Will Vietnam become a Quad Plus member?
Will Vietnam become a Quad Plus
member?
WRITTEN BY BICH T TRAN
27 January 2021
On 20 March 2020, Vietnam (together with New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) was invited to join a conference call with members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The 7-member group dubbed ‘Quad Plus’ discussed collective measures to countering the COVID-19 pandemic and agreed on weekly calls to cooperate on related issues, such as economic assistance and vaccine development. It also notably sought to reduce dependence on China in the global supply chains.
Since the Quad is increasingly perceived regionally as an anti-China block, despite its members’ efforts to push back on the narrative, the question arises as to whether Vietnam will continue to work closely with the group after the global health crisis? To answer this question, we need to understand what the Quad is, why Beijing is a problem for both the Quad and Vietnam, why Vietnam might be a good addition to the Quad, and whether the country should join the quartet at all.
Understanding the Quad
Beijing has viewed the Quad as a threat since the group held its first senior official-level meeting in 2007 to discuss regional security issues. In 2008 Australia, under then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, pulled back from the Quad to protect its economic relationship with China, leading to the grouping becoming inactive. Nevertheless, the Quad reemerged in 2017 with stronger alignment and commitment as the block upgraded its meetings to the ministerial level in 2019.
As the two countries share a socialist ideology, Hanoi has built close party-to-party relations with Beijing which serve as conduits to tone down the South China Sea disputes. Although Vietnam might agree with the core objectives of the Quad, it is less likely to be enthusiastic about publicly adding its name to a group that seeks to counter China.
The Quad’s geographical and ideological foundations were envisioned by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his speech entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas” (the Pacific and the Indian Oceans) at the Indian Parliament in 2007. Japan and India came together as part of a ‘broader Asia’, and then incorporated the United States and Australia, forming a vast network crossing the entirety of the Pacific Ocean.
The Quad nations consist of “like-minded countries” coming together to ensure the security of sea lanes in the “seas of freedom and of prosperity”. Japan, India, Australia, and the United States have all affirmed their support for a rule-based Indo-Pacific order and are committed to close cooperation on maritime security, quality infrastructure, and regional connectivity. The goal is to let people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely in an open and transparent network.
China’s posture in the South China Sea
Meanwhile, China has aggressively asserted its claims in the South China Sea through a series of actions that threaten regional security and economic prosperity. It has systematically interfered with oil and gas development by other claimants in the South China Sea, including Vietnam. Beijing reportedly threatened to attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands if Hanoi continued its oil and gas exploration in areas that lie within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but overlap with China’s so-called ‘9-dash line’.
China’s claims were ruled invalid by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal in relation to proceedings initiated by the Philippines. However, yielding to pressure from China, Vietnam ordered Spanish energy firm Repsol to suspend two of its projects in July 2017 and March 2018. The United States has criticised such coercive measures by China as a threat to regional energy security and the free and open Indo-Pacific energy market.
Moreover, China has repeatedly intruded into Vietnam’s sovereign waters. Notably, in May 2014, Beijing deployed a state-owned oil rig into Hanoi's EEZ leading to a dramatic series of anti-China protests and riots across Vietnam. Between early July and late October 2019, Beijing again sent a survey vessel with armed escorts to Vanguard Bank, which came as close as 65 nautical miles from the coast of Phu Yen Province.
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels have also been seen within the waters of other South China Sea claimants and have harassed their fishermen. One such incident in April 2020 saw the CCG ram and sink a Vietnamese fishing boat. The United States announced that it was “seriously concerned” by the incident and called upon China to “stop exploiting the distraction or vulnerability of other states to expand its unlawful claims in the South China Sea”.
In November 2020, however, China’s legislature released a draft of a new law granting the CCG permission to use weapons within the country’s claimed “jurisdictional waters”, heightening the risk of armed conflict in contested areas of the South China Sea such as the Paracel Islands. Furthermore, since 2014 China has conducted large-scale reclamation and militarisation of many disputed features. It has deployed a wide array of missiles on those artificial islands, which could be used to deny other countries access to the maritime and air domains of the South China Sea.
Vietnam’s diplomatic battles
Among Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam has been the most vocal opponent of China's territorial assertiveness, and the two countries are involved in bilateral and multilateral disputes over the ownership of the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, respectively. In its Note Verbale to the United Nations, Hanoi affirmed its sovereignty over the two archipelagoes and opposed any maritime claims in the South China Sea that exceed the limits provided in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including claims to historic rights. Vietnam supported the arbitral proceedings in the Philippines’ legal case against China and welcomed the award in 2016. It has also expressed appreciation for ongoing Freedom of Navigation Operations by the United States and its allies, which are important in upholding international law.
Moreover, (since becoming a member in 1995) Vietnam has turned to the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) to seek a collective voice and worked toward a conclusion of a Code of Conduct to curb China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. In addition, Vietnam has also raised the South China Sea disputes at other international forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, to seek international support for its stand.
Quad Plus or not?
Hanoi finds itself in a crucible. On the one hand, Vietnam has strong motivations to join the Quad as China’s actions in the South China Sea have a direct impact on its sovereignty and national interests. On the other, China plays an extremely important role in Vietnam’s economic development and regime survival. China has been Vietnam’s biggest trading partner since 2004. As the two countries share a socialist ideology, Hanoi has built close party-to-party relations with Beijing which serve as conduits to tone down the South China Sea disputes. Although Vietnam might agree with the core objectives of the Quad, it is less likely to be enthusiastic about publicly adding its name to a group that seeks to counter China.
Vietnam, however, might be more comfortable joining mechanisms that focus on economic aspects instead of security issues, like the US-led Economic Prosperity Network (EPN) that aims to diversify supply chains to reduce dependence on China. The network is comprised of “like-minded countries”, companies, institutions, and civil society that work under a set of “trust principles” and shared values, including accountability, reciprocity, transparency, respect for rule of law, and respect for the sovereignty of nations. Importantly, the EPN does not inhibit members from working with any country outside the network or force them to select one partnership over another.
Should Vietnam decide to join the EPN, it would not be forced to choose between China and the rest of the group. Thus, Vietnam should take this opportunity and work closely with members of the EPN to facilitate foreign investment and reduce its economic dependence on China.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Bich T. Tran is a PhD. Candidate at the University of Antwerp, a researcher at the Global Affairs Research Center in Kyoto, and a former Asia Studies Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, DC.
A version of this article was first published on the Asie Pacifique platform and has been reposted with the permission of the author. Image credit: US Pacific Fleet/Flickr.