse impact on Germany’s relations with China.

Europe and the Indo-Pacific9DLJanuary 10, 20249DashLine, Germany’s Indo-Pacific aspirations and realities, Rafal Ulatowski, Germany, Indo-Pacific, European Union, EU, bilateral, regional powers, liberal international order, open markets, China, trade, Chinese-German cooperation, intergovernmental consultations, German-Chinese partnership, Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, National Security Strategy, Strategy on China, German Navy, German frigate Bayern, German National Security Strategy, German Strategy on China, US-Chinese competition, diversifying, diversification, democratic values, German-Chinese relations, comprehensive strategic partnership, Federation of German Industries (BDI), partner, competitor, Italy, important partner, systemic rival, military presence, Bayern frigate, Operation Rapid Pacific, Australia, symbolic, middle powers, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, democracies, shared values, resilient supply chains, German arms exports, investments, export, Taiwan, Hing Kong, Hong Kong, malaysia, Thailand, FDI, Luxembourg, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, de-risking, decoupling, Alliance 90/The Greens, Social Democrats, German companies, sensitive technologies, United Kingdom, Bundeswehr, Zeitenwende, NATO, defence spending, 2 per cent goal, Berlin, United States, confrontation, strategic interests, SIPRI, Russia-Ukrainian war, dependence, great powers, COVID-19 pandemic

AUKUS and Australia’s domestic opinion

Written by Sian Troath

Whether people oppose the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, have mixed views, or support it, they often do ground their assessments in strategic analysis and a consideration of other priorities.

2023: Where is Japan headed under Kishida?

9DASHLINE invited a select group of experts to assess how the Kishida administration’s policies on domestic, international, economic, and security issues will differ from the Abe administration.

Pacific9DLJanuary 20, 20239dashline, 2023: Where is Japan under Kishida headed?, DR JAMES D. BROWN, James DJ Brown, DR EVA PEJSOVA, EVA PEJSOVA, DR ELLI-KATHARINA POHLKAMP, ELLI-KATHARINA POHLKAMP, DR STEPHEN NAGY, Stephen Nagy, Japan, Fumio Kishida, Kishida, Abe, Shinzo Abe, Abe administration, approval ratings, Kishida administration, Abenomics, stimulatory economic policy, Japanese military, scandals, nepotism, free-market, new capitalism, security reforms, defence spending, strike missiles, public mood, dovish approach, foreign affairs, security affairs, Russia-Ukraine war, China’s expansionism, China, rules-based international order, US allies, security ties, deterrence, defence budget, nuclear non-proliferation, Taiwan, hostile security environment, geopolitical shocks, party politics, defence posture, Liberal Democratic Party, LDP, Chinese market, Unification Church investigations, National Security Strategy, G7 presidency, UN Security Council non-permanent seat, Tokyo, Sino-US rivalry, Yoshida Doctrine, US-Japan alliance, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP, Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, EPA, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision, FOIP, strategic imperatives, domestic reform

Slowing the escalatory spiral over Taiwan

Written by Amanda Hsiao and Ivy Kwek

A long-lasting solution on Taiwan will be difficult to realise anytime soon. However, avoiding miscalculation and slowing the escalatory spiral that the parties are currently engaged in are achievable outcomes that Taipei, Washington, and Beijing should prioritise.

East Asia9DLSeptember 29, 20229DashLine, Slowing the escalatory spiral over Taiwan, Amanda Hsiao, Ivy Kwek, Taiwan, China, US, USA, escalatory spiral, escalation, Washington, Beijing, Taipei, US-China rivalry, US-China competition, US-China relations, military, military exercise, reunification, one China, one Taiwan, US-Taiwan relations, US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Nancy Pelosi, cyberattacks, sanctions, Taiwanese, Chinese, sovereignty, Pelosi’s visit, median line, maritime, navy, airspace, drone, drones, human error, Pacific, US-Taiwan engagement, defence, defence spending, arms sale, arms package, Biden administration, Biden, Joe Biden, Central Asia, United Nations, 20th Party Congress, Party Congress, propaganda, Xi, Xi Jinping, amphibious invasion, amphibious, military intervention, Trump, Trump administration, Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Japan, Yonaguni Island, Philippines’ EEZ, Philippines, Manila, Taiwan conflict, Taiwan Strait, escalatory cycle, deter, deterrence, One China policy, One China Policy, One China, One-China, One-China Policy, Three Communiques, US Congress, Taiwan Policy Act

Architect of the Indo-Pacific: How will Abe's legacy continue?

Written by Perle Petit

Time will tell which aspects of Shinzo Abe’s legacy will live on most faithfully and whether the role of Japan as a buffer between competing global forces in the region will continue.

The upper house elections and Japanese defence spending

Written by Felix Kuhn

Over the coming months in Japan, discussions over the level of defence spending, what the money will be spent on, and where it will come from, will become more heated. The Japanese government will have to provide clearer answers and allow for some compromises to retain broad support among policymakers and keep the majority of the public on board.