Clouds on the horizon: Sino-German relations and the Bundestag election

21 September 2021

Sunday, 26 September 2021 will mark a significant turning point in Germany’s political system: after the federal elections, Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has governed the country since 2005, will leave office. Although who will succeed her remains an open question, one thing is certain: the new chancellor will have to navigate rough international waters.

The geopolitical climate is becoming increasingly tense as the US-China competition intensifies, and the US demands support from key European allies like Germany. Within Germany, party preferences collide over how to deal with the two world powers. How these preferences are reflected in the election programmes of the six parties with the largest voter bases gives an idea of the already difficult domestic waters that a new chancellor will have to master. After all, since no party is likely to win an absolute majority in Germany, a governing coalition must first be negotiated in which the concerned parties can balance their political positions. So, what can we glean from the election programmes with regard to Sino-German relations?

German coalition in limbo

Six parties are likely to enter the German Bundestag with significant vote shares. According to opinion polls, Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and the Greens (Alliance 90/The Greens) are likely to achieve the largest vote shares. One of the candidates from these three parties is therefore most likely to become the next German chancellor: Armin Laschet (CDU/CSU), Olaf Scholz (SPD), or Annalena Baerbock (the Greens). The polls fluctuate so widely, however, that the winner of the election remains unclear.

The CDU/CSU, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP warn against digital competition with China. As these are the four parties with the largest predicted vote shares, their ideas for reinforcing the digital economy, critical infrastructure, and network security will shape Germany's relations with China as well as the US.

In addition to the three major parties, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), The Left (Die Linke), and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) are also likely to enter the Bundestag and could be available for coalition talks. Due to its extreme right and populist position, the AfD is not expected to be involved in any of the five most likely coalitions. For the other parties, all possible coalition arrangements are being played out in the media. Depending on the coalition, we can expect a more balanced-pragmatic or value-oriented-confrontational German foreign policy toward China. Which party can be expected to adopt which orientation is already evident from the respective election programmes.

At first glance, it becomes apparent that attention to China’s importance for Germany has increased among all parties. Each party has formulated its own positions or even dedicated a separate section to the country, such as the CDU/CSU or the FDP. Having said that, China is still not among the top priorities of the German parties. Domestic issues play a much larger role in the election programmes than foreign policy, which is typical for German elections. In foreign policy, the European Union, relations with the US, and Germany’s role in NATO rank higher than China, as the structure of the SPD or CDU/CSU election programme shows. At the same time, China is often the elephant in the room; for instance, the CDU/CSU calls for greater coordination with the US to strengthen the technology leadership of the value-based West. Hence, much is written between the lines about Germany’s future relations with China, including global challenges such as shaping trade relations or tackling climate change.

Pragmatism meets values

Germany should meet China at eye level: this is the CDU/CSU’s headline message. They argue for a hedging strategy involving a dual approach of cooperating with China wherever possible but also taking a firm stand and balancing China’s power when necessary. The Union uses the widely known EU triad to define China as a partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. The Greens similarly advocate the EU triad and a hedging strategy, but their election programme reads as much more value-oriented. The human rights situation in Hong Kong or Xinjiang, for example, is criticised by the Greens, the SPD, and the FDP, but not in the election programme of Merkel’s party. All of these parties tend to be transatlantic in orientation, and thus they too favour greater Chinese participation in international arms control and disarmament efforts.

In contrast, the AfD describes China primarily as a trading partner for Germany and does not address human rights issues. Nevertheless, the AfD sees China's growing global influence as a challenge and, like the CDU/CSU, advocates cooperation based on equality and fairness. To this end, the CDU/CSU aims to increase Germany’s diplomatic weight. The Union seeks closer cooperation with partners with shared values including Australia, Japan, India, South Korea and other democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Certainly, this takes up US President Joe Biden’s proposal to forge a global democratic alliance, which received widespread attention in Germany, primarily through Biden’s speech at the Virtual Munich Security Conference in February 2021.

We can also find this idea among the Greens and the FDP, though with a more confrontational note. The former sees China as systematically undermining human rights with its authoritarian hegemonic aspirations. To avert this, the Greens suggest closer transatlantic and European coordination. The FDP adds that a NATO strategy for coping with China should be promoted. In contrast, the Left Party sharply condemns the construction of enemy images of China and Russia in NATO and EU strategy papers. According to them, a new Cold War is looming as a result of what the Left Party considers to be a struggle for supremacy by the US and the EU. Against this, they advocate a policy geared towards détente and pursuing peace and disarmament, which resembles the approach of equidistance. Even though some parties prefer a tougher stance on China than others, the bottom line is that for all of them, dialogue and cooperation with China on key global issues will remain indispensable.

The future of Sino-German relations

The election programmes list several areas where national deliberation and international cooperation are needed. Among the most pressing issues are climate change, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and technological competition. Addressing climate change is, of course, most explicitly called for by the Greens, who state that a global socio-ecological transformation is impossible without China. This issue is particularly promising because it is one of the few policy domains in which the US is also willing to work closely with China. A German government could thus accommodate the traditional transatlantic partnership and seek greater Chinese involvement in multilateral regimes. One possibility would be to engage in a broader trilateral climate dialogue with both Washington and Beijing. Such consultations should aim to involve China’s Green Belt and Road Initiative; even if this initiative is criticised for its voluntary approach, it still opens up space for cooperation. The Green BRI remains neglected in the election programmes and among the German public.

Concerning the BRI in general, a more confrontational future seems likely. Only the AfD proposes to “participate offensively” in the BRI: The AfD argues that Germany should complement China's East-West strategy with cross-regional infrastructure projects from the West to the East. Meanwhile, the CDU and FDP, which could form a governing coalition, want to develop a European alternative to the BRI. The existing EU Connectivity Strategy could serve as a vehicle for achieving this goal. Both parties favour stronger ties with the US and engagement with democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific region. This could result in a natural partnership with the US-proposed “Build Back Better World” (3BW) plan. As part of the G7, Germany agreed to 3BW in June 2021 and will play a steering role in 2022 due to its G7 presidency. A European alternative to the BRI could thus coalesce with transatlantic endeavours. This raises the concern that the Chinese BRI will be pushed back sharply, exacerbating systemic rivalry. Although the German parties have realised that the BRI requires an answer, their ideas are yet to be elaborated. The future German government is thus advised to take the issue more seriously and initiate a broader debate on the BRI nationally, on a European level and in a transatlantic view.

Tensions may further be exacerbated by widely shared proposals to strengthen Germany's and Europe's technological competitiveness. The CDU/CSU, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP warn against digital competition with China. As these are the four parties with the largest predicted vote shares, their ideas for reinforcing the digital economy, critical infrastructure, and network security will shape Germany's relations with China as well as the US. The latter is affected because three of these four parties — except the Union — describe Germany as being involved in a technological competition with the United States. Therefore, the next federal government must provide comprehensive answers as to how to regulate critical infrastructures, scientific cooperation, or research and development within and outside Europe. The debates on the development of 5G networks have already shown that there is neither a German nor a European consensus on critical digital issues. This will be a mammoth task to achieve.

Clouds on the horizon

The election programmes of the major German parties for the 2021 federal election convey that German-Chinese relations will become more difficult. A CDU/CSU chancellorship seems to be the most pragmatic force that will stay on the current government’s course. However, the Union’s election platform also emphasises the need for balancing Chinese aspirations and thus taking a tougher stance.

In comparison, the SPD, the FDP and the Greens advocate a stricter China policy that is more sensitive to human rights violations. A values-based shift is likely in a coalition with at least one of these parties, which may revive old tensions in Sino-German relations. This is nothing new: Germany has always struggled to find a balance between its economic interests and its values toward China. With these clouds on the horizon, the time is almost ripe for a parliamentary debate from which a much-needed China strategy should emerge.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Christiane Heidbrink is a research fellow at the Center for Global Studies (CGS) at the University of Bonn. As project manager of the Bonn Power Shift Monitor (BPSM), she explores the political implications of global power shifts, including in particular China's international rise. Following her master's thesis on security sector reform in Afghanistan, she is now pursuing a PhD on security discourses about China's BRI. Image credit: Wikipedia.