In Conversation with Andrea Ghiselli
In Conversation: ANDREA GHISELLI on Protecting China’s Interests Overseas
IN CONVERSATION WITH ANDREA GHISELLI
22 September 2021
We recently sat down with Dr Andrea Ghiselli to discuss his new book, Protecting China’s Interests Overseas, which explores the evolution of Chinese foreign and security policymaking.
Your book challenges the perception that the Chinese government is somehow more strategic and prudent than other governments by providing an absorbing overview of how foreign and security policy is made in China — could you tell us what drew you to this topic and why this matters?
I found myself studying China’s approach to the protection of its interests overseas, especially the role of the military in those efforts, and particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, for two main reasons. The first was dissatisfaction with the mainstream narrative and explanations about Chinese foreign and security policy as a product of highly strategic calculations and driven by the constant desire to challenge US influence. The second was the desire to shed light on a crucial side of Chinese actions in a part of the world that is of critical importance for Italy, my home country, and Europe.
You note the importance of Libya as a turning point in Chinese foreign policy. How might current events, especially the COVID-19 pandemic and the situation unfolding in Afghanistan affect the broader landscape of Chinese foreign policymaking?
The events in Libya exposed two main problems in China’s approach to the protection of its interests overseas. The first one concerns the mismatch between the extreme unpredictability of events in foreign countries, China’s own lack of capabilities to intervene in an effective manner, as well as Chinese companies’ lack of preparation to face security crises. The second problem touches upon the understanding of the idea of “interests overseas”. Until that moment, many thought about them in terms of things of economic value to China and its companies, such as assets or contracts. Yet, the expansion of the international activities of Chinese engineering contractors made that idea dangerously obsolete. The number of Chinese workers overseas created a new type of liability for Chinese policymakers because the political value of protecting the life of a citizen is vastly superior to that of, for example, ensuring the payment of a contract. However, it is important to highlight that sudden, large-scale events like those in Libya are not frequent. Today, the number of unstable countries that host a large number of Chinese workers is very small. Although both COVID-19 and Afghanistan surely present a number of challenges to Chinese diplomacy, they belong to different categories of emergency from something like Libya. I do not believe that these events will have an impact on Chinese foreign policy similar to Libya, though events in Afghanistan might change this assessment.
You describe the growing role of think tanks in Chinese policymaking while observing that many members of this community are former military and government officials. How does this affect the quality of knowledge and analysis that informs policymaking, and despite the growth of research activities, do these occur in an ‘echo chamber’?
Famously, large bureaucracies, not just in China, are exceptional at generating useful information that often does not reach policymakers. This problem can be worse when knowledge is “stored” only in a few places, as has long been the case when it comes to area studies in China. In recent years, many resources have been invested to expand that knowledge base. The public and scholarly debate on the Middle East has boomed, for example, and, probably the policy recommendations have improved as well, though the risk of “echo chamber” is difficult to eliminate.
In your view, how will China's overseas' activities evolve and how will it deploy its own security actors to safeguard BRI projects, such as the CPEC in Pakistan?
I do not think we will see another base like Djibouti any time soon. Opening a base there had become necessary because of the scale of Chinese interests and already existing military activities in the region. At the same time, it was ‘easy’ because of the presence of other foreign militaries there. I cannot think of other similar places. As to ‘security actors’, it depends on which actors and in what context. Chinese private security companies are already operating abroad despite their limited capabilities. Teams from the Ministry of Public Security already travel abroad to investigate accidents involving Chinese nationals, as in Pakistan in July this year. In comparison, the chances of Chinese special forces raiding a terrorist camp or similar operations remain extremely low. In my opinion, China will prefer to keep a low profile and work with local authorities to secure its interests overseas.
How concerned should democratic countries be about China's military activities, and is it just doing what is expected of any "responsible great power" or should democracies be worried?
I think Western policymakers should keep in mind two things. First, their Chinese counterparts have little appetite for military adventures overseas. Moreover, China mostly deploys troops overseas within the framework of the UN. While China has worked to diminish the role of human rights promotion in peacekeeping missions, it can hardly be said that Chinese contingents are a threat to democracy around the world. On the contrary, given the scarcity of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers, Chinese troops make a non-trivial contribution to international peace.
Second, China is rather agnostic about the form of government of other countries. For example, past studies show that China sold many more weapons to democracies in Africa than the United States. What matters is stability. Beyond the usual narrative, China behaves in this way because it fits with its interests, of course. China and Western countries have different positions about human rights and what is the best political system, but looking at Chinese military activities overseas through this lens is of no analytical value.
In your opinion, how can China best protect its interests in Central Asia amid concerns that the Taliban or entities such as AQ and/or IS may attempt to involve themselves in the issue of Xinjiang with potential implications for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative?
This is a question that I am sure puzzles many in Beijing. I believe that the best way forward for Beijing is one based on cooperation with other countries on the one hand, and co-optation and inducement targeted to those who are ready to write China off the list of potential targets on the other. Of course, this is a difficult and complex game that will require great flexibility and skills for Beijing to play it. Unpredictable dynamics among terrorist organisations and changes in the interests of other countries might easily make Chinese efforts fail. That said, it is difficult to think about much better options.
Where do you see the position of the principle of non-interference as the core norm guiding China’s foreign policy (rhetoric) going as its overseas' interests increase?
This is an important debate. The Chinese have added different caveats that allow for a more flexible foreign policy. Moreover, they have also worked to make Chinese actions in the security realm easier to ‘digest’ for its partners as they are often framed within a narrative focused on economic development. That said, it seems to me that Chinese policymakers are fully aware of the costs that shelving that principle would imply. This is why cooperation with local authorities and the security forces of the host country is a priority. As in the case of Pakistan in July, I doubt that Chinese unilateral intervention in that country would have increased the security of Chinese assets and workers; rather, this would have provoked a strong backlash at the diplomatic level. As tensions between China and the US grow every day, diplomatic support from other countries, especially those in the developing world is essential for China.
Which lessons do you feel the West and in particular Europe has yet to fully learn about China; specifically in relation to strategy and its appetite for risk when it comes to the protection of its overseas interests?
I think that Europe has failed to truly understand that China is an increasingly important stakeholder in Africa and the Middle East. This is clear if one looks at the 2019 “EU-China – A strategic outlook” joint communication: the economic and military/security aspects of the Chinese presence in Africa and the Middle East are treated as distinct and separated from each other. This makes Europe blind to two key interrelated issues. First, European actions in those regions can have a significant impact on Chinese interests, and thus, how China acts there and vis-à-vis Europe. Libya is a good example of this. European countries, especially France and the UK, took the lead in bombing that country, thereby worsening the situation of Chinese companies and workers there. As I mentioned earlier and analyse in detail in my book, that event provoked a deep rethink in China about the role of the military in foreign policy. At the same time, it significantly hardened the Chinese stance over Syria, for example.
The second issue is that China will become more active in those regions to protect its interests, which might create both opportunities for cooperation and challenges. An effective European foreign policy requires accepting the fact that Beijing is an important actor and interlocutor for many in those regions thanks to its economic strength and diplomatic clout, as well as understanding the drivers of its behaviour. This will not be possible as long as Europe continues looking at China only as a market and/or solely as an Asian power.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Andrea Ghiselli is an assistant professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs of Fudan University. He is also the head of research of the TOChina Hub’s ChinaMed Project. His research revolves around Chinese foreign policy and China’s role in the wider Mediterranean region, with a special focus on Sino-Middle Eastern relations. Andrea is the author of the book Protecting China’s Interests Overseas: Securitization and Foreign Policy that was published by Oxford University Press in 2021.