The China-Russia ‘no-limits’ friendship in full swing

26 July 2022

Five months have passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite the fact that Moscow has not achieved any of the significant goals of its aggression, and that it is committing atrocities by shelling and bombing civilian infrastructure and murdering innocent people, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has not changed its approach to Russia. Beijing still provides Moscow with political and diplomatic support and parrots Russia’s propaganda and disinformation. The large-scale global criticism of China’s endorsement of Russia — including warnings from the US and the EU that Beijing’s material support for Moscow will end up with serious consequences for the PRC — has not had any significant impact on the China-Russia alignment.

To the contrary, it appears that bilateral ties are working towards a “no-limits” friendship between the two (referring to the 4 February joint statement). For the time being, there are no prospects of these ties loosening. In simple terms, a ‘looser’ relationship is not in the interest of either side. Moreover, it appears that this alignment goes beyond both countries’ bilateral agenda, creating opportunities for China and Russia to strengthen their bonds even further.

Recent developments in the China-Russia alignment

First of all, the China-Russia political dialogue is blooming. Since Russia’s assault on Ukraine, there have been several publicly announced high-level online and personal meetings, including between the two countries’ presidents, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, and their foreign ministers, Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov. Readouts after Xi-Putin and Wang-Lavrov meetings depict a cordial atmosphere, highlighting very good political and economic ties despite “the global turmoil”.

The West must stay united, focus on diversifying its economic ties, and be ready to roll out sanctions on China in case it starts offering material support to Moscow or attacks Taiwan.

An acceleration of interactions was noticeable in June. In the span of ten days (15-24 June), Xi talked to Putin four times. On 15 June, the two presidents held their second phone call since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They decided to strengthen strategic coordination and continue mutual support for core interests. Virtual Xi-Putin meetings were then also held at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (17 June), BRICS summit (23 June), and the High-level Dialogue on Global Development (24 June).

These meetings were held a few weeks after US President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia that resulted in strengthened US-Japan and US-ROK alliances, new impetus for the Quad, and the announcement of a new US economic initiative: the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. A few days after Xi and Putin’s conversations, a NATO summit was held. The new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO mentioned China for the first time and described it as a challenge for the alliance. The China-Russia partnership and its attempts to undercut the rules-based international order were defined as running counter to NATO values and interests.

Second, although there are still no confirmed cases of significant material support from China to Russia, Beijing has signalled its willingness to somehow help Moscow. According to leaks, Xi has tasked his advisers to find a way to help Russia financially, without violating Western sanctions. What is more, China has repeatedly stated that it is determined to maintain normal economic relations with Russia, and the PRC’s customs administration announced in June that imports from Russia are growing. Speaking at the St. Petersburg Forum, Xi said that he predicts China-Russia bilateral trade to hit a new high this year.

Third, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s narrative about whitewashing Russia’s responsibility for the invasion and blaming NATO, particularly the US, has become more apparent. In other words, Beijing endorses Moscow in a very blunt way. Chinese officials claim that “NATO eastward expansion is the main reason of the Russia-Ukraine conflict” and that “the US is an initiator of the 'Ukrainian issue'”. Beijing portrays the war as a conflict between Russia and NATO, represented by the United States. The US is adding “fuel to the flames” in order to weaken and defeat Russia. The US is the only actor that benefits from the war, earning huge money by selling weapons and energy resources to Europe.

This leads to the fourth development in the China-Russia alignment: the endeavour to win over developing countries. The three aforementioned multilateral meetings in June were devoted to, and attended by, developing countries. Also, in recent weeks, both the Chinese and Russian leaders have met separately with representatives of the Global South. Although China-Russia cooperation in the developing world is not new, this trend has accelerated since Russia’s assault on Ukraine.

Additionally, Beijing has been enormously critical of the sanctions imposed on Russia. China claims that restrictions are detrimental mostly to developing countries, causing food and energy crises that may lead to social and political instability, as well as possibly instigating migration crises. The message is clear: the West neglects the developing world. By imposing sanctions on Russia, it is responsible for the upcoming multifaceted crisis in the Global South. War in Ukraine and sanctions, Beijing says, is the United States’ attempt to maintain its hegemony and seek illicit interests.

As a response, China and Russia present themselves as stabilising powers that focus on multilateralism (versus Western unilateralism); inclusiveness (versus Western protectionism); and development models that should be decided by the country according to its national conditions (versus Western-led ‘universal liberal values’). The rationale behind this is clear: avoiding isolation and winning over allies (or building coalitions) to compete with the West, and reforming the existing global order, or even establishing a parallel one in which the Global South will have more to say. In this context, it is important to note that China perceives itself as the world’s largest developing country.

The rationale for not loosening Beijing-Moscow bonds

Recent developments in China-Russia relations show that the alignment is becoming stronger — or, at least, is not weakening. The belief among various decision makers and experts (including myself) that Russia’s lack of success in Ukraine, the atrocities it is committing, and the enormous global pressure on China to detach from Russia, would result in Beijing’s distancing from Moscow was a vain hope. Two factors were missing in our thinking about the China-Russia alignment: the fundaments of the alignment and two current global trends happening simultaneously.

If we had taken into account these two elements, the China-Russia alignment (or even stronger Chinese support for Moscow) would not have been a surprise, nor been judged as manifestations of Beijing’s irrational thinking. When it comes to the first issue, the glue that sticks China and Russia together is their joint anti-Western, mostly anti-US, approach. What both countries want to change is the US-led international order, which preserves the United States’ status as a hegemon with a capacity to impose its rules and norms on others.

This situation is not acceptable for China and Russia, which have superpower ambitions and whose authoritarian, or even totalitarian, political regimes are incompatible with liberal values. In other words, the survival of China and Russia’s political systems is at stake. To ensure survival, a friendly (or at least neutral) international environment is needed. Under these circumstances, a US-led rules-based international order seriously hinders China and Russia’s strategic goals.

On the second issue, two parallel global trends are having an impact on the China-Russia relationship. The first trend is growing distrust of China among Western countries, mostly in the US and Europe. This is not a new phenomenon; however, the trend has accelerated in recent years. At the same time, developing countries present a different assessment than the West when it comes to Russia’s invasion. Generally, the Global South emulates China’s approach.

The war is seen as a provoked one that may bring serious hurdles to developing countries. What is more, the West is losing its appeal with its conditionality in foreign assistance and its moralising when it comes to political systems and development models. China and Russia’s rush to the Global South to express sympathy and offer diplomatic and material help, with rather insignificant Western engagement, offers them the potential to win hearts and minds, as well as strengthen their bilateral alignment.

What to expect and what to do?

Taking into account these two factors, expecting any Chinese detachment from Russia (however soft) would be unreasonable. Consequently, we should not expect any significant change in Beijing’s approach. As Yan Xuetong — one of the best-known Chinese experts on international relations — mentioned: “Beijing sees little to gain from joining the international chorus condemning Moscow”. Antagonising Russia will not change the United States’ China approach, as the US-China conflict is structural. To the contrary, it may result in creating a dangerous situation for the People’s Republic of China, such as competing simultaneously with two powers: the US and Russia. This is a lesson learned from the past.

This leads to an important lesson that the West must learn. The Beijing-Moscow alignment is strong; there is no point in attempting to drive a wedge between the two. Possible concessions from China would neither be cost- and condition-free, nor change the nature of Beijing-Moscow ties. The best way for the West to deal with the China-Russia alignment is to acknowledge that these bonds are strong and to improve its own resilience and deterrence capacities.

The West must stay united, focus on diversifying its economic ties, and be ready to roll out sanctions on China in case it starts offering material support to Moscow or attacks Taiwan. Without a detailed list of sanctions, that should be presented to the Chinese side as a means of deterrence, the West will lose credibility and will be more vulnerable to Chinese pressure. It should also pay more attention to the Global South, offering unconditional support in the upcoming food and energy crises, while refraining from moralising.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Justyna Szczudlik is Deputy Head of Research and China Analyst with the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Image credit: Kremlin.ru.