Myanmar coup: What happens to the peace process now?

9 March 2021

The recent military coup in Myanmar has abruptly ended the country’s short-lived yet much-touted experiment with democracy. As its future looks into a bottomless abyss of uncertainty, even the most experienced observers of Burmese politics have little idea of what will happen in the coming months, yet one thing is clear — the rough, yet visible, path to ethnic peace and reconciliation has now disappeared.

The peace process before the coup

Despite all its faults, Myanmar did embark on a formal peace process before the Generals decided to go for the nuclear option last month. ‘National reconciliation’ was one of the main planks on which the now-deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in 2015 after the country’s first free-and-fair election in over six decades. It was a natural political platform for any mainstream party given the nearly half a century of armed conflict between the military and dozens of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) fighting for ethnic autonomy. Under the close supervision of its leader and Nobel laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD created an elaborate peace-making bureaucracy to serve as a multi-stakeholder institutional framework for ethnic reconciliation. This was premised on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was introduced by the quasi-civilian Thein Sein administration (2011-15) under the Tatmadaw’s guidance.

The NCA, meant to be a pre-condition for any EAO to secure a seat at the negotiating table, was a breakthrough agreement in many ways. By 2018, ten EAOs, out of some thirty active groups, had agreed to stop their armed struggle and sign the document. It also set-up the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) and Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPJDC) which together, along with the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) created by the NLD government, were the three key nodal points of the peace process.

With the latest putsch, all of that is practically dead.

Why was the peace process crucial?

The peace process, which the NLD took full control over after 2015, had many structural flaws and practical constraints. It excluded a large set of well-armed EAOs and was held back by obstinate positions over sticky issues. Nonetheless, it reflected something very crucial — the collective will to achieve lasting peace and build a federal democratic union. For a country ravaged by more than sixty years of incessant civil wars, that mattered quite a lot. It also provided a common platform for various EAOs, ethnic parties, the Tatmadaw, civilian government and civil society groups to come together and hash out their differences without the fear of coercive action or a zero-sum conflict. It fostered a rare kind of institutional amiability and a sense of common purpose, giving the impression that Naypyidaw was finally serious about peace and ethnic autonomy, even if very slowly. Most importantly, the nascent peace process attempted to put minority ethnic representative groups on par with other national stakeholders and reduce the Tatmadaw, at least on paper, to just one of the many negotiating parties on the table.

All these signs point to a dark reality — the peace process as we knew it has collapsed and national reconciliation is no more a viable prospect. Needless to say, this forebodes a fresh spurt of armed conflict around the country. The situation, of course, could abruptly change if somehow the coup fails and a civilian government comes to power.

In that sense, Suu Kyi’s peace process did have some of the Panglong spirit of ethnic reconciliation and unity that her father, General Aung San, once dreamt of. She even revived it through the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference (21CPC), which became the NLD government’s flagship peace forum. The fourth (and latest) iteration of the conference was held in August 2020 — three months before the now-invalidated general election. Ironically, Suu Kyi outlined the blueprint for continued political dialogue in the post-election phase during this meeting and talked about expanding the dialogue to include non-NCA EAOs and ways to achieve a democratic federal union. Stakeholders also signed the Union Accord-III, which laid out a strategy to implement the 51 ‘basic principles’ agreed upon in the earlier iterations. There was fresh energy around the table and a strong sense of hope that negotiations would go on, no matter what.

What happens now?

Soon after overthrowing the elected government on 1 February, the military reconfigured its peace negotiation team and abolished the NRPC, which was the nerve centre of Suu Kyi’s peace process. During his first speech on 8 February, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said that the peace process would move forward based on the NCA. Then on 16 February, during its first press conference after the coup, the military-led State Administrative Council (SAC) announced the creation of three new bodies for continued dialogue with EAOs — the National Solidarity and Peace Making Committee (NSPMC) led by SAC chair Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, for policy-making; the National Solidarity and Peace Making Working Committee (NSPMWC), led by SAC deputy chair Vice Senior General Soe Win, meant for policy implementation; and the National Unity and Negotiation Committee (NUNC) led by Lieutenant-General Yar Pyae (who previously headed the Tatmadaw’s negotiations team and later the JCMC) to negotiate with EAOs.

However, since 1 February, the other stakeholders have only grown more disillusioned. The 10 NCA signatories organised under the Peace Process Steering Committee (PPST) initially released a statement noting that the coup had “reversed the course” of the democratic transition but agreed to work with the military under the NCA framework. Even so, in a volte-face on 20 February, the PPST announced the suspension of political talks with the military administration. It also lent firm support to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and demanded the release of all political prisoners.

So far, three signatory EAOs — the Karen National Union (KNU), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) — have issued formal statements condemning the coup and extending support to peaceful anti-coup protests. Since the KNU and RCSS particularly have clashed with the Tatmadaw on several instances in the last few years, their opposition to military rule doesn’t come as a surprise. However, the KNU’s strong position against the military shows how seriously the NCA process has been hit. The group, one of Myanmar’s most influential EAOs and the largest of all the NCA signatories, has vowed to protect peaceful protestors. Indeed, on 5 March, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) troops were seen accompanying demonstrators in the state. On the same day, the KNU’s Mutraw District Steering Committee (Brigade 5), a powerful arm of the group, released a strong statement demanding an end to the coup. KNU leaders and soldiers have also been seen flashing the anti-coup three-finger salute in a recent virtual meeting. It is worth noting that the KNLA and Tatmadaw engaged in heavy clashes in January and the latter reportedly continues to deny access to humanitarian aid meant for displaced Karen civilians.

Amongst the non-signatories, the KIA has taken a somewhat critical position against the coup. While avoiding any official public statement, Vice Chairman Lt Gen Gun Maw urged the Tatmadaw to avoid violent crackdowns in a Facebook post dated 8 February and stated that the KIO would raise its voice in defence of the people if such a thing were to happen. Since then, there have been reports of the Tatmadaw clashing with the KIA in Kachin State.

Bloody past, bleak present, but a better future?

All these signs point to a dark reality — the peace process as we knew it has collapsed and national reconciliation is no more a viable prospect. Needless to say, this forebodes a fresh spurt of armed conflict around the country. The situation, of course, could abruptly change if somehow the coup fails and a civilian government comes to power. At the heart of this unravelling is a historical lack of trust between the Tatmadaw and Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities. This paralysing trust deficit had just begun to close, thanks to incremental gains made by the civilian peace process but with the military now taking absolute control, ethnic groups, at least the NCA signatories, are back to rejecting political dialogue. Given their bitter historical experience under military rule, they certainly do not trust the Generals to give them genuine ethnic autonomy or a guarantee of non-aggression.

Those that hadn’t signed the NCA, who are now organised under the Federal Political Negotiations and Coordination Committee (FPNCC) led by Myanmar’s largest EAO, United Wa State Army (UWSA), were already against the NCA-led process. The coup doesn’t make much of a difference to them, but a military dictatorship in Naypyidaw and the closure of all doors to future negotiation makes things more difficult. An expansion of the formal dialogue process to include them, as was proposed by Suu Kyi last August, looks impractical now. There are some exceptions. Certain groups like the Arakan Army (AA), which inked an unexpected 'informal ceasefire' with the Tatmadaw at the end of last year, might want to stay neutral for now to secure politico-strategic concessions for their own populations. Others like the UWSA, which is cosy with China, would want to wait and see if they can hedge their bets and strengthen their position in future talks. Despite this bleak reality, however, we must remember that this is a moment of extraordinary social and political transformation. The coup has brought together various ethnic groups in a way that hasn’t been seen in decades.

Most notably, the coup seems to be bridging the gap of apathy between ethnic minorities and the Bamar majority, from which the Tatmadaw has traditionally drawn its legitimacy. Calls to create a democratic federal union, which the ethnic minorities had been making tirelessly so far, are now being iterated more widely and clearly. At the same time, smaller ethnic groups are fearlessly asserting their unique identities once again, while also standing by each other.

So it is possible that if and when the coup ends and a civilian government returns to Naypyidaw, a new peace process will rise from the ashes — one that is fed by a deeper and broader appetite for unity, empathy, and understanding. By standing together against a common enemy, Myanmar’s fractured social milieu might just transcend its bloody past and foster a new united future.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Angshuman Choudhury is a Senior Researcher and Coordinator of the Southeast Asia Research Programme at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, and former GIBSA Visiting Fellow to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. Image credit: Flickr/Syed Shameel.