How Buddhist nationalism is shaping Sri Lanka’s domestic and foreign policy
How Buddhist Nationalism is Shaping Sri Lanka’s Domestic and Foreign Policy
WRITTEN BY ANDREA MALJI
24 March 2021
A global resurgence in nationalism has attracted the interest of academics and policymakers alike. From the Philippines and India to the United States and Brazil, nationalism is shaping the policies of countries across the world. The Hindu nationalist policies of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India have received most of the attention in South Asia. However, religious nationalism in the region has a scope well beyond India and Hinduism. Buddhist nationalism has become a defining force in both Sri Lanka and Myanmar yet receives less attention compared to their nuclear-armed neighbour.
The close relationship among radical Buddhist monks, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), and the Rajapaksa political dynasty has interwoven Buddhist nationalism into the political fabric of Sri Lanka. Since 2009, Buddhist nationalism has played an increasing role in the domestic politics and foreign policies of Sri Lanka. However, the growing presence of Buddhist nationalism is further marginalising minorities and threatens to create a new era of conflict.
The role of Buddhist nationalism
Since Buddhism is popularly associated with non-violence and peace, nationalism appears contrary to its foundations. However, religion is frequently politicised and merged with the ideological vision of political parties. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalist organisations like the BBS have been able to greatly influence political leaders and policies. When Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the current president of Sri Lanka, was defence minister in 2014 he visited a new Buddhist brigade school and declared, “It is the monks who protect our country, religion, and race". Such language just five years after the end of a decades-long civil war fought along ethnic-religious lines did little to promote unity. Instead, the speech demonstrated his vision for Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese Buddhist country.
The trade relationship between Myanmar and Sri Lanka has flourished. In addition, both countries have signed several agreements and MOU’s over the past decade, signalling important growth between the two countries. It is unclear how the recent coup in Myanmar will impact bilateral relations though some analysts worry Sri Lanka is following a similar path.
Buddhist nationalism, like most religious nationalist movements, operates under the assumption that the dominant group is under threat, usually by a minority. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalists have considered this threat primarily twofold. First, from independence in 1948 until the end of the civil war in 2009, the Tamils, who are 15 per cent of the population and mostly Hindu, were framed as the largest threat. Since the end of the civil war until the present, the focus shifted toward the 10 per cent Muslim population. The perception of this threat gave rise to the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), a Buddhist nationalist organisation, in 2012. By mid-2012, the BBS launched its anti-Muslim campaign. The group claimed Muslim cultural practices, such as Islamic clothing and halal meat slaughter negatively impact the Sinhala public. They also began contesting Muslim architectural sites suggesting they were built on or near Buddhist sites with one such Muslim shrine even destroyed.
The BBS promoted Buddhist nationalist sentiment throughout the country by framing Muslims as an existential threat to Buddhists and their way of life. Anti-Muslim rhetoric, particularly from monk and BBS leader Gnanasara Thero, became increasingly common and escalated into anti-Muslim riots in Southwest Sri Lanka in 2014. The riots left hundreds of Muslim homes and businesses destroyed, four killed, and dozens injured. The violence was certainly noteworthy, especially in a country with a history of communal violence. But did the increasing Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiment have a wider impact?
Sri Lanka’s domestic politics
Extremist and exclusionary rhetoric is unfortunately common throughout the world. What makes Sri Lanka unique is the influence of Buddhist nationalism on Sri Lankan policy, particularly through the Rajapaksa family. When the BBS first came into existence, Mahinda Rajapaksa was president and his brother Gotabaya was the defence secretary. The Rajapaksas utilised a strong military offensive to counter the Liberation Tamil Tiger Eelam (LTTE) in the North and East during the fourth phase of the civil war from 2006-2009 (Eelam War IV). By the time the war ended, the United Nations found that between 40,000-70,000 Tamil non-combatants might have been killed just in the final phases of the war. While the international community condemned the actions of the Sri Lankan government, Mahinda Rajapaksa became a hero among many Sinhalese Buddhists. Buddhism had held an important place in Sri Lankan state identity since independence, but it became increasingly visible and politicised during and after Eelam War IV.
The post-war years in Sri Lanka mobilised Buddhist nationalists against a perceived new threat, Muslims. There was a limited historical conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Sri Lanka. However, with the civil war over and the global rise in Islamic terrorism, Buddhist groups shifted their attention to domestic Islamic extremism. Over the next years, Islamophobic sentiment became more prominent, both online and in person. On social media, harmful rumours about Muslims spread rapidly and anti-Muslim riots broke out in 2018 causing widespread destruction and displacement. The 2018 riots supposedly helped mobilise a small segment of Sri Lankan Muslims into the National Tawheed Jamaat (NTJ), a relatively unknown Islamic extremist organisation in Sri Lanka. On Easter Sunday 2019, the organisation killed 253 in an attack targeting churches and hotels frequented by Westerners. The attack was the deadliest in the post-Civil War era.
Within a week of the Easter attacks, Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced his candidacy for president and his intent to tackle radical Islam. Rajapaksa’s hawkish history was appealing to Buddhist nationalists and those that feared future terrorist attacks. Throughout the election, Gotabaya referenced the Easter attacks and campaigned alongside nationalist monks proclaiming he is the only one that can restore security. Following Rajapaksa’s November 2019 win, Gnanasara proclaimed “We built an ideology that the country needs a Sinhala leader who does not bend in front of minorities, now that ideology has won”. The monks helped rally support for the Rajapaksa brothers and continued their influence once in power. A year and a half after Gotabaya’s presidential win, his brother became the prime minister and consolidated control of the country. With the Rajapaksa brothers in charge, Buddhist nationalist authoritarianism became the guiding philosophy of Sri Lanka.
The Rajapaksas have already implemented specific policies targeting the Muslim community during their short time in power. Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, the state began requiring all deceased Covid-19 victims to be cremated. Although cremation is widely practised by the Hindu and Buddhist communities, it is considered haram in Islam and an act of desecration. The policy carried on for months amid outcry from local and global Muslim institutions, the United Nations, and multiple global government agencies. Buddhist nationalists, on the other hand, held protests demanding cremation for all coronavirus victims. The cremation policy continued until mid-February 2021 and demonstrates the regime’s commitment to follow their ideology despite the global backlash. Shortly after ending the forced cremation policy, the government submitted a proposal to ban the face veil for “security reasons”. This was not the first time such a ban has been instituted. Following the Easter attacks, a face veil ban was one of the first emergency actions undertaken. Hindu nationalists in India even took note of the policy and requested India to follow in the steps of Sri Lanka. Finally, President Rajapaksa created an archaeological task force with only Buddhist members. The goal of the task force is to preserve the religious and cultural heritage of Sri Lanka’s Eastern province, an area dominated by Tamils and Muslims. While such a task force is not concerning in theory, the absence of Tamils and Muslims is troubling since the destruction of minority religious sites is a key strategy of religious nationalists.
Foreign Policy
Buddhist nationalists do not consider the threat from Muslims as merely an isolated matter. Instead, since Sri Lanka is one of the last remaining Buddhist countries in the world, they see Sinhalese Buddhists as a threatened global minority. Muslims, in contrast, have dozens of Muslim majority states. While there are an increasing number of analyses examining Buddhist nationalism, there have been surprisingly few that analyse its impact on foreign policy. However, the domestic problems of Sri Lanka have always been internationalised. For example, India’s extensive support for the Tamils from 1987-1990 led to a contentious relationship between the two countries. Sri Lanka also considered Western countries to be overly sympathetic to the Tamil cause.
Buddhist nationalism shares many parallels with Hindu nationalism in India and Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar. However, the way Buddhist nationalism shapes Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is more complex than simply forging ties with other nationalist countries. For one, historical support for the regime is an important factor. China has been one of Sri Lanka’s most ardent defenders on the global stage. Not only did China assist Sri Lanka during the final stages of Eelam War IV, it has since defended Sri Lanka against allegations of human rights abuses. Beijing’s friendly stance toward Colombo amid global criticism helped forge a closer relationship between the two countries. Xi Jinping has sought to further consolidate this relationship through increased ties with the regime, linking China’s goals to those of Sri Lanka. In 2017, China signed a 99-year lease on the Hambantota Port in southern Sri Lanka. The lease deal occurred following Sri Lanka’s default on a 1.1-billion-dollar loan from China in 2002. The loan was intended to help develop the port, but when Sri Lanka defaulted, China offered to lease the port instead. China also gained access to 15,000 adjacent acres that it hopes to convert into an industrial zone. The port provides a strategic expansion of China’s presence in the Indian Ocean.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa participated at an election campaign rally in Kandeketiya, Dec. 21, 2014. Image Credit: Flickr/Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Some Sri Lankans and many Western countries have expressed concerns about China’s presence in Sri Lanka. However, Rajapaksa has assured his constituents that China’s intent is benign, and their relationship will help bring development. During Rajapaksa’s 2020 visit to India, he also commended China’s Belt and Road Initiative saying Sri Lanka has received many benefits from the project with his positive words toward China (while in India) notable given the on-going tension between China and India at their borders.
Historically, Sri Lanka’s relationship with India has been more contentious. India’s aid to the Tamils caused fury in the Sri Lankan government, which called the naval mission and airdrop by India “a naked violation of our independence". India’s interventions reduced following the end of Eelam War I and the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a female LTTE suicide bomber in 1994. China, meanwhile, took advantage of the opportunity. India and Sri Lanka appeared to move closer during the administration of Maithripala Sirisena (2015-2019) who stalled Chinese development projects and welcomed Indian Prime Minister Modi twice during his short tenure. India hoped to continue this warming relationship even when Sirisena announced he would not be seeking re-election. Modi was the first world leader to congratulate Rajapaksa on his presidential win with India later offering to assist Sri Lanka with its debt and fight against terrorism. The BBS and India’s Hindu nationalist organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have also discussed creating a ‘Buddist-Hindu Peace Zone’ to fight against Islamic extremism in South Asia.
Perhaps South Asia’s less examined relationship exists between Sri Lanka and Myanmar where official ties date back to the 4th century. Both countries enjoy geostrategic locations in the shadow of India and China. Beyond religion, they share many similarities having dealt with on-going instability and insurgencies since independence and are attempting to navigate their positions amid the competing interests of their neighbours. In the past decade, both have seen increasingly powerful Buddhist nationalist movements, through the BBS in Sri Lanka and the Ma Ba Tha and 969 movement in Myanmar. Both organisations have hosted the other and also signed agreements pledging to tackle terrorism in South Asia. Myanmar has undoubtedly taken a more extreme approach toward its internal instability, carrying out what many in the international community classify as genocide. Sri Lanka has not publicly denounced Myanmar’s actions toward the Rohingya nor do they accept Rohingya refugees into the country. Additionally, radical Buddhist monks have attacked the UNHCR in Colombo for hosting 31 Rohingya refugees. Sri Lanka’s relationship with Myanmar has greatly strengthened over the past decade. Since the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, the trade relationship between Myanmar and Sri Lanka has flourished. In addition, both countries have signed several agreements and MOU’s over the past decade, signalling important growth between the two countries. It is unclear how the recent coup in Myanmar will impact bilateral relations though some analysts worry Sri Lanka is following a similar path.
An uncertain future
The popular view of Buddhism as a peaceful and non-confrontational religion has prevented analysts from examining the threat religious nationalism poses to domestic, regional, and international security. The decline of liberal democracy and the growing embrace of nationalism in South Asia threatens regional stability and Sri Lanka’s history of civil war and division further heightens the risk of violence. Regional leadership that challenges exclusionary policies and leads by example is especially needed. However, as India and China vie for influence, neither will likely criticise Sri Lanka’s controversial domestic policies, especially since both India and China practice similar or worse in their respective countries.
Exclusionary policies can generate internal instability, threaten democratic institutions and norms, nurture violent uprisings, and create refugee crises, all of which have regional and global implications. The Rajapaksa’s embrace of Buddhist nationalism threatens to undo the significant progress made since the end of the civil war in 2009. If Buddhist nationalism becomes increasingly integrated into the state, these risks will only increase.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Andrea Malji is an Assistant Professor of International Studies and Diplomacy and Military Studies at Hawaiʻi Pacific University. Her research focuses on political violence and religious nationalism with a regional specialisation in South Asia. Image credit: Flickr/Mahinda Rajapaksa.