Japan’s vaccine diplomacy: Quality over quantity
Japan’s Vaccine Diplomacy: Quality over Quantity
WRITTEN BY PHAN XUAN DUNG AND WICHUTA TEERATANABODEE
26 July 2021
Like some other countries, Japan has been using vaccine diplomacy as a soft power tool to project the image of a responsible international stakeholder. In June 2021, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide pledged to ensure fair access to safe and effective vaccines worldwide by supporting the development of preservation logistics. Japan’s multilateral efforts have also been remarkable; Tokyo has contributed a total of USD 1 billion and offered 30 million vaccine doses to WHO’s COVAX global vaccine distribution scheme.
In addition, Japan is working with the other Quad countries — the United States, Australia, and India — toward providing up to 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines for Asian countries by the end of 2022. Recently, Japan also embarked on an independent vaccine donation campaign in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s choice of recipient countries shows that both public diplomacy and geopolitical considerations inform its decision-making.
A friend in need
Japan delivered its first batch of 1.24 million AstraZeneca doses to Taiwan on 5 June and 1 million jabs to Vietnam on 15 June, quickly followed by another 2 batches of 1 million doses for each country. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines were subsequently added to the list of beneficiaries, each receiving 1 million vaccine doses from Japan in early July. Tokyo also announced a separate donation of 11 million vaccine doses to Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific Islands through COVAX. Japan’s assistance came at a critical moment as governments across the Asia-Pacific were scrambling to procure shots amid the rapid spread of the new Delta variant.
Japan’s AstraZeneca provision stood out compared to China, thanks to its perceived better quality. In addition, China’s soft power has been seriously undermined by an assertion of hard power in territorial disputes and coercive diplomacy against states that refuse to toe its line.
By providing the vaccines, Japan has not only extended assistance to its partners but has also gained trust from the public of those countries. Japan’s policy is an act of public diplomacy to portray the country as a reliable friend, as Taiwanese Premier Su Tseng-chang remarked on his Facebook page: "True friends always lend a hand when they need each other the most". Likewise, Vietnamese Health Minister Nguyen Thanh Long noted that Japan’s vaccine donation is a valuable gift that reflects the cordial relationship between the government and the people of the two countries, especially in the context of global vaccine scarcity.
Geopolitical drivers of Japan’s vaccine diplomacy
Japan's COVID-19 assistance should be analysed in conjunction with the current geopolitical context. Japan identifies vaccine recipients based on the infection situation and vaccine availability in these countries as well as “their relations with Japan and other aspects”. Through its vaccine distribution policy, Japan is countering China's vaccine charm offensive, and more broadly, China's dominant position in the Asia-Pacific. Tension between the two powers has increased amid China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and intensified clashes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands throughout the past decade. This has prompted Tokyo to strengthen cooperation with like-minded countries in counterbalancing China’s growing clout. Vaccine diplomacy is a dimension of this geostrategic trend.
Japan’s COVID-19 vaccine support to Taiwan, in particular, is more than just a humanitarian gesture. China’s increased military and political pressure on Taiwan is a cause for alarm. Japan’s latest defence white paper explicitly links Taiwan’s stability to Japan’s security and Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro recently said that Tokyo would join Washington in defending Taipei in the face of a Chinese invasion. These developments came after Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide’s meeting with US President Joe Biden in April, in which the two leaders discussed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Their messages and intentions undoubtedly targeted Beijing. Thus, recent timely provisions of vaccines to Taipei by Japan and the US could be interpreted as a collaborative strategy aimed at weakening China’s grip on Taiwan and its overall regional dominance.
The Taiwan issue has been significant in great power competition in the Pacific region. As China has been using aid diplomacy to pressure small states in the Pacific into recognising Beijing over Taipei, Japan and the US have stepped up efforts to counter Chinese influence in this region. At the 9th Pacific Leaders Meeting on 2 July, Suga promised 3 million vaccine doses to Pacific nations while urging them to safeguard against authoritarianism and develop deeper relations in a "free and open Indo-Pacific”. It is also no coincidence that Japan has decided to reach out to Southeast Asian nations as the first targets for its vaccine donation scheme. When asked about Japan’s donation to ASEAN countries, foreign minister Motegi said that “they are very important countries for our initiative to realise a free and open Indo-Pacific region”. Japan has provided significant investment and assistance to these countries, which are also wary of China’s military might in the South China Sea.
However, Japan is late to the vaccine diplomacy game. Gaining a head start as Japan struggled to contain the virus and roll out its vaccination programme, as of 19 July, China has sold 884 million and donated 27 million Sinovac and Sinopharm shots globally, with the Asia-Pacific receiving the largest number of doses — 245.5 million. In terms of quantity, Japan cannot hope to match China’s massive vaccine diplomacy any time soon. Unlike China, Japan does not have its homegrown vaccines but manufactures AstraZeneca with a license from the UK. Moreover, in the past few months, Japan has faced domestic pressure to secure sufficient vaccines for its citizens and boost the relatively low inoculation rate. Preoccupation with hosting and ensuring safety for the Olympics, amid the recurring state of emergency at home, is likely to slow down Japan’s plan to ship vaccines abroad. Meanwhile, the Quad’s vaccination distribution efforts have suffered a setback as India — the world’s largest vaccine maker — temporarily halted its exports to prioritise domestic demand.
Quality over quantity
Nonetheless, the race is not all hopeless for Japan. Hesitancy over Chinese vaccines, particularly Sinovac, has been high in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. These doubts worsened when 350 Indonesian doctors and medical workers were reported to have caught COVID-19 in June after their complete Sinovac jabs. Apart from effectiveness, the image of vaccine providers on data transparency also plays a significant role in gaining public trust. Thus, despite smaller quantities and late delivery, Japan’s AstraZeneca provision stood out compared to China, thanks to its perceived better quality. In addition, China’s soft power has been seriously undermined by an assertion of hard power in territorial disputes and coercive diplomacy against states that refuse to toe its line.
As Japan’s weakness in the vaccine public diplomacy game is primarily an issue of quantity, it has focused on places that generate the most strategic and public diplomacy dividends — Taiwan and Vietnam, followed by other Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific Island states. The perceived better quality of Tokyo’s vaccines over those of Beijing will help Japan maximise its chance to win this vaccine diplomacy game in those countries. Once Japan has ensured that its vaccine roll-out plan at home is on track, we can expect to see a more active and extensive vaccine diplomacy campaign.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Phan Xuan Dung is a Young Leaders program member of the Pacific Forum, Hawaii, and a graduate in MSc Asian Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies — Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Wichuta Teeratanabodee obtained an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies — Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and an MSc in Development Studies from Lund University, Sweden. Image credit: Wikipedia.