In Brief: Hunter Marston, our Southeast Asia Associate
14 May 2024
9DL recently had the pleasure of catching up with Hunter Marston, who has been our associate based in Canberra for the past two years. Hunter has played an important role in expanding 9DASHLINE’s network in Australia as well as contributing nuanced analysis on the emerging dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia.
With Hunter’s recent move to Washington DC, we are looking forward to continuing to collaborate with him as our Southeast Asia Associate. Here are some insightful excerpts from our conversation.
9DL: As you approach the end of your doctoral research, which you have been pursuing at the Australia National University, you recently moved back to your home, the United States. How has the time spent in Australia shaped your perceptions of the Indo-Pacific and the United States’ role in this dynamic region?
HM: Spending four and a half years in Canberra, which is the centre of many debates on Australia’s role in the Indo-Pacific and the world, has let me gain a greater appreciation for the role of middle powers and the multipolar nature of the Indo-Pacific more broadly. Canberra continues to view the United States as an essential ally and stabilising force in the region, but the debate in Australia is far more nuanced, and there are a range of critical views of Washington and the US-Australia alliance in general. AUKUS is one trigger for much of this debate, and many Australians question its utility and worry that it ties their country too closely to the US’ efforts to reassert primacy even as its relative power wanes in this new multipolar Asia.
9DL: Your doctoral research focuses on the persistence of hedging in Southeast Asian states’ responses to great power competition. Given your deep understanding of the region, how do you see the future of ASEAN as a regional organisation at the heart of the Indo-Pacific?
HM: I see Southeast Asia as inherently multipolar. Thomas Parks has made this argument quite convincingly in his recent book Southeast Asia’s Multipolar Future: Averting a New Cold War. Based on this reading of Southeast Asia’s distribution of power, I am optimistic about the state of the region writ large. That said, there are several challenges facing ASEAN in the coming years as the organisation struggles to remain relevant and credible. Internal disarray based on divergent interests and threat perceptions is just one of the pressing issues for ASEAN to address. Currently, the Philippines stands virtually alone in its advocacy for a stronger response in condemning China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, other states like Cambodia and Laos have recently aligned more closely with China. I expect hedging to remain the norm across most of Southeast Asia. However, countries like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are advocating for a middle position which does not alienate China but remains firm in its principled defence of international norms and law.
9DL: With a population of more than 600 million, half of which is under the age of 30, Southeast Asia presents unique challenges and opportunities. What are some lesser-known issues that you believe deserve closer attention?
HM: That is a very astute observation regarding Southeast Asia’s demographics. In my opinion, not enough people are aware of the extraordinary size, youth, and vibrancy of Southeast Asia. In addition to its enormous population, Southeast Asia boasts a combined GDP of USD 3 trillion, making it the world’s fifth-largest economy as a bloc. But we often think of ASEAN countries as small and powerless states and view them through the lens of US-China competition. That view is dangerously outdated. I think the legacy of the Cold War continues to colour Western perceptions of the region, and our understanding of Southeast Asia has not caught up to the current reality. These are no longer the “tiger economies” of the 1970s or 1980s. They are now emerging middle powers in their own right. The security and prosperity of external powers are now tied to Southeast Asia’s future. Continued growth and peace in the region will deliver global prosperity and stability if they can navigate current geopolitical tensions.
9DL: The situation in Myanmar is evolving rapidly. The junta's mounting losses and the growing resistance movement suggest a new phase in this complex and multi-layered conflict. How do you assess the current situation and, in your view, what are the key geopolitical considerations at play?
HM: The current situation in Myanmar is truly unprecedented and a genuine tragedy. The country has not seen this level of division and destruction because of violent conflict since the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence during World War II. With the enormous challenges the country is facing currently, there is also a profound opportunity to redefine the country’s national identity and build new foundations from the wreckage of the ongoing conflict. The resistance has gained decisive momentum over the past six months. While I would not anticipate the junta to categorically lose the war in the coming months, it will face overwhelming pressure to negotiate a political settlement or continue the fight from its stronghold in Naypyidaw while surrendering de facto control over the majority of the country. However, the civilian-led National Unity Government and National Unity Consultative Council have failed to unify disparate resistance groups, so it appears that the future will hinge on Myanmar’s ability to forge a federal democracy with a level of autonomy for ethnic minorities previously unseen throughout the country’s history.
This is an experiment in state-building, and it remains to be seen how cohesive or stable such an outcome will be, but there is reason for hope if the armed resistance can eradicate the military once and for all.
9DL: You have also written about the role and influence of the US in the Indo-Pacific. With developments in the region increasingly assessed through the lens of great power politics, regional states’ agency is often discounted. How do you see ASEAN states’ ability to exercise agency and secure greater space for themselves?
HM: ASEAN states have demonstrated remarkable, but uneven, capacity to preserve agency in an era of great power competition. Most leaders of Southeast Asian states are familiar with such pressures within their lifetimes or recent memories. For instance, Singapore’s ambassador Bilahari Kausikan told me that great power competition is nothing new for Southeast Asia, and small states like Singapore will weather this storm again as they have no other option but to survive. One particularly vexing problem for ASEAN is its inability to mobilise collective action. Therefore, individual states have pursued their own courses of action — often through new minilateral institutions — to diversify their range of security partners and deepen hedging strategies in light of uncertainty regarding US-China competition. So, you see the Philippines joining Japan, Australia, and the United States in a new grouping loosely known as “the Squad”, while Laos and Cambodia have largely gravitated into China’s camp for lack of alternatives. Thus, the picture is very uneven across the region, and not all states have been successful in securing greater agency amidst this new great game.
9DL: Do you feel the 'West' genuinely understands Southeast Asia? If not, what are the key misperceptions, what would you like to correct, and why are these so important?
HM: Plenty of people opine that the West overlooks Southeast Asia’s agency and treats regional states as pawns in great power politics. However, I think that sells us short just a bit. If you look at the rhetoric coming from Beijing, it is far less nuanced and often entirely ignores Southeast Asian agency, treating the Philippines as merely a US proxy in their territorial dispute, for instance. So, the West is doing satisfactorily in that regard. Where Washington has erred is in making the broad assumption that Southeast Asia shares its views of the threat which China poses, which not all do. Many Southeast Asian states — even those locked in difficult maritime disputes in the South China Sea such as Vietnam — recognise China as a central player and even partner in regional geopolitics. Therefore, they will not join a US-led coalition to oppose China, and this further undermines the US’ influence and alienates Western partners who would seek to enlist Southeast Asian states in their anti-China agenda. Australia and Japan serve as useful examples to look at how external countries have successfully engaged Southeast Asia on their own terms without asking them to join such anti-China security initiatives.
Finally, it is worth stating the obvious that few in the West — outside of the private sector — realise the enormity of Southeast Asia’s economic growth and the opportunities it presents for Western countries and businesses. We are far too used to treating Southeast Asia as a collection of small states and developing economies, when in fact it is one of the fastest-growing regions and home to a rapidly expanding middle class with enormous consumer demand. Southeast Asia will dictate the future balance of power and economic influence across the globe. It is time that international headlines and pundits caught up with this reality.
9DL: Finally, what are your plans? What are some of the key developments in Southeast Asia that you would like to go deeper into and perhaps further build on?
HM: I moved back to the United States at the end of 2023 and am currently seeking job opportunities in Washington think tanks as well as the US government. I would like to apply my PhD research on hedging and security alignment in Southeast Asia to contribute to more effective US policy in the Indo-Pacific. I would also like to build on my four and a half years of living in Canberra to expand trilateral dialogues and understanding between Southeast Asia, Australia, and the US, particularly by raising greater awareness among US policymakers concerning regional views about new minilateral security initiatives like AUKUS and the Quad. Canberra and Washington can learn from one another’s experiences and engagements in the Indo-Pacific and share lessons for more informed policies looking ahead.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biography
Hunter Marston is the Southeast Asia Associate at 9DASHLINE.