The AUKUS controversy: Security issues in US-Australia relations under Biden and beyond
the aukus controversy: security issues in us-australia relations under biden and beyond
WRITTEN BY DEREK MCDOUGALL
9 MAY 2024
AUKUS-related security issues have been foremost in US-Australia relations under the Biden administration. Announced in September 2021 as a new security partnership involving Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), AUKUS has subsequently dominated the security debate in Australia, while also being significant for both the UK and the US. For Australia, the impact has bound it even more closely to the US, making it more difficult to pursue an independent course in relation to its major ally. A change of administration in the US after the November 2024 presidential elections might complicate the AUKUS arrangement in some respects, but the general direction is likely to remain the same.
The Australia-US strategic relationship in context
Australia’s strategic culture has long focused on having the support of a powerful protector. In the context of the British Empire, that protector was Britain. The focus shifted to the US in the context of World War II, although the UK retained some importance until the end of the 1960s and arguably beyond. The 1951 ANZUS Treaty (Australia-New Zealand-United States), negotiated as a quid pro quo for Australia (and New Zealand) accepting a more lenient peace treaty with Japan, symbolised the shift. Australia fought alongside the US in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, also playing host to various communications facilities, the most important of which was the Pine Gap in Central Australia.
While there was a shift to greater Australian independence in the aftermath of Vietnam, the US alliance remained central to Australian security policy. Defence links between the two powers have strengthened since the 1990s, with Australia fighting alongside the US in the Gulf War (1991), the Iraq War (post-2003), and Afghanistan (2001-21), as well as cooperating in various peacekeeping missions such as Somalia in the early 1990s, and importantly in East Timor (1999-2002) where the US provided political and logistical support.
A change of administration in the US after the November 2024 presidential elections might complicate the AUKUS arrangement in some respects, but the general direction is likely to remain the same.
During a 2011 visit to Canberra, President Barack Obama announced a ‘tilt’ by the US towards the Asia-Pacific, signalling that the US was strongly engaged in this region, not just the Middle East. Part of the tilt was a rotation of US marines (up to 2,500) through northern Australia, with air facilities in this part of the country being upgraded to accommodate American military aircraft as required. Underpinning US strategy — and complementing that of Australia — was the ‘soft balancing’ of ‘rising China’. At the same time, both the US and Australia had a high degree of economic interdependence with China. About one-quarter of Australia’s trade is with China, which accounts for 30 per cent of exports. Nevertheless, the soft balancing of China continued, exemplified in such developments as the promotion of an Indo-Pacific strategy and the emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), especially after 2017. Japan and India, as well as the US and Australia, were important actors in these developments.
There was a deterioration in US-China relations during the Trump administration of 2017-2021, exacerbated by more assertive behaviour by Xi Jinping over issues such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Australia was largely ‘in sync’ with the tougher US stance towards China. In response, China tried to penalise Australia by restricting some Australian exports to China. Although Biden put more emphasis on cooperating with allies, the difficulties in US-China relations have largely continued since 2021.
The AUKUS announcement
These developments were the background to the joint announcement of AUKUS in September 2021 by Biden and the prime ministers of Australia (Scott Morrison) and the UK (Boris Johnson), both centre-right. The announcement was preceded by Australia’s cancelling of a contract for France to supply twelve conventional submarines based on its nuclear-powered Barracuda class. Morrison thought that Australia could obtain a better deal with an interim arrangement for the US to supply Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines (three and up to five), followed by cooperating with the UK on developing and constructing up to eight new nuclear-powered AUKUS submarines. This project would not be completed until the 2050s, with an estimated cost of AUD 368 billion (USD 245 billion).
While Australia’s need to acquire replacement submarines was the main impetus for Morrison’s AUKUS initiative, he acted quickly to lock the opposition Labor Party into the deal. The Labor leadership feared being portrayed as weak on security although the dominant Labor view has always been supportive towards the US alliance. The strategic assumptions underlying AUKUS were important. The proposed submarines could operate close to China rather than simply focusing on maritime regions close to Australia. Although Australia would retain sovereign authority over its submarines, politically the US would expect Australia to complement its military forces in the event of a clash with China. This would be a most divisive issue in Australia, especially if a Labor government were in office.
AUKUS’s evolution
With Labor having committed itself to AUKUS, it continued with the same approach upon winning office in May 2022 and had the responsibility for implementing the partnership. While the Labor government held steady to its course, opposition to AUKUS has come from significant figures such as former centre-right prime minister Malcolm Turnbull and former Labor prime minister Paul Keating, as well as former Labor foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Bob Carr. They have focused on Australia’s loss of strategic autonomy given that Australia’s defences would become more integrated with those of the US, with corresponding assumptions about a shared strategic outlook. There has also been a strong critique of the AUKUS submarine project, partly on the grounds of the immense cost. Hugh White, a leading strategic commentator, has argued that Australia could do far better for a lot less, by having conventional submarines that focus on Australia’s maritime approaches.
Another criticism of the submarine project related to the UK’s lacklustre record in constructing submarines — usually taking longer than expected and costing a lot more than the original budget. Although the Biden administration has been supportive, the US is currently unable to produce enough submarines for its own needs, and the relevant Congressional legislation has an opt-out clause that would allow the US to avoid providing Australia with the Virginia submarines. The most recent Biden budget proposal only provided for constructing one new Virginia submarine in the coming fiscal year (down from 1.3 submarines per year currently being built). Production would need to be at the rate of 2.33 submarines per year to meet Australia’s requirements.
Consequences of Trump 2
AUKUS faces many potential political obstacles, keeping in mind that this is a project extending over decades. From the US perspective, the recent federal budget proposal suggests one such obstacle. Another potential obstacle is the possible election of Donald Trump this November. If Biden were to be re-elected one can expect a continuation of what has happened so far with US involvement in the project: Congressional politics and the capacity of the US to build enough submarines fast enough being the main obstacles.
In the case of Trump 2, his transactional approach to politics is most relevant. The question for Trump would be ‘What’s in it for the US?’. AUKUS — as it has developed to date — is aligned with US interests. The US strengthens its position vis-à-vis China and Australia injects additional funds into shipyards building submarines in the US. If the US budget is stretched to produce enough submarines for its own needs, then Trump (and this could also apply to Biden) might ask for more funds from Australia, adding further to the already large cost. Alternatively, Australia might just have to wait longer. If the US cannot increase the rate at which it builds submarines, Australia could find itself without submarines once the existing six Collins-class submarines can no longer be used. Australia would have to negotiate with the US to deploy submarines in such a way that Australia’s needs were also covered. Australia’s strategic autonomy would again be diminished — and the US might be reluctant if it judged such an arrangement to weaken its defences.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Derek McDougall is Professorial Fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne. His academic area is Asia-Pacific international politics, with particular reference to Australian engagement. His most recent book is Asia Pacific in World Politics. Further reading on the topic can be found here. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/U.S. Secretary of Defense (cropped).