India and China: Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Decade — Part I
India and China: Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Decade — Part I
WRITTEN BY VELINA TCHAKAROVA
8 March 2021
Following the COVID-19 virus outbreak, 2021 marks the beginning of the Indo-Pacific decade. China and India seem destined to become ‘indispensable powers’ as their rise will shape the emerging global order in one way or another. The Asian continent is anticipated to surpass North America and Europe in terms of demographics and economic power, with the two giants being at the centre of this global power shift. Although the rapid rise of regional centres of power is creating an impression of multipolarity, what we are witnessing is in fact a new systemic bipolarity between the US and China, which has been in the making for quite some time now.
With India on the path to becoming the third-largest economic power by 2025, the Indo-Pacific region is slowly but surely becoming the main arena for global power competition in the 21st century. Gurpreet Khurana describes this geopolitical space as stretching from the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans to the littorals of West Africa and East Asia. The traditional South Asian security dilemma triangle between China, Pakistan, and India as well as the imminent reconfiguration of the global supply chains due to the COVID-19 crisis, provide fertile grounds for a tectonic shift in their relations. Indeed, no other corner of the world, except for Northeast Asia, contains three nuclear powers in close proximity, marked by unresolved security dilemmas and a zero-sum game mentality. How will the global power shift impact the relationship between China and India based on the geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific region? Are Beijing and New Delhi going to rise peacefully in the emerging bipolarity rooted in the systemic competition between Washington and Beijing?
China and the return of realpolitik
Since their foundation, China and India have been increasingly engaged “in a monumental battle for geopolitical supremacy”, based on still unresolved disputes such as the McMahon Line and issues such as competition for strategic access to the Indian Ocean. In the global context, however, China faces the unique chance of becoming the first Asian global power in the modern history of international relations. Beijing’s global rise will primarily be determined by the outcome of the Fourth Industrial Revolution of cyber-physical systems as well as China’s willingness and capability to establish its own global networks of finance, trade, energy, economics, and diplomacy. In this regard, borrowing Halford Mackinder’s and Nicholas Spykman’s terms, China currently seems to be in a unique position to become the first “heartland” and “rimland” power at once.
While Beijing treats New Delhi as a second-order rival due to its predominant focus on the systemic competition with the US, India considers China the primary existential threat to its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, India sees itself confronted by two nuclear powers both of which are immediate neighbours.
China’s One Belt One Road launched in 2013, which later became the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), can be seen as an attempt to establish terrestrial connectivity for winning “the heartland” in Eurasia, which would, in turn, enable global power projection. Additionally, Beijing has also introduced various political and economic platforms for engagement and cooperation with countries from this region, with the 17+1 initiative being the most famous among them. At the same time, China is also building up its military presence in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific realm, while developing the ‘string of pearls’ approach in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to create a network of friendly ports and trade posts in India’s direct neighbourhood.
Political, economic, and diplomatic relations between China and India have grown significantly in recent decades, guided by the principle of cooperation and trust-building. However, Beijing’s surging geopolitical clout and geoeconomic footprint, coupled with unresolved border issues with India, have brought about a shift in the relationship between the two Asian powers in recent years. Furthermore, a fundamental mismatch in perceptions underlies the increasing tense bilateral relationship. Whereas China approaches its affairs with India as asymmetric and non-zero-sum, India sees itself involved in a zero-sum interaction between two equally powerful countries in South Asia. India’s perception of China is that Beijing is taking the central position in its direct neighbourhood and increasingly in the IOR, while China perceives New Delhi as a major geopolitical factor with considerable naval capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.
The two nuclear-armed nations with the largest militaries and populations in Asia are slowly but surely turning into regional rivals despite their shared aspirations for multipolarity and cooperation on international issues of mutual interest. The geopolitical tensions between them have particularly intensified since 2017. There have been armed clashes on the Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas. This was not only the worst standoff in the last decade, but it also resulted in a shift in the bilateral relationship from a cooperative towards a more confrontational modality.
China’s geopolitical approach towards India
Two decisive asymmetries arise from China’s geopolitical perceptions of its relationship with India. First, Beijing sees itself as a rising global power facing systemic competition with the US in all relevant socio-economic fields and key industrial sectors. In contrast, India is considered a significant regional power in possession of nuclear weapons, but with limited power projection. Second, Beijing has managed to develop a long-term geoeconomic relationship with India’s direct rival — Pakistan. The realpolitik calculus behind their economic and trade ties coupled with immense funding for Islamabad is part of China’s maritime connectivity strategy aimed at securing access to the Indian Ocean. However, China-Pakistan ties have created a significant geopolitical imbalance in the Indo-Pacific region, which is detrimental to India’s interests.
There has been a profound shift in Chinese perceptions of India’s foreign and security policies following the re-election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2019, which is now characterised by Chinese scholars as involving a ‘riskier’ approach. One of the major topics in current Chinese academic literature is India’s shift towards the US following the COVID-19 crisis. China endorses India’s objective of taking a leadership role in shaping global affairs towards ‘reformed multilateralism’. However, India’s rapprochement with the US in the Indo-Pacific region and enhanced security and defence cooperation with Japan and Australia within the QUAD is detrimental to Chinese geopolitical interests. Furthermore, Chinese experts carefully follow India’s growing economic self-reliance strategy and pursuit of a reconfiguration of global supply chains away from China as part of the systemic decoupling process between Washington and Beijing.
China’s views have also shifted following their skirmishes in the Ladakh region in 2020, which shattered any expectations of stability and predictability in the bilateral relationship. Since India has voluntarily pulled out of negotiations on a deal with China’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Beijing’s expectations that the Indian economy would become steadily integrated into the industrial and supply chain networks in Asia with China at the centre have become too unrealistic. Currently, the common understanding is that it may take a long time for the Sino-Indian relationship to normalise following the Ladakh episode.
India’s geopolitical approach towards China
For India, the outcome of the systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing will be decisive for its path towards becoming an established power in the Indo-Pacific region. If China emerges as the winner of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and manages to establish itself as a second global centre of power, this systemic process will have a negative impact on India’s geopolitical interests and goals. Thus, it is in New Delhi’s interest to build strong ties with as many regional actors as possible in Asia. Beyond that, India seeks to strengthen security and defence ties with various countries close to the US, particularly in the maritime domain. The quadrilateral (QUAD) cooperation between India, the US, Japan, and Australia is aimed at boosting security and defence ties between the four Indo-Pacific countries while counterbalancing China’s rise in this region.
Whether the Indian government will pursue a policy of non-alignment in the systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing remains an open question. However, it seems likely that India may not have the option of remaining strategically neutral this time. In the current geopolitical context, a deepening of relations with the US towards a comprehensive strategic alliance may only be a matter of time. China’s behaviour towards India will be a decisive factor in this calculus. Beijing faces two options: either adopt a more assertive approach towards India, possibly resulting in further tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the IOR, or mitigate the antagonistic relationship with New Delhi via diplomatic channels and geoeconomic incentives to prevent a second major conflict arena while dealing with the US in other parts of the world.
For its part, New Delhi has long anticipated geostrategic encirclement through Beijing’s so-called ‘string of pearls’ approach. While Beijing treats New Delhi as a second-order rival due to its predominant focus on the systemic competition with the US, India considers China the primary existential threat to its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, India sees itself confronted by two nuclear powers both of which are immediate neighbours. Consequently, New Delhi also follows a two-fold approach incorporating both, terrestrial and maritime components in its strategic response.
To counterbalance the growing Chinese presence in the IOR and its direct neighbourhood, India is expanding its network of regional and bilateral partnerships through various security and defence constellations, “while playing as well, carefully but with dedication, the card of the Indo-Pacific”. As a ‘middle power’ positioned between Washington and Beijing with ambitious regional power projection capabilities, its main goal is to establish strategic autonomy in its relations with other key players such as the US, Russia, Japan, and Australia, while carefully navigating complex relationships with China and Pakistan. Ultimately, India’s approach aims to partially replace China by cutting domestic economic dependencies, while simultaneously attracting foreign investors who similarly seek to diversify supply chains, production processes, and trade ties away from Beijing.
New arenas of competition
While both China and India have become more active in various international and regional organisations, Beijing is in the lead once again. Even though New Delhi has actively participated in China-led organisational formats such as BRICS, AIIB and SCO, it has refrained from participating in trade blocs such as RCEP due to geoeconomic considerations. The RCEP represents the world's largest trading bloc with ASEAN countries with the participation of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, while excluding major economic powers such as the US, the EU, and India. India pulled out of the treaty due to fears of unequal competition with China in addition to its boycott of Chinese products, services and technology solutions.
Regional and international organisations are likely to become another playground for India and China to seek relative advantages. The United Nations Security Council will be an important arena for diplomatic clashes in the next two years since New Delhi is a non-permanent member until 2023. Neither the clashes with China along the disputed Himalayan border nor the Chinese presence on the Tibetan Plateau are expected to diminish or to be resolved diplomatically in the coming years, therefore, incidents between the Indian and Chinese troops can be expected to occur repeatedly.
From a geopolitical point of view, the new great game will be predominantly situated in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean due to rising competition between the two Asian giants, in addition to the systemic rivalry between China and the US. The close relationship between China and Pakistan, as well as coordination between China and Russia (the Dragonbear), are key examples of fluid regional formations that will have a major impact on India. Given that China and India will be the two major powers of the Indo-Pacific region, their relationship will increasingly be shaped by competition and confrontation in their quest for shaping this common geopolitical space.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Velina Tchakarova is Director of the Austrian Institute for Europe and International Security (AIES). She holds an M.A. in political science/political science of South Asia from the University in Heidelberg, Germany and a B.A. in international relations from the University of World and National Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria. Her scope of work includes research, lecturing and consulting on the topics of Global System Transformation, geostrategy of global actors and the role of the EU in Eastern Europe. An earlier version of this article appeared in TDHJ Special Edition I/21. Geopolitics. February 2021, p. 14-19. Image credit: Wikipedia