What China’s assertive actions mean for the India-China border

7 January 2022

Of late, the Eastern Sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de-facto border between India and China, has seen an increase in Chinese activity. In November 2021, satellite images showed that China had allegedly constructed a village — a cluster of around 60 buildings — in the Shi Yomi district of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, about six kilometres within what India perceives to be its boundary with China.

This is not the first instance of Chinese constructions along the border. Last January, reports indicated that China had constructed an enclave of about 100 houses along the banks of the Tsari Chu River in Upper Subansiri, another district in Arunachal Pradesh. Additionally, India’s Eastern Army Commander stated in October 2021 that China had stepped up military exercises close to the border in the Eastern Sector. Further, a high number of reserve troops that had been mobilised at the beginning of the standoff in May 2020 continue to be deployed along the border. While it is not uncommon for either India or China to develop infrastructure in border areas or conduct military exercises close to the border, China’s increasingly assertive actions along the LAC bode ill for an unsettled border between two rising powers.

An unsettled boundary

At the heart of India-China border tensions lies a boundary dispute that goes back to the 1950s. Although India and China signed a Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement in 1993, in which they agreed to “strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides”, the two countries have not agreed on the precise location of the LAC. Both sides interpret the LAC as the extent to which they can exercise control along the frontier, however, these claims overlap at several points leading to periodic friction.

Beijing is keen to maintain its edge in border infrastructure and is in no rush to clarify the LAC, as it believes that an unsettled border will keep India limited to the region and prevent New Delhi from projecting its power globally.

Given that the LAC is not a settled boundary, the two countries have engaged in intermittent dialogue to find a mutually acceptable resolution to the dispute. They have also established a series of mechanisms for maintaining peace along the border. Even so, protracted border tensions and frequent standoffs suggest that existing measures may not be sufficient. In 2013, following a border standoff in Daulat Beg Oldi, the two countries signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), thereby setting up a new mechanism to defuse border tensions and avoid faceoffs between the Indian and Chinese militaries. However, since the BDCA came into effect, there have been standoffs at Chumar in 2014, Burtse in 2015, and Doklam in 2017, not to mention the current impasse in eastern Ladakh that has lasted more than a year and a half.

Today, the unsettled nature of the India-China border and the lack of meaningful dialogue is leading to the LAC becoming increasingly militarised. India and China are engaged in what some have described as an “infrastructure arms race” along the border where each country seeks to continuously develop border infrastructure for strategic and tactical reasons. This allows the two countries to deploy soldiers and equipment to the border more quickly and retain them close to the LAC for longer periods.

Since tensions escalated in 2020, India and China have also initiated a build-up of troops and weaponry along the border. While it is not clear how many troops Beijing has deployed to the LAC, New Delhi has moved around 50,000 troops from its border with Pakistan to the LAC and reoriented one of its three mechanised strike corps to counter a potential Chinese threat in Ladakh. Furthermore, India has deployed its newly acquired advanced weapons systems including the M777 howitzers and Rafale fighter aircraft close to the border with China. This redeployment signals that New Delhi is increasingly concerned about Beijing’s military capabilities along the frontier and is prepared to adopt a more aggressive posture. All things considered, it is almost a certainty that the LAC will increasingly feature in the security calculus of both countries and continue to bog down relations between them.

China’s new border law

While heightened tensions would warrant China embracing a softer approach to resolve the ongoing standoff, Beijing has instead opted for a more assertive position. In October, it adopted a border law which came into effect on 1 January 2022. On the surface, the law is simply an attempt to improve Beijing’s control of its borders and strengthen border protection. But it could have serious implications for India. To begin with, China’s new border law states that it will “take effective measures to resolutely protect territorial sovereignty and land border security”. This comes as China continues to engage in talks with India to settle the boundary dispute — consequently signalling Beijing’s resolve to settle the border on its own terms.

The border law also mentions that “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China are sacred and inviolable”. This is of concern to New Delhi as Chinese maps show parts of Ladakh, the Barahoti Plains in the state of Uttarakhand, and the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. This has raised speculation that any Indian territory that China occupies either militarily or through settling civilians within these areas will automatically be considered sovereign Chinese territory. In other words, the border law could legitimise China’s military incursions along the LAC and empower it to continue building villages in disputed areas to support its territorial claims. Indian observes have also pointed out that this provision will make it harder to resolve the ongoing standoff in eastern Ladakh as China is likely to refuse to withdraw any further and remain encamped in its current positions.

Furthermore, the law forbids the construction of permanent structures close to China’s border without the permission of the concerned Chinese authority. Here, the law’s vague wording could be interpreted to mean both sides of the border. Moreover, since the two countries differ on the exact alignment of the LAC in several areas, China might object to India constructing infrastructure on its own side of the border. This would create the potential for another point of border friction between the two countries.

As expected, shortly after the border law was passed, India expressed concerns over China’s new legal instrument. In response, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin sought to reassure New Delhi, stating that the border law “will not affect China’s compliance with existing treaties related to national land boundary affairs China has already signed or change China’s current mode of boundary management and cooperation with countries sharing a land boundary with it. Nor will it alter China’s position and proposition on relevant boundary issues”. However, given that India already considers China’s activities to be in violation of border agreements, it is unlikely that any Chinese statements will allay Indian apprehensions about China’s border law.

Border tensions in the long term?

Overall, the unsettled nature of the India-China border coupled with China’s aggressive moves along the LAC and its new border law suggest that tensions between the two countries are likely in the long term. While India has seldom shown the desire to initiate border talks, China does not seem to be interested in defusing tensions at all. It appears that Beijing is keen to maintain its edge in border infrastructure and is in no rush to clarify the LAC, as it believes that an unsettled border will keep India limited to the region and prevent New Delhi from projecting its power globally. Therefore, despite the clash in the Galwan Valley, which saw the death of 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese soldiers, Beijing has not changed its approach and continues to push India along the LAC.

Recent reports suggest that China has continued its military build-up opposite eastern Ladakh. It has deployed heavy weaponry such as missiles close to the border and ramped up the construction of new highways, habitats, and airstrips. It is even building a bridge across the Pangong Lake close to a disputed area between the two countries. This will probably lead to a proportionate response from India, which in turn, will deploy more troops and weapons systems along the border and strive to improve its own border infrastructure. New Delhi is already rushing to complete the strategic Zoji La tunnel that will enable all-weather connectivity between the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, and enhance military preparedness. Recently, it also announced 27 projects for roads and bridges in areas close to the LAC for facilitating the mobility of troops and weaponry and developing border areas. While India remains a long way behind China in terms of border infrastructure, it has indicated a strong desire to narrow the gap.

With an increasingly militarised India-China border, one can anticipate continued tensions along the LAC and perhaps more frequent border standoffs as well. There is a danger that a misunderstanding between the two countries along the frontier could lead to a conflict on the border far deadlier than the clash at the Galwan Valley — a proposition China’s recent actions do little to alleviate.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Rahul Bhatia is a Research Analyst in the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India. His research focuses on the India-China border and India’s foreign and defence policies. Image credit: Flickr/The Adventurous b3n.