How the Russia-North Korea alliance challenges China's strategic interests in Northeast Asia

5 February 2025

The last reported meeting between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un was in June 2019, when Xi made his first personal visit to Pyongyang as China's president. The Chinese and North Korean leaders met five times between 2018 and 2019, which made many believe that Beijing had rebuilt its relationship with Pyongyang after years of sustained tension and strained diplomacy. This rapprochement also coincided with the complete silencing of public debates among Chinese scholars and analysts about whether to abandon or support North Korea, which had been particularly heated in 2017. Only recently have a few critical voices begun to re-emerge, which might signal growing unease in Beijing toward its traditional ally.

Recent reports of a strengthening military alliance between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un have raised international concerns. North Korea is suspected to have sent more than 10,000 troops to train and support Russia in its war against Ukraine, likely in exchange for air defence missile systems, oil, and money. In addition, Moscow and Pyongyang finalised the ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which includes a mutual defence clause. The timing of these developments is likely to be a calculated step, possibly providing legal grounds for sending troops into Russia.

Beijing’s passive approach only reflects its dilemma of balancing its regional interests with its need to preserve strategic ties with both Russia and North Korea, especially as the competition between China and the United States is likely to intensify.

Officially, Beijing claims that it is ‘not aware’ of its neighbour’s troops operating in Russia and has refrained from commenting on the evolving Russia-North Korea relationship. However, Pyongyang’s deepening military ties with Moscow and its involvement in the Ukraine war not only impact Europe, but also change the security dynamics in Northeast Asia — against China’s national interests. Beijing’s longstanding strategic priority has been to maintain stability and thus preserve the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

China has no interest in a ‘Northern Triangle’

North Korea’s actions not only exacerbate regional tensions but also accelerate the very dynamics China seeks to avoid: the framing of China as a common adversary in a broader geopolitical contest, the expansion of US-led military alliances along China’s periphery, and increased European engagement in Asia. While Beijing has accused Washington of harbouring a ‘Cold War mentality’ that seeks to divide the world along ideological lines, the mutual defence treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang embodies the very bloc politics that Beijing claims to oppose.

There is a risk that China might be seen as part of a trilateral axis in Northeast Asia, forming a new ‘Northern Triangle’. Beijing, however, has no interest in being linked to an alignment that was originally established during the Cold War designed to counter the United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea (also known as the ‘Southern Triangle’). Such an association, which is based on the dichotomy of ‘friends’ versus ‘enemy’, contradicts the principles of China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) such as rejecting group politics and bloc confrontation. Introduced by Xi Jinping in April 2022, the GSI presents a set of security concepts and principles, reflecting China’s ambition to reshape the US-led international order. Moreover, unlike Russia and North Korea, which are relatively isolated internationally, an official alliance with Kim and Putin could also jeopardise China's efforts to maintain good relations with major Western countries. Although the three countries share a common adversary in the United States, China’s relations with Russia and North Korea, respectively, are complex, shaped by historical legacies and divergent strategic interests and priorities. While Beijing’s close ties with Moscow and Pyongyang may offer immediate benefits, they potentially pose long-term challenges to China’s national interests, especially in its immediate neighbourhood.

Pyongyang’s close cooperation with Moscow could help North Korea upgrade its conventional military capabilities and transfer advanced weapons technology that enhances North Korea's nuclear-capable missiles. Moreover, Pyongyang’s possible participation in active combat in the Ukraine war could set a precedent for invoking mutual defence clauses between the two regimes. This underscores the possibility that Russia could also provide military assistance to North Korea in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which would significantly alter its security balance. Furthermore, North Korea’s rapidly growing military ties with Russia and the acquisition of combat experience by North Korean troops could embolden the Kim regime to take more aggressive actions that might create instability in Northeast Asia.

The growing threat perception of the Russia-North Korea alliance is likely to drive South Korea and Japan to further strengthen their ties with the United States. North Korea's continued advancement of its missile and nuclear programs over the past two decades has gradually fostered increased cooperation among these three countries. The historic meeting at Camp David in 2023 marked a milestone in enhancing trilateral security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States, which extends beyond addressing the North Korean threat. This has reinforced Beijing’s perception that Washington is working toward the formation of a US-led ‘Asian NATO’ aimed at advancing its strategic rivalry with China.

Beijing's dilemma in the face of rising tensions

Beijing’s increasing concern over the current developments is reflected in a recent statement made by Xi Jinping in a meeting with Biden on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: “China does not allow conflict and turmoil to happen on the Korean peninsula. It will not sit idly by when its strategic security and core interests are under threat”. The last times Xi issued similar statements were in 2016 and 2017, during heightened tensions triggered by a series of escalatory events, including a ‘war of words’ between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.

Xi’s words can be seen as a warning aimed at both the United States and North Korea. Like 2017, Pyongyang’s provocative actions and military cooperation with Moscow have significantly increased tensions in the region. Despite facing increasing international pressure to curb North Korea, the extent of Beijing's actual influence over the Kim regime has remained uncertain. Now, as ties between Russia and North Korea deepen, Beijing’s already limited leverage is further diminishing.

So far, the CCP leadership has refrained from criticising either Moscow or Pyongyang, despite their policies and actions conflicting with China's priority of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing’s passive approach only reflects its dilemma of balancing its regional interests with its need to preserve strategic ties with both Russia and North Korea, especially as the competition between China and the United States is likely to intensify. Moreover, Donald Trump’s return to the White House could revive US engagement with North Korea, as seen during his first term, which might bring new turbulence to the Korean Peninsula.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Anny Boc works at the German Bundestag and is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies (GEAS) at the Freie Universität Berlin. Her research focuses on China’s foreign policy in Northeast Asia and China-US relations. Image credit: kremlin.ru.