Seoul cannot have a credible Indo-Pacific strategy without Taiwan
Seoul cannot have a credible Indo-Pacific strategy without Taiwan
WRITTEN BY ZSUZSA ANNA FERENCZY AND TEREZA NOVOTNA
25 August 2022
Whether in Seoul, Brussels, or Washington, pundits have been arguing about the merits, timing, and repercussions of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in early August. Whether her journey was a clever move and to Taiwan’s benefit or instead provided China with a handy pretext for escalation in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing’s heavy-handed retaliation was unprecedented, with tensions in the Taiwan Strait spiking to the highest level in decades. Through its response, including large-scale military drills and ballistic missile tests around Taiwan, intensified economic coercion, and harsh rhetoric, the message Beijing wanted to send was, however, not new: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not compromise on Taiwan.
With Taipei being caught in the middle and the implications for the status quo in the Taiwan Strait still to be seen, two questions emerge: will these tensions lead to a reinforced security dialogue between like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific? And in this new context, will Seoul be able to re-position itself within the region?
Is Seoul heading towards an ‘upgrade’ in the Indo-Pacific?
Taiwan has already moved up on Tokyo’s political agenda, but has yet to fully enter the political discourse in Seoul. While South Korea’s new President Yoon Suk-yeol has signalled more clarity in aligning his country with Washington’s thinking on China, Seoul’s ‘strategic dilemma’ — stuck between the US for its security and China regarding its trade — has for long constrained Korea’s aspirations to act as a ‘middle power’ on the international stage. At the same time, Seoul’s delicate ties with Tokyo have shaped its views on the Indo-Pacific.
If South Korea wants to deliver on its ambition to project itself as a “global ‘pivotal’ state” which is willing to contribute to upholding the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific, it can no longer avoid recognising Taiwan’s relevance to peace and stability in the region. In fact, Seoul cannot have a credible Indo-Pacific strategy without Taiwan.
Even though the South Korean administration was adamant to emphasise that a virtual call instead of a face-to-face meeting was pre-arranged, the fact that Yoon was on vacation in Seoul when Pelosi landed there after her trip to Taipei has led to speculation that Seoul wants to avoid confrontation with China. A few days later South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin even travelled to Beijing to meet with his Chinese counterpart. This behaviour may indeed suggest that Yoon has not moved past Seoul’s strategic dilemma.
In other words, if South Korea wants to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific, it is high time that Seoul joins the ‘Taiwan club’.
Whereas Japan, India, and Australia face similar challenges as far as a challenging Chinese neighbour is concerned, they have started taking measures to strengthen their own resilience. India has taken several initiatives to acknowledge Taiwan, with both sides re-evaluating their respective policies and the impact of the China factor in their bilateral ties. For the first time in 2021, Japan mentioned the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait in its annual defence white paper. In March 2021, its Defence Minister Kishi Nobuo and his American counterpart, Lloyd Austin, agreed to closely cooperate in case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. While drafting its upcoming Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea should consider a similar path.
Although the new strategic document will be published in autumn, Seoul has already started following through on a new policy, catching up with its neighbours. In May 2022, President Yoon formalised South Korea’s participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (a US-led regional trade initiative), which suggests that Seoul is getting ready to join forces with Washington on the economic front.
Going forward, any new steps do not need to be big jumps. Seoul should be smart and strategic to seize the opportunity and explore practical ways in which it can expand cooperation with Taiwan, in line with its like-minded partners. Seoul’s Indo-Pacific policy should be anchored in promoting free trade, democracy, and a rules-based order, including with Taiwan. This will support, rather than undermine, Seoul’s pursuit of its national interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Such a revamped Indo-Pacific focus will help turn Seoul into an attractive partner in the eyes of other democracies in the region and worldwide, including Europe. With the US-China geostrategic competition intensifying, the EU has also started to adjust to a new geopolitical reality. In fact, Brussels now sees Taiwan on its own merit, as the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy from 2021 and the European Parliament’s June 2022 report on security challenges in the Indo-Pacific indicate.
From technology to the pandemic: opportunities to engage
There are two concrete reasons why Seoul should seek to enhance its engagement with Taiwan. First, Seoul and Taipei have shown themselves as capable of deploying highly effective COVID-19 strategies. Whereas South Korea has inspired with its “trace, test, and treat” approach, the “Taiwan model” — based on transparency, technology, and trust — has increased the country’s global profile as a technologically advanced economy and a vibrant democracy. As a result, Taiwan has entered the political discourse in Europe, while perceptions of China in this part of the world have continued to deteriorate.
Established in 2015 by the US and Taiwan, the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) now also includes Japan and Australia. For the first time this year, a GCTF workshop on digital health was held in India allowing for the participation of over 250 virtual participants who were able to learn about how the ‘Taiwan Model’ achieved such success in tackling the pandemic. With its similarly successful pandemic management strategy, South Korea would have much to bring to the GCTF table.
Second, Taiwan’s pivotal role in the global semiconductor industry places it at the heart of regional and worldwide efforts to reconfigure global supply chains in emerging technologies. The pandemic has forced corporations and governments to reimagine supply chains to manage delays and disruptions as well as to ensure business continuity. Countries have acknowledged the need to reduce their strategic dependencies, including the EU, which remains profoundly integrated in global production chains, significantly more than the US and China.
The fact that the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly mentions both South Korea and Taiwan as partners in securing resilient supply chains is a sign that Brussels is genuinely interested in engaging Seoul and Taipei. However, it is the implementation of the Strategy that will determine the intensity of the Europeans’ determination.
Together against coercion
Beijing regards Taiwan as an internal affair, fundamental to China’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, President Xi will not and cannot give up Taiwan. Over the years, through intimidation and hybrid warfare, Beijing has used coercive behaviour against Taipei in the economic, military, and political realms — including via amphibious landing exercises, naval patrols, cyberattacks, and diplomatic isolation, all of which present a security risk to the entire Indo-Pacific.
China’s economic coercion has not spared South Korea either, as illustrated by Beijing’s retaliation after the 2017 deployment of the THAAD missile defence system on its territory. This suggests that while threat perceptions of countries in the region vis-à-vis China might diverge, Beijing has made clear that it will not shy away from weaponising trade. Exchanging notes on how to better understand the relationship between power and vulnerability in their economic interdependence with China would benefit all countries in the region that remain exposed to China’s economic bullying.
When it comes to Quad partners, they remain united by a common concern about China. Yet, given their significant trade volumes with China, they try to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing to varying degrees. As such, the Quad has created a working group on supply chain vulnerabilities in critical technologies, supporting efforts to “formalise” the partnership "as a force for good” while building secure, resilient, diverse, and sustainable technology supply chains.
With the Quad looking for ways to strengthen partnerships, Seoul and Taipei should both seize this opportunity, reinforce one another in this regard and contribute to upholding the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, India, Japan, and Australia launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) in April 2021, for “strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth in the region”, with the possible expansion of the initiative “based on consensus” between the three countries. With their expertise, Taiwan and South Korea would both have much to contribute to this initiative.
Following Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan’s Defence Ministry said multiple Chinese military “craft” crossed the median line separating its territorial waters from the PRC, carrying out a “possible simulated attack”. Japan’s Defence Ministry announced that five Chinese ballistic missiles had landed in its exclusive economic zone, which was a “first”. It remains to be seen how the Quad will manage the heightened tensions. So far, the US, Australian, and Japanese foreign ministers have urged Beijing to cease its military exercises and condemned the launch of ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, Delhi chose to maintain a “studied silence” amid reactions to the unfolding situation.
In late August 2022, South Korea and the US relaunched their joint military drills that had been suspended since 2018 and are primarily aimed at repelling any North Korean threat toward the South. Even though Seoul does not seem to be prepared to join the Quad just yet, the revived exercises will in a way serve as a demonstration of the allied force vis-à-vis China, too. Any response by Beijing — and Pyongyang — remains to be seen at the time of writing.
Seoul should join the ‘Taiwan club’
With economic prosperity closely tied to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific, convincing partners to see Taiwan as a crucial player is Taipei’s central objective. Democracies have started to converge on acknowledging that a Taiwan contingency would have direct security ramifications for the region and beyond — a trend that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further intensified.
In December 2021, the late Abe Shinzo warned that it would be “suicidal” for Beijing to invade Taiwan, and urged Taiwan, Japan, and the US to strengthen capabilities and work together to counter security threats. Earlier, in June 2021, Japan’s Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi had said "the peace and stability of Taiwan is directly connected to Japan”, while the joint statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues.
Whether or not Seoul will partner with other like-minded countries, including Europe, in terms of valuing Taiwan as a responsible and reliable stakeholder is likely to become clear only in several months, once South Korea’s new Indo-Pacific strategy is released. For President Yoon to deliver on his ‘global pivotal state’ promise, it is crucial to improve the relationship between South Korea and Japan. Much of this is also about how far Seoul will be prepared to join many of its partners in working with Taiwan. In other words, if South Korea wants to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific, it is high time that Seoul joins the ‘Taiwan club’.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is the Head of Associate Network at 9DASHLINE and Assistant Professor at National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan.
Dr Tereza Novotna is the Korea Associate at 9DASHLINE, as well as a Korea-Europe Center Fellow at Free University Berlin and Senior Associate Researcher at EUROPEUM Prague. Image Credit: Flickr/Republic of Korea.