NATO on a risky course

16 September 2024

Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand — the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) — have been routinely participating in NATO summits since 2022. This was also the case at the latest summit in Washington at the beginning of July, where China's behaviour was described in the final declaration in unusually sharp terms as a "challenge to our interests, security, and values". At the same time, several military manoeuvres in the Pacific region like Pacific Skies, a joint deployment to Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, Australia, and India, were a demonstration of the growing military cooperation between European NATO members, the US, and their allies in East Asia.

Closer cooperation between the transatlantic alliance and partners in the Pacific region is seen by its proponents as a contribution to greater security through deterrence and mutual reinforcement, not only against China but also against North Korea and Russia — which stands in a conflict with Japan over the Kuril Islands. However, all the fanfare about NATO's "Asia-Pacificisation" or Beijing’s insinuation of an “Asian NATO” should not be taken too seriously, at least not for the time being. The European commitment is still mostly symbolic support for the US and its Asian allies. In fact, Europe can hardly provide any substantial military force. NATO's presence in the Pacific will hardly intimidate China and will not create more security or deterrence.

European interests in the region vary widely beyond the affirmation to defend liberal values and the ‘freedom of the seas’. Former colonial powers like France with territories like New Caledonia and French Polynesia, and the United Kingdom, which “wants to reinforce its regional presence and activities under the banner of ‘Global Britain’”, want to extend their military presence. But most of the European governments are primarily focussing on economic security and functioning transport routes and supply chains, an objective that would be contradicted by any military escalation. Additionally, Europe has enough problems of its own, particularly due to the war in Ukraine and internal differences. However, with the escalation of the conflict between China and the US, the global situation is changing and pressure is growing on NATO and its European members to become increasingly involved in military geopolitics.

An end to the peace dividend

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was not only in Europe that many had hoped for a peace dividend through disarmament. For a while, NATO also largely limited itself to out-of-area missions such as Afghanistan or counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean which were more or less covered by frameworks of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty. Whether NATO's eastward expansion since 1999 represents a breach of commitments to the Soviet Union or Russia is debatable. In any case, it did not at all contribute to peace and deterrence, as the Russian aggression against Ukraine illustrates. At the very least, it provided a justification for it, if not a trigger, as even high-ranking Western politicians admit.

However, with every further escalation, the pressure to close ranks, to form hostile blocs and thus the danger of a military confrontation grows.

Since then, Russian aggression and the support for Ukraine have driven the rearmament of NATO and its member states, encouraged by a perceived or invoked Russian threat to Europe and NATO. Even if an attack on NATO territory is highly unlikely in view of the problems Russia already has with Ukraine, European politicians like German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius are announcing the need to become politically and economically “ready for war” and to push ahead with expanding the arms industry, even into a 'war economy'.

Pressure from Washington on European NATO members to strengthen their defence of the 'rules-based order' worldwide has also increased, drastically under Donald Trump and more diplomatically under Joe Biden. At the centre is the call to raise military spending to the agreed level of two per cent of gross domestic product, firmly underlined by Trump's threat, that he would "encourage" Russia to attack any NATO member that fails to ‘pay its bills’. The announced deployment of far-reaching US weapons systems on German territory in two years' time, recently announced by the US government, brings back memories of the Cold War, when NATO’s double-track decision turned up the spiral of deterrence and armament. Germany in particular, as one of the most important 'hegemonic legitimizers' of a US-led international order during the Cold War, upholds transatlantic alliance loyalty.

Such a rearmament of NATO is much more important than the European presence in the Far East. This would relieve the burden on the US, which could withdraw to some extent from its involvement in Europe and concentrate on the Pacific stage — a benefit that is worth more than a few Tornados and frigates in the Pacific. The increasing arms expenditures of the European NATO members is also a good business model for the US as the main weapons exporter. At the same time, this arms race is tying up Russia's military resources and weakening it economically.

Connecting the hotspots

For a long time, “Europe has consistently sought to avoid being drawn into this unfolding US-China rivalry“. Most European governments tried to maintain a balance between condemning and collaborating with China. China as a "cooperation partner and competitor" was essentially seen as an economic threat to "Global Europe", not least for its own presence in the Global South, which was increasingly moving closer to the People's Republic thanks to "Belt and Road". The main responses to this situation were efforts to reduce economic dependency on China ('de-coupling' or 'de-risking') and to launch competing infrastructure and investment initiatives such as Europe’s Global Gateway.

With the definition of China as a "systemic competitor", the tone had already become harsher and the criticism was intensified by a socio-political and ideological confrontation — the defence of the liberal world order and the confrontation between "democracy and authoritarianism", for which the People's Republic and many of its partner governments provide sufficient ammunition. But even then, Europe's policy towards China continued to strive to avoid harsh confrontation. Examples for the continued attempts to strike a balance are Germany’s debates about a new strategy for the Indo-Pacific (2023) and the China strategy (2023), the EU-Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (2022), and the many visits to Beijing by top European politicians such as Macron, Scholz, von der Leyen, and Borrell.

The latest turn in the escalation spiral is to define China as a military threat to Europe’s security because of its ongoing alignment with Russia, pushed forward by tough Western sanctions and efforts to isolate Russia internationally. Through this alignment, the two very different conflicts in Europe and Asia are increasingly being linked under the all-encompassing umbrella of "national security", with the impression, that the face-off, so far restricted to Taiwan and US allies in Southeast Asia, is reaching Europe’s doorstep. This has been emphasised by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who highlighted the Biden administration's efforts to develop a "connective tissue between the US alliances in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe". NATO's closer cooperation with IP4 and the US in Asia-Pacific and the cooperation between China and Russia are fuelling each other, according to Liselotte Odgaard, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Limiting the space for mediation

Felix Heiduk of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin observed in September 2023: "Many in Germany's foreign policy elite are still uncomfortable with the rapid geopoliticisation of the region". In other European countries and even in NATO itself, there is considerable hesitation about being drawn into the new ‘War of the Worlds’ as well.

However, with every further escalation, the pressure to close ranks, to form hostile blocs and thus the danger of a military confrontation grows. Deterrence can quickly turn into a hot war. A recent study, published by the NATO Defense College, shows, how NATO countries with their support for Taiwan or the US alliance in Asia-Pacific could nolens volens become directly involved in a Taiwan contingency. This means that the trigger to escalate the conflict further lies with the adversaries China and the US, who set the agenda in the Asia-Pacific theatre: They could create a situation or an 'incident' for NATO to get involved under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The pressure to take sides also makes it more difficult for middle-size powers in Europe, as well as in Central Asia, Latin America and Africa, to pursue their aspirations of "strategic autonomy". Hopes that they could act as a 'third force' to stop the intensifying great power rivalry are fading.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Uwe Hoering, Editor China, Geopolitics, and the Global South. Living in Bonn, Germany, he works as a freelancer on various globalisation issues for newspapers, radio, and magazines. He has published several books, including China’s Long March 2.0. The Belt and Road Initiative as a development model (2020). Image credit: Flickr/NATO.