Nobody likes a bully: China’s grip over the South China Sea is slipping

WRITTEN BY JONATHAN DORSEY
15 May 2024

In recent decades, the world has witnessed China’s expansionary ambitions across the South China Sea (SCS), leading to excessive territorial claims. Through the construction of artificial islands, the build-up of the world’s largest naval fleet, and its use of paramilitary maritime forces, China has impeded its neighbours’ access to resources within their economic exclusive zones (EEZ). China continues to expand its claims with the recently released 10-dash line “standard map” that it wrongly believes would tighten its claims. However, the tide is turning. The neighbouring nations are growing weary of Beijing’s coercive tactics, drawing their lines against the revisionist power, demanding respect for national sovereignty, and uniting around a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

China’s coercion is far from grey

China seeks to solidify its position as the dominant regional power in the SCS through the employment of a myriad of coercive tactics. As the Chinese proverb goes — ‘Kill the chicken to scare the monkey’ — Beijing’s use of ‘grey zone’ tactics not only pressures the targeted nation but serves as a reminder to the region of the increased risks and costs of conducting operations in China’s claimed areas of jurisdiction.

China is not just bullying its SCS neighbours but is also targeting those perceived to impede its regional dominance, with the United States Navy (USN), Japan Self-Defense Force, and even Canada having been subjected to risky encounters

According to Kelly Grieco, “the prospects for building a regional coalition to counter Chinese aggression are significantly higher in the SCS than the Taiwan Strait because more states see China’s infringement on sovereignty in the SCS as more directly linked to their national security interests”. These countries see the escalation of activities around Taiwan as a key indicator of how coercive tactics may evolve in future encounters with China. leaving them to search for ways to rebalance their standing against a regional bully.

Territorial disputes in the region are nothing new, with Chinese actors having harassed, chased away, blocked, and occasionally, attacked Vietnamese and Philippine fishermen within their own EEZs to assert their claims. While some of this harassment has been carried out by unmarked civilian vessels of China’s maritime militia, those disputes are often backed by the China Coast Guard, which claims to be enforcing Chinese law and territory. The competing claimants continue to witness a rise in unsafe acts by the Chinese aimed at challenging their security and sovereignty, giving them a shared cause in pushing back. China is not just bullying its SCS neighbours but is also targeting those perceived to impede its regional dominance, with the United States Navy (USN), Japan Self-Defense Force, and even Canada having been subjected to risky encounters. While these countries may be able to meet China on an equal playing field, they also play a role in supporting smaller nations in the region that are more vulnerable to Beijing’s harassment, threats, and intimidation.

Finding ways to push back

While militarily outmatched, China’s SCS neighbours have achieved success in pushing back against Beijing through increased public information awareness, maritime security engagements, and additional defence investments. The countertactics developed and deployed by neighbours provide an opportunity for mutual learning and sharing of successful strategies in countering China’s coercive actions.

Beijing is trying to balance its desire to be perceived as a responsible regional leader with its long-term goal of establishing itself as the dominant regional power. SCS neighbours have successfully called out risky encounters to strengthen their sovereignty claims and garnered greater international support through public awareness about the types of coercive tactics Beijing employs. Vietnam and the Philippines have publicised Chinese vessels’ use of water cannons and military lasers against their fishermen and maritime security forces for the international community to observe. These publicised encounters have drawn scrutiny from leaders, with Singapore’s defence minister and ASEAN foreign ministers urging China to take the lead in reducing tensions in the SCS. Building on these successful information campaigns, SCS neighbours must continuously bring their plight to the international community.

Beyond public relations, neighbouring nations are looking to expand engagement opportunities that enhance their maritime security forces and navies through bi- or multi-lateral relations. The Philippines Coast Guard increased the number of drills and exercises they conducted in 2023 with like-minded neighbours. Similarly, Vietnam has sought maritime cooperation to enhance interoperability on a range of issues, such as unplanned encounters, antipiracy, illegal fishing, and disaster relief. In mid-2023, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia renewed their INDOMAPHI efforts to conduct coordinated patrols aimed at combating piracy and terrorism. Such cooperative training and support provide these states with enough confidence to stand up to Beijing. In early 2023, the Philippine Armed Forces successfully carried out an operation to remove a Chinese floating barrier inside the Philippines’ internationally recognised EEZ. As Philippine Coast Guard Commodore Jay Tarriela recently stated, “By engaging in military collaborations with other countries that support the rules-based order [we] can not only prevent China’s domination, but also deter its illegal bullying and aggressive behaviour”.

Investment in maritime security is necessary to protect civilian vessels, control the resources within EEZs, and uphold competing territorial claims. Japan is providing security assistance to the Philippines, while Indonesia is in negotiations with Italy to swiftly purchase new patrol vessels, and the Philippines and Vietnam are expected to sign a memorandum of understanding on maritime cooperation. All these efforts are aimed at strengthening understanding, trust, and cooperation to protect their mutual interest. Through information operations, intensified maritime security training, and enhanced inter-regional collaboration, Southeast Asian states are discovering methods to create seams in China’s grip over the SCS.

Building on progress

As countries in the SCS take steps to stand up to China in their backyard, further US-led efforts will sustain this momentum. Secretary of the Navy Del Toro highlights the strategic importance of naval diplomacy to continually “prioritize our greatest asymmetric strength: our network of security alliances and partnerships”. A US-led implementation of integrated deterrence and increased presence has the potential to foster cooperative security in the SCS.

Southeast Asian nations have not only received support from the US but also from Australia, Japan, and other maritime nations that have fostered successful cooperative engagements and investments across the region. As countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and others coalesce to conduct more joint patrols in the SCS, the US has an opportunity to elevate this effort by coordinating a continual rotation of ships to patrol alongside like-minded nations. This US-led effort would provide the additional maritime capability to deter aggressive militant actors, increase integration of training and support efforts, streamline redundant activities, and establish an international normalised presence within the region that reaffirms a FOIP.

Persistent engagement, at the appropriate level, increases the organic capability of Southeast Asian maritime security forces to assert their sovereignty. The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) presence and capabilities are making inroads across the region as they rotate deployment of cutters to the area to share maritime security practices with the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia. The US maritime services should build upon the success of these rotations and explore additional means to utilise the unique tools and capabilities the USCG brings to support territorial maritime security operations, thereby strengthening their relationships within the region.

While the US Navy (USN) is the world’s premier “blue water” navy, the competing nations in the region are seeking “green water” maritime support. While the US has established foreign military and security training for conventional land-based forces, there is a dearth of an equivalent maritime unit. To support the maritime need, the USN needs to look at how independent deployers can receive dedicated “green water” maritime security training during work-ups to better position themselves to offer the support, cooperation, and integration sought by these countries. The USCG can capitalise on new Pacific partnerships to establish a detachment in the theatre that rotates crews to the USN deployers. Embarking USCG on USN ships enhances maritime law and security operations, facilitates inter-service training, and provides maritime security specialists to train Southeast Asian partners’ forces.

Beijing’s new map draws ire from the international community and exacerbates tension in the SCS region. With the steadfast resolve of Southeast Asian nations and bolstered by international support, China is losing its grip on the SCS. The mounting pressure may compel Beijing to reconsider its multi-front coercion campaign.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author Biography

Cmdr. Jonathan Dorsey is a U.S. Navy Fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington D.C. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Navy, Department of Defense, or the US Government. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/United States Coast Guard.