The E3: Flexible mechanism for European engagement in the Indo-Pacific
The E3: Flexible Mechanism for European Engagement in the Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY ANISA HERITAGE
16 March 2021
When UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, releases the Integrated Review on 16 March, the UK’s post-Brexit foreign and defence policy, under the ‘Global Britain’ vision will start to take shape. Along with the much-anticipated details of the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, it is reported the review will focus on structures such as the E3, a diplomatic mechanism between the UK, France and Germany.
The E3
Established in the early 2000s, this loose diplomatic coalition became more formalised during the JCPOA negotiations with Iran. The forum gained prominence during the Brexit negotiations and amid tense US-EU relations under the Trump administration. Without a post-Brexit agreement on UK-EU defence and security arrangements, the E3 is likely to evolve into a regular and more strategically focused fixture in European diplomacy and security dialogue.
A key advantage of the E3 mechanism is its flexibility — being situated outside formal EU mechanisms but not precluding them. According to a June 2020 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, the E3 has jointly issued or participated in approximately sixty-seven statements between 2003 and 2020 on various international security issues and engaged different actors. Examples of successful small group initiatives include the May 2020 Joint Statement issued with the EU High Representative on the JCPOA, and with the US in February 2021. In November 2019, the Foreign Ministers of the Small Group on Syria, involving the E3, the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, issued a Joint Statement in support of the work of the UN in Syria.
While the EU deliberates on EU strategic autonomy and European Sovereignty, the E3 is in a good position to forge ahead with President Macron’s idea of a ‘flexible Europe’. Outlined in his 2017 Sorbonne speech, this approach would enable a small core group of countries to deepen ad hoc cooperation on foreign and security matters outside formal EU structures.
European Indo-Pacific strategies
The return of great power rivalry and the economic and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific has stimulated a focused effort on formulating Indo-Pacific strategies in European capitals: France (2018), Germany and the Netherlands (2020). Their strategies consistently focus on strengthening economic ties in the region along with climate change, peace and security, human rights and the rule of law. Equally important, is the recognition that diversification will reduce economic dependence on China — a growing source of concern in the Netherlands and Germany. European states are less unified on a potential security role.
France’s Indo-Pacific strategy emphasises its resident power status and obligations to protect its 1.6 million French citizens across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The UK’s presence originates in a long-established military presence in Brunei and a naval facility in Singapore. Through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the UK maintains regional security commitments and military partnerships with Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and Australia.
The maritime element of the Indo-Pacific tilt sets the tone for the UK government’s plans to maintain a persistent regional security presence. Carrier Strike Group (CSG21) will deploy to the Indo-Pacific region in the second half of 2021, having reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in January 2021, following the success of Joint Warrior Exercises involving diverse global partners in 2020.
France and the UK have independently conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. A French nuclear attack submarine conducted a patrol in the South China Sea as recently as February 2021. Germany is cautiously expanding regional security and defence cooperation and participation in maritime exercises. In 2021, it will send a frigate to Japan, offering support over the East China Sea disputes, and will traverse the South China Sea on its return, although not conducting a FONOP.
E3 security coordination in the Indo-Pacific
European aspirations to avoid the economic battle lines between Beijing and Washington for as long as possible mirrors Indo-Pacific openness to a European presence to act as a counterweight to US-China rivalry. How might a European security presence in the Indo-Pacific add value?
The EU has moved towards enhancing cooperation with Indo-Pacific states, through its Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia (May 2018). This strategy underlines the EU’s commitment to upscaling security engagement ‘in and with’ Asia, by developing partnerships and focusing on maritime, counter-terrorism, crisis management (peacekeeping) and cybersecurity. EU policy is evolving but has not yet translated into sustained commitments and capacity-building.
The E3 forum presents a foundational collaborative and flexible framework through which European states could be supported in undertaking a more active security role in the Indo-Pacific.
Utilise existing regional security groupings
E3 members will continue to coordinate and consolidate their existing maritime security relationships with Indo-Pacific partners. France has the FRANZ Arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, and the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In addition to FPDA, the UK also engages with Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZUK). The UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands have participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises with the US, Japan and ASEAN nations.
Undertake collaborative FONOPs
Individual, ad hoc FONOPSs have limited capacity to mount a serious defence of international maritime law. Undertaking coordinated European FONOPS, potentially with Indo-Pacific partners, signals resolve and creates a practical framework for wider European maritime operations in the Indo-Pacific.
Coordinate sub-regional strategies
The E3 format could offer flexible diplomatic working relations with individual like-minded ASEAN states, starting with less contentious joint areas of concern, including cyber cooperation and countering disinformation, climate change, piracy and trafficking.
Deepen security partnerships
The E3 could continue to deepen interoperability in flexible small groups including Japan, India, Australia and South Korea on security issues of mutual concern, including cyber defence and maritime domain awareness. Japan has developed strong security ties with France and the UK. Synergy exists between Japan and Germany in capacity building, humanitarian and development assistance and both are strongly committed to multilateralism and strengthening the liberal international order by defending existing rules and international law.
Japan becomes the Sixth Eye
Already enjoying close intelligence cooperation with its Five Eyes partners, it is increasingly likely that Japan will become the Sixth Eye — the first East Asian non-English-speaking nation to be accepted into this elite alliance.
And finally
Key European states and the EU recognise that great power rivalry and geopolitical and geo-economic realities increasingly require a European security role in the Indo-Pacific. The E3 format offers a maturing framework within which European states could flexibly and practically develop a deeper role in Indo-Pacific security. France and the UK have strong working relationships with like-minded partners that could support further European engagement.
A European presence is broadly welcomed in the region — with significant caveats. Indo-Pacific states want peace, stability and economic prosperity. They will not engage in activity viewed as overt containment of China or that which forces a choice between the US and China. The UK, in particular, will be judged on the consistency of its persistent presence beyond the deployment of CSG21. It is vital, therefore, that European states clarify and plainly communicate their strategic goals if they are to be taken seriously.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Anisa Heritage is a senior lecturer in the Defence and International Affairs Department, Faculty for the Study of Leadership, Security and Warfare at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS), U.K. She is a Research Fellow of the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent, U.K. The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly those of the author and not those of RMAS, U.K. MoD, or HMG. Image credit: Wikipedia.