2022: Russia the other Pacific power

14 January 2022

Although China and the US are at the forefront of discussions concerning Indo-Pacific geopolitics, Russia remains a significant actor in the region. While the spotlight is currently on its moves against Ukraine, Russia has been strengthening ties with China, has a long-standing territorial dispute with Japan, and has maintained a historically significant strategic relationship with India, among other interests in the region.

Here, 9DASHLINE invites a select group of leading experts to consider why Russia appears to fly under the radar in the Indo-Pacific, and what role it may play in regional security dynamics in the coming months.

DEEPENING SINO-RUSSIAN ALIGNMENT

Natasha Kuhrt, Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London.

Russia’s view of the region tends to be through the lens of China, given the Sino-Russian alignment. This falls slightly short of an alliance but is strengthening in all spheres, particularly military cooperation. Russia previously strove to maintain strategic autonomy by diversifying relations, eg with Japan and South Korea, but Russian rapprochement with Japan has been hostage to the territorial dispute, and China’s economic ascendancy makes rapprochement less attractive.

Relations with India are more promising, although, given India’s role as a linchpin of its Indo-Pacific strategy, Russia was often suspicious and hostile. However, India’s non-aligned stance has meant that New Delhi has been reluctant to be seen as containing China, seeking instead to emphasise the influence of ASEAN and the East Asia Summits — forums more appealing to Russia as potential counterweights to US hegemony. A significant uptick in Sino-Russian military cooperation is the naval drills that Russia has conducted with China since 2016. In December 2020, Russia deployed an S-300 missile defence system to the disputed Kuril Islands. Thus, joint exercises with China in the Sea of Japan, as well as Russian drills there, look provocative, although Russia’s Pacific Fleet remains more focused on sea access denial.

Since 2019, Russia and China have undertaken joint bomber patrols annually, eliciting protests in both Tokyo and Seoul. Nevertheless, while this might seem to run counter to Russia’s avowed ‘neutral’ stance on Chinese territorial disputes, this is low risk for Russia. This is in part as the US itself has yet to articulate a clear strategy for the region, and as Washington has largely neglected ties with Vietnam and the Philippines in Southeast Asia. Moscow has maintained good relations with both these states, especially on energy and arms sales, and the region’s share of Russian trade has increased relative to that with EU countries. While Russia is not a major player in the region, given Russia’s disdain for human rights, it has the flexibility to reach out to regimes that would be deemed anathema to the West. Finally, a two-theatre conflict collaboration between Russia and China would reduce the efficacy of US economic and political pressure.

A FORGOTTEN PACIFIC POWER WITH A GROWING MILITARY PRESENCE

Joe Varner, former Director of Policy to Canada's Minister of Defence and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point's Modern War Institute.

Since the end of the Second World War, Russia has been a forgotten Pacific power and has flown under the radar with few exceptions. But Russia does have an ability to project power throughout the Indo-Pacific should it choose to do so. In a sense, it is an aggressive China and the countering of the United States that draws all the attention. To many casual observers, Russia is considered a European power threatening NATO interests in the Baltic and Central Europe. But a quick look at Russian moves in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 points to a different picture, and sets the stage for 2022 and beyond.

Russia and China are strategic partners, and this partnership is a direct challenge to the US and its allies — particularly Japan, the lynchpin of US interest in the Pacific. It is Moscow that puts pressure on this key US ally, either with China or on its own, in an attempt to disrupt American military alliances in the region. As part of Zapad 2021 (August), we saw a joint Russian-Chinese ground-focused war exercise (hosted by China) for the first time. In mid-October, Russia and China held joint naval exercises off the coast of Honshu (Japan), fielding five warships each for the war games. The later part of November last year saw the third joint Russian-China strategic air patrol of the East China Sea, using nuclear-capable Tu-95 and H-6 bomber aircraft.

In December, Russia continued its militarisation of the Russian-controlled Kuril Islands — taken from Japan in the last days of the Second World War — by deploying Bastion anti-ship missiles to the Island of Matua. These missiles could threaten targets 500 kilometres from shore, causing consternation in Japan. For Russia and China, 2021 was a landmark year for their strategic partnership, which saw them jointly exercising on land, sea and in the air in operations directed at and geared to intimidate Japan. We can expect more of the same in 2022 and beyond, with Japan their joint target.

A POTENTIALLY INDISPENSABLE REGIONAL PARTNER

Velina Tchakarova, Director of the Austrian Institute for Europe and International Security (AIES).

Russia sees the global focus shifting to Eurasia (Central Asia, South Caucasus, Eastern Europe), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan) and the Indo-Pacific region. Moscow vehemently opposes the emergence of geopolitical blocs in the Indo-Pacific and has now created a two-front scenario against the US by coordinating its position on Ukraine with Beijing's position on Taiwan. Russia's engagement in the Indo-Pacific could take place through a few possible geopolitical corridors.

Currently, Moscow is expanding its military presence in Africa and is seeking to build military bases in several African countries, including Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan. This is one way in which Russia could acquire direct access to the Indian Ocean and, in the long run, project its power in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, despite the deepening of relations between Moscow and Beijing, India remains a strategic and traditionally reliable partner of Russia. Indeed, Moscow has managed to build the best relationship with China (the Dragonbear), and at the same time consolidate its long-standing strategic partnership with India.

Diplomatically, Russia supports China's stand on the Indo-Pacific, openly opposing geopolitical blocs such as the US-UK-Australia Security and Defence Pact (AUKUS) and QUAD (US, India, Australia, and Japan). Moscow is also open to India's proposition for a more active Russian role in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi and Moscow share a geoeconomic interest in creating an alternative to China's terrestrial BRI connectivity in South and Central Asia, which is why they are promoting the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as a multimodal transit route connecting India with Europe, Central Asia and Russia.

Even if Russia does not play a key role in the competition between the major powers of the Indo-Pacific right now, the country could become an indispensable partner in the future geopolitical constellations in this most significant geographical area. Russia remains an important player with significant geopolitical potential for both China and India. Moscow's actions during the 2020 border tensions between China and India have clearly shown that it prefers the role of a mediator, seeking to defuse possible escalations rather than taking sides. In sum, Russia has a strong interest in supplying arms to both countries and will only renounce this opportunity with great reluctance if tensions arise between the two Asian giants in the Indo-Pacific in the future.

AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA

Thomas Bruce, PhD student at the Political Science Department of the University of Toronto and a veteran of the Royal Canadian Navy.

In light of a potential conflict in Ukraine, and the belief that Russia lacks the material power to be an important player in the Indo-Pacific, it may seem fruitless to speculate on what impact its activities there could have in 2022. These latter two points are emphasised in a recent book by the historian Chris Miller, who argues that Russia has long been unable to meaningfully pivot to Asia and leave the West behind. Although compelling, this view overlooks Russia’s long ties to India and the complexity this brings vis-à-vis the Quad or Sino-Russian relations, to say nothing of long-standing territorial disputes with Japan, another key member of the Quad. Russia’s declining arms sales to Southeast Asia will still challenge efforts to cope with the crisis in Myanmar, and it will remain an attractive partner for ASEAN states looking to balance the material heft of China in the region.

With this in mind, the Indo-Pacific presents Russia with the opportunity to still act and be perceived as a Great Power via its ties to Southeast Asian states and key Quad members like India or Japan. This will likely become more important in 2022, as Russia faces stark limits to its influence in Europe and uncertainty in Central Asia, and as China expands its economic and now security presence. Instead of viewing Russia through the lens of failed pivots, we should instead ask why the Indo-Pacific seems to provide a less dangerous space for Russia to pursue engagement and competition, as well as what this might say about regional dynamics beyond the US and China.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Wikimedia.