India’s inevitable military diversification to the West
India’s inevitable military diversification to the West
WRITTEN BY PATRIZIA COGO MORALES
19 June 2024
During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington, D.C. in 2023, India and the US announced a landmark agreement between General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to manufacture fighting jet engines in India. This collaboration showcases a turning point in their bilateral relations. Similarly, in January 2024, France and India agreed to jointly produce defence equipment, including helicopters and submarines.
According to SIPRI, India has been diversifying its military partnerships. Traditionally dependent on the Soviet Union and later Russia, India is shifting its focus towards the West, with the US and France as key partners. However, there is untapped potential for collaboration with other European countries and their respective private sectors. To unlock it, these countries need to enhance their interactions with India and therefore gain a deeper understanding of India’s security challenges in the region. This includes concerns related to China, particularly its robust linkages with Pakistan and Russia.
Like the US and France, other European countries and their private sectors should enhance their engagement with India, given the significant potential in military procurement deals and the defence industry overall.
India is the world’s largest arms importer from 2019 to 2023, accounting for a 9.8 per cent share of global arms imports. Its main suppliers are Russia (36 per cent), France (33 per cent), and the US (13 per cent). The database highlights that although Russia remains India's primary supplier, arms imports from Moscow have decreased over the years from 76 per cent (2009-2013) to 58 per cent (2014-2018) and now, remarkably, to 36 per cent (2019-2023). These findings indicate that India has been actively diversifying its partners. Specifically, India has invested significant efforts in strengthening ties with the West to reduce its long-standing dependency on Russia and enhance its strategic autonomy.
India’s shift away from its traditional reliance on Russian arms can be attributed to three main reasons: first, the "China factor”; second, a drive for self-reliance; and finally, Russia’s war in Ukraine. It is in this context where the West, especially the EU and its member states, should seize this opportunity to deepen their defence ties with India.
India’s security landscape and the “China factor”
China stands as the most prominent challenge shaping India’s foreign policy and security landscape in three important ways.
First, long-standing border disputes with China remain a considerable pressure for New Delhi, persisting as a recurrent feature in the bilateral relations. The 2020 Ladakh clash, which saw casualties on both sides for the first time in four decades, marked a turning point. The lack of a mutual agreement on the demarcation of the border and border infrastructure development makes it difficult to return to ‘normalcy’. These tensions spill over into other dimensions of the bilateral relationship, impacting trade and people-to-people exchanges. Further, India has enhanced its military capabilities by investing in its defence industry and strengthening strategic partnerships with the West. This approach allows it to balance both economic and security interests.
Second, Russia’s close ties with China have heightened concerns in New Delhi. While Delhi’s historical partnership with Moscow dates to the Cold War, Russia, being India’s largest arms supplier for decades is a strategic asset in maintaining India’s strategy autonomy, particularly in defence. However, the growing symbiosis between Moscow and Beijing contrasts sharply with the worsening relations between China and India, opening the door for the latter to strengthen its dialogue with the West to address shared concerns vis-à-vis these authoritarian powers. In the past, India was able to count on Russia’s support to counter security concerns coming from China and Pakistan, but as China and Russia strengthen their relationship, Russia’s role in India’s security policies is likely to weaken over time. Consequently, India’s diversification towards other partners such as France and the US, among others, can be consequential in increasing India’s margin of manoeuvre vis-à-vis both Russia and China.
Third, China’s growing presence and influence in India’s immediate neighbourhood has been a concern for New Delhi for years. Since Xi Jinping came to power, China has deployed an assertive foreign policy that leverages economic ties for its security interests. This has led to a geoeconomic rivalry between India and China in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In this context, Pakistan’s historical animosity towards India and its “all-weather friendship” with China plays a crucial role. Pakistan ranked fifth among the top global arms importers from 2019 to 2023, with China accounting for 82 per cent of its arms imports. Similarly, China supplies 72 per cent of Bangladesh’ arms. This further raises the “alarm mode” of India’s concerns in its neighbourhood’s arms trade dynamics.
The ramifications of the “China factor” in Indian foreign policy should prompt the EU and other Western actors to pay more attention to this security landscape. In an era marked by intense power competition between the US and China, understanding these regional dynamics becomes crucial. The US and France are at the forefront in this regard.
Washington and Paris as anchors of Delhi’s tilt to the West
There have been key developments in US-India ties over the last decade, especially in trade, technology, and military cooperation. In 2020, the two countries signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), enabling the sharing of sensitive information, including geospatial data, to upgrade India’s military capabilities. In 2023, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) was put into motion with the objective to expand collaboration at the intersection of technology and defence. iCET was then followed by the launch of the US-India Strategic Trade Dialogue. Cooperation in the Quad to uphold the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific is also a key layer of interaction between Washington and Delhi.
France is leading engagement with India among all EU member states. The foundation of this bilateral relationship is based on a long-standing history of strategic trust, particularly evident in the fields of nuclear energy, space, technology and defence. Key initiatives include the International Solar Alliance launched in 2015, a Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, and an annual defence dialogue at the ministerial level since 2018. Their militaries also have a structured network of dialogues and regularly conduct joint exercises such as Varuna, Garuda and Shakti. Therefore, it is no surprise France has emerged as India’s second supplier of arms.
Interactions between the EU and India have also increased over the last decade, with growing attention towards Delhi from both the EU collectively as well as its member states individually. Notably, holding security and defence consultations, cooperation in defence equipment, and strengthening cooperation in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific underscores the importance of security considerations in India’s engagement with Europe. Initiatives such as the EU-India Trade and Technology Council represent the ‘cherry on top of the cake’ of the prioritising bilateral cooperation, especially in times when economic power is increasingly intertwined with security considerations.
Untapped potential in India’s defence industry
While the recent decline in Russian arms exports to India is primarily due to the ‘China factor’, it is also a by-product of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The resulting multiple sanctions on Russia have created logistical challenges, including delays in deliveries. Despite the West’s efforts to isolate Russia, however, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s visit to Moscow in December 2023, underscores India’s continuing engagement with Russia in line with its multi-alignment approach.
For years, India has emphasised the importance of strengthening its defence industry and reducing dependence on imports for its armed forces, which is reflected in the 2014 Make in India initiative. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this process. While it is unrealistic for India to withdraw from acquiring Russian arms and equipment in the short term, the continuing war is increasingly straining relations between New Delhi and Moscow.
In this context, diversifying towards the West can provide India with an edge, helping New Delhi move beyond its Cold War-era reliance on Russia and assert its strategic autonomy. Like the US and France, other European countries and their private sectors should enhance their engagement with India, given the significant potential in military procurement deals and the defence industry overall. Notably, EU Member States such as Germany, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Poland, rank among to the top-20 arms suppliers to India. With India’s strategy of diversifying imports from other sources and its indigenization efforts, there exists untapped potential for collaboration with these countries.
Italy and Spain, ranked sixth and eighth largest exporters of arms in the world, are great examples that could play a crucial role in building bridges with India in the defence industry. In fact, Italy and India recently signed a defence cooperation agreement to collaborate on R&D and maritime security, which sets the stage for joint projects and co-production ventures in India involving companies from both nations. Spain, on the other hand, has already made strides with the Airbus C-295 aircraft deal, including the assembly of 40 aircraft in India. There is also potential for collaboration on high-tech conventional submarines under the Indian Navy’s Project-75.
India is actively looking for partners to help fulfil its objective of building up its domestic defence industry, aiming to enhance its military capabilities and strengthen self-reliance. This implies New Delhi’s keen interest in frameworks of technology transfer programs. It is still unclear to what extent European countries will be willing to be part of these frameworks, but the GE-HAL deal between the US and India sets a precedent for ground-breaking cooperation in the defence industry between India and the West.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Patrizia Cogo Morales is a researcher focusing on India and its relations with the EU and China, as well as how technology shapes geopolitics. She is the founder of India Watch Briefing, a newsletter on Indian foreign policy. Previously, she was Project Officer at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance, and Research Assistant at Elcano Royal Institute. She holds a dual degree in Law and Global Governance from Esade, and a Master’s in International Relations, Security and Development from the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Image credit: Flickr/MEAphotogallery.