No room for missteps: Cambodia’s strategic wishlist For Trump 2.0
No Room for Missteps: Cambodia’s Strategic Wishlist For Trump 2.0
WRITTEN BY CHHAY LIM
6 February 2025
When Donald Trump last occupied the White House, Southeast Asia often found itself an afterthought in the administration’s strategic calculus. This time around, the region’s capitals are expected to brace for another era of unpredictability. For Cambodia, a small state often overshadowed by its larger neighbours and caught between competing powers, the stakes are particularly high. Cambodia is putting effort into presenting itself not as a passive bystander but as an active player in international politics with clear expectations of what Washington can and should bring to the table. Will the US recognise Cambodia’s strategic wishlist and align its policies to secure mutual economic and security benefits, or will its engagement fall short of Phnom Penh’s expectations?
A strong desire to recalibrate bilateral relations
Cambodia’s relationship with the US has been turbulent over the years, characterised by cycles of engagement and estrangement. Much of this volatility stems from Phnom Penh’s close alignment with Beijing on foreign policy and US concerns over its deteriorating political and human rights practices. However, there have been glimmers of improvement since Prime Minister Hun Manet took office in late 2023, signalling a potential reset in bilateral relations. With the return of a Trump administration, Cambodia hopes to build on this momentum — but not without caution and clear priorities.
Policies that force Cambodia into a binary choice risk deepening its reliance on China and undermining US efforts to maintain influence in Southeast Asia.
At the top of Phnom Penh’s wish list is a recalibration of Washington’s policy approach to Southeast Asia. Cambodia seeks a relationship with the United States that transcends reductive labels, such as being a proxy for Beijing or a purely autocratic state. This oversimplification undermines Cambodia’s nuanced position as a small state balancing survival with strategic ambition. Instead of being boxed into the great power rivalry between China and the US, Cambodia’s leadership envisions leveraging its bilateral ties to expand manoeuvrability and secure tangible and non-tangible benefits — both economic and geopolitical. This recalibration will require Washington’s active participation in areas where shared priorities intersect, particularly in advancing Cambodia’s economic and security goals that are shaped by both domestic imperatives and regional uncertainties.
Cambodia is prioritising infrastructure development, digital transformation, and trade diversification to reduce over-reliance on China while strengthening its global economic positioning. Security-wise, Cambodia is also seeking to enhance its maritime capacity, modernise its defence structures, and engage in strategic hedging to maintain autonomy amid intensifying US-China competition. Unlike Vietnam or the Philippines, Cambodia lacks the military and geopolitical weight to engage in direct soft-balancing strategies, making its approach to security deeply embedded in diplomatic manoeuvring and selective alignment.
Prioritising pragmatic cooperation over ideology
A key Cambodian expectation is that a renewed US administration will prioritise economic and development cooperation over ideological confrontations. Rather than framing bilateral ties around liberal democratic values — which often strain relations — Cambodia would prefer Washington focus on areas of shared interest, such as trade, investment, and capacity-building in fields like maritime security, demining operations, and digital innovation. However, the Trump administration’s abrupt 90-day suspension of USAID has disrupted many aid-dependent states, including Cambodia. While framed as a review, it signals that US engagement under Trump 2.0 will be more transactional, unpredictable, and interest-driven. For Phnom Penh, this is not just about aid — it is a wake-up call on the fragility of relying on Western assistance. While the immediate impact on demining, public health, and civic engagement programs is disruptive, the long-term lesson is clear: Cambodia must rethink its foreign partnerships to avoid overdependence on any single power.
Digital innovation, in particular, holds transformative potential for Cambodia’s development trajectory. With a rapidly growing population of tech-savvy youth, Cambodia is positioning itself as a future hub for technology and digital entrepreneurship in the Greater Mekong subregion. However, the digital divide, inadequate infrastructure, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities present significant challenges in furthering digital transformation. US support in these areas such as providing expertise, facilitating public-private partnerships, and funding digital literacy programmes could help Cambodia unlock this potential while aligning with Washington’s own interests in fostering open, secure, and resilient digital ecosystems in Southeast Asia. Additionally, reducing strong reliance on Chinese technology infrastructure through US-backed alternatives would provide Cambodia with critical leverage in navigating great power competition, ensuring its digital sovereignty, data security, and economic autonomy.
Washington also has a chance to work with Cambodia on maritime security, an area where Phnom Penh’s leadership has quietly signalled its openness to resume military exchanges, including at the controversial Ream Naval Base on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand, close to the Malacca Strait. Previously accused by Washington of granting exclusive Chinese naval access, Cambodia has sought to change this perception. For example, former Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly assured Japan that its Maritime Self-Defence Force would be the first to dock at Ream Base once construction is complete.
Japan is perceived as a potential bridge to send strategic messages to the West over the Base’s transparency. This carefully calibrated outreach underscores Cambodia’s intent to diversify its security partnerships while avoiding the direct provocation of its ironclad friend, China. Cambodian policymakers hope to strategically leverage Japan as a partner perceived as less antagonistic by Beijing compared to the US, ensuring that its diversification efforts do not appear as overt alignment against China. Moreover, Phnom Penh employs strategic ambiguity, signalling openness to broader security engagements while maintaining a diplomatic balance that prevents alienation from its primary economic benefactor. If Washington is willing to engage pragmatically, it could use such signals to deepen its strategic presence in Cambodia, particularly given its close security ties with Japan, but without forcing Phnom Penh into a binary choice.
Bridging differences on “democracy and pragmatism”
The biggest friction point in US-Cambodia relations remains democracy and human rights. Cambodian leadership does not view the US’s democracy promotion efforts as practical. A Cambodian Foreign Ministry document once captures this sentiment, quoting a US congressman, “It is not democracy to send in billions of dollars to push regime change overseas”. These concerns are not new. In 2022, the US Congress passed the Cambodia Democracy and Human Rights Act, targeting individuals deemed responsible for democratic backsliding.
Marco Rubio, a key proponent of the Bill and a staunch China hawk, criticised Cambodia’s leadership at the time, stating, “The Hun Sen dictatorship destroyed democracy in Cambodia and allowed the nation to be exploited by the Chinese Communist Party”. Rubio’s recent appointment as Secretary of State by Trump signals that Cambodia may face even greater pressure to conform to liberal democratic values, particularly if democracy promotion and human rights take precedence in Washington’s Southeast Asia agenda. However, Washington must recognise that ideological pressure risks further pushing Cambodia towards Beijing. Phnom Penh consistently urges Washington to adopt a policy grounded in “mutual respect and understanding”. This would mean focusing on practical areas of cooperation rather than imposing prescriptive reforms.
Another critical ask is for Washington to approach Cambodia-China relations with greater understanding. Cambodia’s reliance on China is often portrayed as a clear-cut geopolitical choice, but for Phnom Penh, it is largely driven by necessity. Cambodia views its relationship with China as vital to its national interest, supporting its economic growth, sustaining the long-ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s political legitimacy, and providing security assurances amidst constant pressures from larger neighbours like Thailand and Vietnam.
Cambodia views Washington’s approach to Vietnam as a relevant precedent for how it should engage with Phnom Penh. China remains Cambodia’s largest investor and a key economic lifeline. Most Cambodian policymakers often compare the West’s treatment of Cambodia with its treatment of neighbouring Vietnam. For example, the US respects Vietnam’s political system governed solely by the Communist Party of Vietnam and the latter’s decision to balance relations with Beijing, Washington, and even Moscow. In 2024, the US and Vietnam upgraded their ties through a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership even as China-Vietnam trade reached USD 185.4 billion — far surpassing US-Vietnam trade at USD 110 billion. Vietnam has also not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine while continuing to work closely with Russia on areas of common interest. Cambodia believes the same logic should be applied to its relationship with China. A US policy that respects Cambodia’s need for balanced relations with Beijing and other partners, rather than forcing a binary choice, would better align with Phnom Penh’s priorities.
Breaking the cycle of collateral damage
Cambodia’s strategic message to Washington is not to halt its competition with Beijing but to reconsider how the repercussions of aggressive containment policies affect smaller states in the region. Policies that force Cambodia into a binary choice risk deepening its reliance on China and undermining US efforts to maintain influence in Southeast Asia. An antagonistic US approach would only reinforce this dynamic. The notion that smaller states must always suffer when "elephants fight or make love" deserves to be challenged. Phnom Penh seeks to break this cycle by creating a space where smaller states like itself can chart their own paths to grow resiliently and thrive.
Cambodia’s adjusted goals in its bilateral relations with the US reflect a broader reassessment of relations across Southeast Asia. The region is no longer content to passively absorb the externalities of great power rivalry; instead, states are quietly renegotiating their roles within the shifting geopolitical architecture. In this context, Cambodia’s recalibration is not merely a national strategy but a bellwether for how smaller Southeast Asian states navigate great power dynamics. Its ability to extract strategic value from multiple actors without provoking retaliation or rigid alignments highlights a broader pattern in the region — where states prefer fluid, interest-based engagement over formal alliance. For Washington, this signals the need to re-adjust its Indo-Pacific approach to foster long-term economic integration, infrastructure investment, and security cooperation tailored to regional needs. Anything less risks not just losing ground, but relevance in a region that is charting its own course.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Chhay Lim is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of the Institute for International Studies and Public Policy, Royal University of Phnom Penh. He is also a Young Leader for the Pacific Forum International and a Japanese Government-MEXT scholar at Ritsumeikan University. Image credit: Pixabay/White House.