NATO and Northeast Asia: A growing partnership
NATO and Northeast Asia: A growing partnership
WRITTEN BY EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY
8 August 2024
As US domestic politics churned through July, Washington hosted the NATO Summit, showcasing the Biden administration’s approach to foreign policy. Along with the 32 member nations, a quartet of Indo-Pacific countries joined for the third consecutive year: Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia. The White House trumpeted the progress made in deepening ties between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Partners (IPP), noting the implications for economic and security stability in both regions, explicitly identifying Russia’s aggression and China’s support of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Japan and South Korea have been particularly eager to develop these linkages. Underlying the occasion were fundamental questions: how strong and established is the NATO-IPP relationship? How far will the two Northeast Asian countries go to align strategic priorities with NATO and, should American leadership falter, can European allies and these Asian democracies hold together the institutions and partnerships that define the international liberal order?
With strategic outlooks converging as conflicts across the globe become increasingly connected, leaders in NATO capitals, Tokyo, and Seoul still face obstacles in deepening cooperation. But with Russia’s war in Ukraine entering its third year and China continuing to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas, these governments could find common cause to overcome these differences. Particularly if the US retreats from alliance commitments, the stakes for peace and stability in both theatres will rise.
Invasion of Ukraine spurs cooperation
The links between Northeast Asia and NATO are not new. Japan has gradually pursued more strategic engagement with NATO over the past 15 years, establishing pragmatic cooperation in areas such as information security and counter-piracy. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe emphasised building ties with NATO, laying the groundwork for future cooperation. Tokyo’s efforts have accelerated in the past two years, driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and NATO’s increasing willingness to frame and label China as a strategic challenge, a theme that resonates in Tokyo.
A decisive shift in US policy towards isolationism and “America First” could disrupt or downgrade ‘trans-Atlantic’ and Indo-Pacific alliances.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reacted to Russia’s aggression forcefully and swiftly, levying sanctions and other financial restrictions on Moscow that far exceeded Tokyo’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In doing so, Kishida shattered Japan’s relationship with Russia, breaking with the Abe administration’s years of courtship of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The invasion also appeared to jolt the Japanese public, with opinion polls demonstrating stronger support for increases in defence spending. As Kishida articulated, “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow”. The brazenness of Russia’s invasion boosted Japan’s relations with NATO, solidifying a shared strategic outlook and building on the cooperative efforts that had been developing over the years.
South Korea’s ties with NATO are less well developed, but President Yoon Suk Yeol has vigorously pursued the relationship, becoming the first South Korean leader to attend a NATO Summit in Madrid in 2022. Yoon joined the international response to Russia’s aggression, imposing sanctions on Moscow and providing humanitarian aid to Kyiv. South Korea has utilised its strong defence industry to support Europe as NATO countries deplete their own stockpiles and look to import replacements. Poland has been a particularly strong buyer, completing contracts worth an estimated USD 15 billion with South Korean firms. Seoul is considering abandoning its policy of not directly exporting arms to active conflict areas and has sent artillery shells to the United States, fully understanding that the munitions would then be transferred to the Ukrainians for their resistance against Russia.
Strategic blocs emerge
When North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Putin formalised their strategic partnership at the Pyongyang summit in June, the linkages between the Korean peninsula and the conflict in Ukraine came into stark relief. As the DPRK shipped artillery shells and missiles to Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urged Seoul to provide anti-aircraft systems to repel Russian attacks. With Moscow now lending support to North Korea’s expanding military capability and Beijing backing Moscow, Seoul can no longer avoid pushing back against Russia and China out of economic and strategic caution. Geopolitical developments and Yoon’s pursuit of international partnerships have driven Seoul closer to NATO’s strategic stance.
The Putin-Kim summit and China’s diplomatic and economic support of Russia together may also have driven NATO members closer to Japan and South Korea’s overwhelming security concerns. For South Korea, the threat from the north has long been an existential concern, framing nearly all its foreign policy choices. Japan, too, is concerned about the DPRK’s growing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. China’s rapid military modernisation and economic power, together with its growing maritime aggression and territorial claims, drive fear in Seoul and, most acutely, in Tokyo.
NATO has long been focused on Russia, from its origins during the Cold War to the present. But the geographical distance is not as determinative now, with the DPRK and Russia drawing closer and assisting each other in their military priorities. This creates danger for South Korea, Japan, and NATO members alike, as North Korean munitions pound Ukraine and Russian technology sharpens Pyongyang’s missile capabilities. China, too, is supporting Russia’s defence industrial base, allowing Moscow to continue its war effort.
US uncertainty and isolationism bolster IPP-NATO ties
While South Korea and Japan have tightened their relations with NATO, both countries are also somewhat anxiously assessing the reliability of their respective alliances with the US in this election year. South Korea and Japan both have widened their security cooperation with partners in the region and Europe, with NATO engagement a part of that effort. Minilateral agreements have flourished under Biden: US-South Korea-Japan, US-Japan-Philippines, AUKUS, the Quad, etc. Although the Biden-Harris administration has put alliances at the centre of its foreign policy, former president Donald Trump has expressed sharp scepticism about the value of US alliances, repeatedly voicing his disdain for NATO and Asian alliances alike. Seoul and Tokyo fear that a rejection of multilateralism under a Trump administration could leave them stranded in the face of a more aggressive China.
Growing isolationism in the US Congress — with GOP vice presidential candidate JD Vance among the loudest voices against US foreign engagement — alarms defence planners in both European and Asian capitals. A decisive shift in US policy towards isolationism and “America First” could disrupt or downgrade ‘trans-Atlantic’ and Indo-Pacific alliances. In turn, this could drive more NATO-Indo-Pacific cooperation as governments look for like-minded partners to reinforce the ballast that holds up international rules and norms. The grooves of the NATO-IPP relationships are not deep and only narrowly institutionalised at this stage. Nevertheless, the convergence in strategic perspectives could solidify stronger partnerships beyond Ukraine to attempt to preserve the international rules-based order and — to the degree possible — stabilise volatile geopolitics.
The overlapping interests of the Indo-Pacific and Europe are swelling. But the challenges to developing a more tightly-knit, collective and action-based partnership would be steep. NATO remains focused on Europe, and Japan and South Korea’s security concerns are predominantly regional. The tyranny of distance and the nuanced but real differences in strategic perspective would be hard to overcome. With limited resources and political capital, ultimately NATO will prioritise security in its own neighbourhood, and South Korea and Japan will do the same. That said, the significant threats to the international order, particularly if America’s global security commitments were diminished, may demand that level of ambition.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Emma Chanlett-Avery is Director of Political-Security Affairs at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Previously, she served for 20 years as a Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. Image credit: Flickr/NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.