Punching above their weight: EU small powers and the Indo-Pacific

3 June 2024

According to the European Union (EU) High Representative Josep Borrell, the Indo-Pacific is where “the future of our planet and of history will be decided”. Because of its growing economic and political importance for global equilibria, the EU itself and various major EU states such as France, Germany, and Italy have drafted or are developing their strategies, aiming to directly influence the region’s dynamics.

Interestingly, many small EU countries such as Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Ireland have recently followed suit by drafting their own Indo-Pacific strategies. The Netherlands, as the first mover among the four, published its document in November 2020, followed by the Czech Republic in October 2022, as well as Lithuania and Ireland a year later. At the macro level, these strategic papers align closely with the priorities outlined in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Dutch guidelines, for instance, explicitly discuss the country’s interests and actions to be undertaken in the Indo-Pacific within a European framework. Similarly, the Lithuanian document makes clear that the country’s strategy “aims to contribute to the implementation of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”.

The EU small powers’ strategies for engaging the Indo-Pacific demonstrate their capacity to shape their foreign policy goals in the region, despite the structural and material constraints they have faced compared to larger European players.

The publication of such strategic documents by these small European powers can be linked to their willingness to defend specific interests and pursue particular geopolitical objectives vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. Such activism is quite surprising, as the region has traditionally been outside of their geo-strategic perimeter of reference. How should we understand this foreign policy shift, and how may it affect the EU’s engagement with the region?

Motivations, interests, and goals in the region

As the third EU member state to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy, the Netherlands has played a crucial role in initiating the strategic conversation on the Indo-Pacific at the EU level and shaping the content of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy. This activism can be partially linked to the Netherlands’ past as a maritime power and sea-faring nation with global interests, which remains integral to its national self-identity today. However, the country’s economic interests in Asia are also an important factor underlying the Hague’s concerns about a deteriorating maritime security outlook.

As a result, the Dutch have been among a small group of European powers engaging in naval diplomacy in the region. They sent the frigate HNLMS Evertsen to the Indo-Pacific in 2021 and, more recently, deployed the frigate HNLMS Tromp, which carried out joint exercises with the US Navy in the South China Sea in May 2024. By adopting this ‘politics of presence’, the Netherlands is fulfilling its primary objective of signalling its stake in maintaining the sea lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific open and secure. The Hague also wishes to leverage some of its competitive advantages in the digital connectivity and cyber domains to enhance cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and, possibly, promote EU regulatory standards in the digital sector across the region.

Distinctively, the ‘China factor’ features prominently in the Lithuania and Czech Republic’s narratives of their Indo-Pacific strategies. In 2021, Lithuania became the first country to withdraw from the China and Central and Eastern European Countries Initiative, a platform for economic cooperation between Beijing and seventeen European states. The Lithuanian government also allowed the opening of a Taiwanese representation office in Vilnius under the name ‘Taiwan’ (rather than ‘Taipei’), a move perceived by Beijing as a violation of the One-China principle. In response, Chinese authorities launched a campaign of economic coercion against the country. Given this background, an important rationale behind Lithuania’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is its role to serve as a diplomatic tool to resist the pressures from China by closely coordinating with EU member states, NATO Indo-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea), and the United States, which features prominently in the Strategy.

A very similar rationale underlies the Czech Republic’s strategy, which employs particularly direct language vis-à-vis China. On the one hand, in line with the so-called EU triptych, the document acknowledges that Beijing should be considered a partner, an economic adversary, and a systemic rival. On the other hand, however, it states that “China‘s growing ambitions and assertive (if not confrontational) approach have given rise to tense political, economic and security relationships with countries within the Indo-Pacific and beyond”. This stance should be understood in light of the Central and Eastern European countries’ strong disapproval of Beijing’s continued closeness with Moscow, even after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, a position that directly contradicts their core security interests.

Prague’s ties with Beijing have also been severely deteriorating in the economic domain, with the Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský recently declaring that the aforementioned China and Central and Eastern European Countries Initiative “has neither substance nor future”. In contrast, links with Taiwan are very solid, especially when it comes to investment. At present, the Czech Republic hosts around EUR 1 billion in FDI from the island, and Taiwanese entrepreneurs have generated more jobs than any other East Asia investor in the country. The Czech Indo-Pacific Strategy also represents a way to bolster relations with the United States, which is framed as the “natural partner and close ally with important interests in the region”. Accordingly, Indo-Pacific-related issues featured prominently in the latest iteration of the Strategic Dialogue between the two countries.

Finally, Ireland’s case is different — unlike the other countries, Dublin has chosen to label the region ‘Asia-Pacific’ within its strategy. This term is more neutral than ‘Indo-Pacific’, which carries a specific geopolitical connotation and is particularly perceived by Chinese policymakers as a way to conceptually and strategically encircle China. In addition, the wording used to describe the country’s relations with Beijing is notably soft, pinpointing that “Ireland has benefited significantly from economic and people-to-people engagement with China. These economic, political and cultural relationships will remain a priority”. This cautious approach is explained by the trade surplus that the country enjoys vis-à-vis the Asian power and the number of Chinese companies based in Dublin, among other factors. However, Ireland’s Strategy explicitly stresses the need to uphold values and a principles-based foreign policy when dealing with local players, aligning with its longstanding diplomatic tradition of promoting international law. As such, Ireland’s intended engagement with the region showcases a delicate balance between economic and normative interests.

Importantly, these strategic papers are increasingly complemented by concrete activities on the ground. Dutch Defence Minister Kajsa Ollongren has declared the country’s commitment to maintaining its naval presence by sending a vessel on a mission in the region every two years. Lithuania is particularly active on the diplomatic front, evident in the opening of new embassies in countries such as Singapore, Australia, and the Republic of Korea, and its expanding politico-economic outreach to targeted Indo-Pacific regions like Southeast Asia. The Czech Republic is working to strengthen its ties with regional partners in critical sectors such as trade, defence industrial cooperation, and cyber security, exemplified by its recently inked Strategic Partnership on Innovation with India. Finally, Ireland is committed to hedging its economic bets by expressing its willingness to expand its trade ties with other important regional players such as India, the Republic of Korea, and Vietnam.

By no means negligible

The EU small powers’ strategies for engaging the Indo-Pacific demonstrate their capacity to shape their foreign policy goals in the region, despite the structural and material constraints they have faced compared to larger European players. Their newfound attention towards the Indo-Pacific suggests increasing attempts to shape the EU’s foreign policy agenda for the region.

In this sense, besides promoting their own strategic interests, there is a potential for them to take on a mediating role between the major EU powers who regard the Indo-Pacific as one of the testing grounds for European strategic autonomy, and those who mainly see it through commercial and normative lenses. Additionally, in light of their strategic vicinity with the United States, it’s conceivable that they could advocate for a closer alignment between Washington and Brussels on Indo-Pacific issues, an aspect that has been lacking so far. Considering all the above, it is fair to predict that the activism of EU small powers will continue to play a role in shaping EU-wide discussions and initiatives regarding Indo-Pacific affairs.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Fabio Figiaconi is a PhD researcher at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance. His research interests include great power competition, great powers/secondary states dynamics, Indo-Pacific geopolitics (with a special focus on Southeast Asia), European Union’s actorness in Asia, theory and practice of Grand Strategy, and United States foreign policy. Image credit: Flickr/belgium24.eu.