China's preferred endgame in Ukraine is a hybrid peace

12 February 2025

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there has been an ongoing debate about how much Beijing wants Russia to win the war. This is all the more relevant as China has consistently supported Russia — politically and diplomatically, but also economically and militarily — since its aggression.

Politically, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has neither condemned Russia for the aggression nor openly supported the Ukrainian resistance. However, Sino-Russian political dialogue has flourished (in contrast to China's sparse and mostly low-level contacts with Ukraine), with frequent face-to-face meetings between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, both during bilateral official visits and at summits of multilateral formats such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. There are also plans for Xi-Putin in-person meetings in 2025. Already on 21 January, the day after President Trump's inauguration, Xi and Putin held a video meeting.

Economically, the PRC is importing more hydrocarbons from Russia and exporting more consumer goods, such as vehicles, electronics, and household appliances, to Russia than it did before the invasion. China is also supplying Russia with dual-use items such as semiconductors, ball bearings, trucks, and excavators — all of which can be used in military equipment (for instance, tanks or drones) or to build fortifications on the battlefield. Despite China's cautious approach to Russia in terms of financial cooperation, investments, and the open supply of lethal weapons for fear of sanctions (mainly imposed by the US), the PRC's support for Russia is significant. By providing political and economic support to Russia, China protects Moscow from international isolation, stabilises Russia's budget by providing revenue, and helps maintain social stability by supplying consumer goods. As a result, Russia can focus more on the war with Ukraine and produce or repair weapons needed for the battlefield.

Sympathising with the idea of hybrid peace is a dangerous trap for the West. The only way to undermine Sino-Russian alignment, deter China from aggressive moves, and defend the rules-based order is to do everything possible to help Ukraine win the war.

But what is China's preferred endgame in the Ukraine war? On the one hand, China's support for Russia suggests that Xi wants Putin to win, but, on the other hand, in various Chinese readouts and remarks on the war in Ukraine (which, in the official Chinese narrative is the "Ukrainian issue" or "problem"), Beijing suggests it is ready to be a peace broker.

With Russia against the US

The problem with answering this question of China’s preferred endgame in Ukraine is that under Xi, who has tightened the screws and made policies highly opaque, Chinese politics is a veritable black box. Thus, looking at China's approach to Russia and Ukraine through the prism of its broader foreign policy objectives will help to understand what China wants to achieve in the Ukraine war.

China's overarching foreign policy goal for now is to win the rivalry with the US or (at least) contain the China policy that President Donald Trump set in motion during his first term (2017-2021). China confirmed its extreme anti-US approach through a report on US hegemonic and bullying practices, published on 20 February 2023, a few days before the first anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

China has long been perceived as the main challenge for the US but this was emphasised in the National Security Strategy adopted in December 2017, which described China as a country that challenges American power, influence, and interests and seeks to undermine American security and prosperity. Trump launched a trade and technological war with China that focused mostly on imposing tariffs on Chinese imports, blocking Chinese 5G companies from operating in the US, and banning Chinese telecoms from buying American parts and components. All of this was combined with pressure on US allies to follow suit. The Biden administration (2021-2025) largely emulated this approach when it announced new tariffs and restrictions on high-tech items and also invested in strengthening alliances in the Asia-Pacific. As Trump enters his second term as the 47th US President, tension is likely to increase.

In this deepening US-China rivalry, including the unpredictability of Trump's approach to China, Beijing needs at least political friends, if not allies, to "fight" the US. That is why Russia is China's indispensable partner. As one Chinese think-tank expert based in Shanghai told me in late 2023, "Russia is not our ideal political friend, but it is very useful in our rivalry with the US. We have no better Russia to deal with, so we have to work with Russia as it is".

One of Russia's main assets for China is its strong anti-American, sentiments. This encourages China to work hand-in-hand with Russia against the US, a nation that authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia, perceive as a direct threat. Like Russia, China wants to reshape the Western and primarily US-led global order and undermine the NATO-based security architecture in Europe. The joint statement announced by Putin and Xi in February 2022 said that the two countries “oppose further NATO expansion” and are against the alliance system. Furthermore, during Putin’s May 2024 visit to China, both countries agreed that building a new security architecture is the best solution to the “Ukraine crisis” and that China is ready to work with Russia to lead the correction of global governance.

A ‘hybrid peace’

From Beijing's perspective, the best outcome of the Ukrainian war seems to be something between peace and war. This preferred situation could be called a “hybrid peace”, a frozen form of conflict with a ceasefire and Russia effectively occupying part of Ukraine. In line with Trump's original idea of ending the war in 24 hours, the hybrid peace could result from an international deal with Russia over Ukraine's head, or from international pressure on Ukraine.

China prefers a hybrid peace because Beijing does not want Russia to be a clear winner or loser. A victorious Russia will be politically stronger and, even if militarily exhausted, still well trained on the battlefield — a situation that could pose a challenge to China. Both Putin and Xi have an egotistical drive to make their countries superpowers, so a victorious Russia might feel powerful enough to go further, perhaps even testing NATO's eastern flank. This could lead to a war in Europe, which is against China's interests, given the importance of the European market to China's export-driven economy. Moreover, a kinetic war with NATO could be the beginning of a world war that could spill over into Asia.

A defeated Russia is not a good solution for China either. Russia could implode, risking chaos in China's immediate neighbourhood, including Central Asia, where China is currently responsible for economic development. Russia is also — in China's view — a buffer against NATO, and its collapse could make it easier for the Alliance to expand into Asia, which Beijing believes is NATO's goal.

China also seems to fear regime change in Russia. A potentially democratic Russia is clearly not in Xi's interest, as it would not be a partner for authoritarian China. But even if there is no change in Russia’s authoritarian regime after its defeat, the transition from Putin to another leader could be a challenge for China. Who knows who will replace Putin? For now, the Sino-Russian friendship rests on a solid foundation of personal relations between Xi and Putin. The changing of the guard in the Kremlin, even if Putin is replaced by another Putin-like leader, will definitely create turbulence, or at least uncertainty, between China and Russia, and it will take time to stabilise relations. In the case of US policy towards China, any problems or instability in Beijing's relations with Russia will not work in China's favour.

A ‘hybrid’ peace is a trap

A hybrid peace seems to be a good idea only for China and Russia, but not for Ukraine, the US, Europe, and the rules-based world order. In the case of the PRC, a frozen Russia-Ukraine war will not only end Western pressure on China to limit or stop cooperation with Russia, but it will also keep the West busy in Europe. Without Russia's final capitulation, future aggressive moves by Western forces in Ukraine or Eastern Europe are highly likely.

For Ukraine, a hybrid peace means not only being played by the great powers and losing part of its legal territory, but also leaving room for Russia to unfreeze the conflict and move further. While a hybrid peace may save lives (this is a fairly constant argument in China's discourse on Ukraine, and seems to be the case in Trump's argument about ending this “ridiculous war” and that “no more lives should be lost”), it would seriously undermine international law, including the UN Charter, which prohibits aggressive war. Crucially, a hybrid peace would be detrimental to any nation-building process. Beyond its physical territory and people’s lives, Ukraine is fighting to save its identity, its nationhood, and its statehood. We should not forget this dimension of the Ukrainian struggle against its attrition.

A hybrid peace will be detrimental to the US’s global leadership and credibility and to Europe as a normative power. While undermining international law and Ukrainian statehood, others, such as China could think that it might be worth starting a conflict in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or over Taiwan. There would be catastrophic consequences for the world because of the severe disruption to global trade and the involvement of the US in the war. From a European perspective, a war in Asia would divert US attention from Europe, Ukraine, and Russia.

There is danger that the idea of hybrid peace, which has been in the air in Washington since at least the presidential campaign in 2024 and Trump's comments on Ukraine, could become popular in Europe, especially in countries that are geographically distant from the battlefield in Ukraine and those where populists and pro-Russian parties are gaining public support. There has been a narrative about Western or European war fatigue, which could lead Western leaders to want to make a hybrid peace. Sympathising with the idea of hybrid peace is a dangerous trap for the West. The only way to undermine Sino-Russian alignment, deter China from aggressive moves, and defend the rules-based order is to do everything possible to help Ukraine win the war. Ukraine's victory, with support from the overwhelming majority, means Russia's unconditional surrender. Otherwise, both the US and several European countries will fall in line with the plan written in Beijing and favourable to Russia.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography
Dr Justyna Szczudlik is the deputy head of research, a China analyst, and the former Head of the Asia-Pacific Program (2016-2021) with the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Image credit: Unsplash/Karollyne Videira Hubert.