Japan-Russia relations: Stronger stance needed on energy imports
Japan-Russia relations: Stronger stance needed on energy imports
Japan has impressed the international community with the firmness of its response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Japanese government’s sanctions closely align with those of its G7 partners, and it has remained robust in the face of Russian retaliation. However, while generally deserving of praise, Japan must go further in the area of energy. When Vladimir Putin’s regime annexed Crimea in 2014, Japan’s response was equivocal. Despite condemning the change to the status quo by force, the Abe Shinzo administration dragged its feet on sanctions. Moreover, when some measures were finally announced, they were tokenistic, designed to give the appearance of solidarity with Western partners while ensuring no real impact on the Russian economy.
Additionally, Abe, who wanted to secure his legacy by resolving Japan’s territorial dispute with Russia and regarded Putin as a “man who keeps his promises”, resumed engagement inappropriately quickly. In May 2016, Abe travelled to Sochi to offer an “eight-point economic cooperation plan”. Abe’s government also invited senior Russian officials to Japan. In December 2016, the Japanese prime minister hosted Putin in his family hometown in Yamaguchi. One year later, Japan welcomed the leadership of the Russian military, including General Oleg Salyukov — the Russian Army’s commander-in-chief, who was even permitted to test-drive a Japanese tank.
Better than in 2014
Given this shameful record, there were doubts about how Japan would respond to Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. However, these concerns were quickly dispelled. Although Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, who entered office in October 2021, had been Abe’s Foreign Minister from 2012 to 2017, he adopted a much tougher approach to Russia. His government was shocked by Russia’s willingness to show such flagrant disregard for international law. With China in mind, Kishida also stated feeling “a strong sense of crisis that Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow”.
The Kishida administration’s record since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is impressive, especially compared to Abe’s pandering to Putin. Yet Japan needs to go one step further by rapidly cutting imports of Russian gas.
The Kishida government was therefore quick in its condemnation of Russia’s behaviour, labelling it “shinryaku” — a powerful term meaning ‘aggression’ or ‘invasion’. Several packages of sanctions soon followed, including asset freezes against major Russian banks and a ban on the export of dual-use technologies like semiconductors. Furthermore, while Abe had lauded Putin as someone “dear to me as a partner”, Kishida slapped sanctions on him. Hundreds of other Russian officials and companies were also targeted. The intensity of these measures was unprecedented for Japan. Most eye-catching was the decision to phase out Russian coal and oil imports. In April, Japan’s government also expelled eight Russian diplomats who were suspected of intelligence-related activities. This is the first time Japan has ordered the mass expulsion of foreign diplomats from any country.
Support for Ukraine has also been substantial. Japan has provided USD 600 million in fiscal support and has delivered non-lethal equipment to Kyiv, including surveillance drones and bulletproof vests. This latter step required a review of Japan’s guidelines on the overseas transfer of defence equipment since the country usually avoids shipments of defence equipment to countries involved in armed conflict. Japan has also welcomed over 1,000 Ukrainians fleeing the conflict, although it labels them “evacuees” rather than “refugees” — the latter category denoting greater legal rights.
Russia strikes back
It is to Tokyo’s credit that the Putin regime sees Japan’s response as sufficiently weighty to merit retaliation. This has taken several forms. The Russian government has officially declared Japan an “unfriendly country”. Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, has also accused Japan of “striving for a leading position in the global movement of Russophobes”. More concretely, Russia suspended talks about a peace treaty, which has yet to be signed since the end of World War II due to the countries’ dispute over the Southern Kurils, which has been ongoing since these islands were occupied by Russia in 1945. Moscow also cancelled visa-free visits to the disputed territory for former Japanese islanders who were expelled after Soviet occupation. Russia’s apparent aim is to harm this community of long-suffering pensioners in the hope they will pressure the Japanese government to ease up on sanctions.
Additionally, Russia has maintained a steady drumbeat of military activity. At the end of March, the Russian military announced live-fire drills on the disputed Kuril Islands, featuring 3,000 troops, anti-tank missiles, and drones. Russia also included the Japanese-claimed islands in the Vostok-2022 exercises in September, a decision that Japanese Defence Minister Hamada Yasukazu condemned as “totally unacceptable”. China has assisted with this sabre rattling. As well as contributing forces to Vostok-2022, the Chinese military dispatched two strategic bombers to a joint aviation patrol with Russia in May. These aircraft approached Japan’s airspace in what the Japanese defence minister described as “a higher level of provocation than before”. Furthermore, at the end of September, three Chinese and four Russian warships completed a full circuit of the Japanese archipelago.
This show of force was predictable, yet Moscow has also tried to unsettle Japan through ‘horizontal’ retaliation; that is, by striking back in unexpected areas. For instance, on 28 September, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Japan of not showing repentance for its imperial aggression and stated that “the crimes of militarist Japan have no statute of limitation and must not be forgotten”.
More alarmingly, the Russian security services took a Japanese diplomat hostage, albeit briefly. On 26 September, it was announced that Motoki Tatsunori, consul at Japan’s consulate in Vladivostok, had been detained by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and accused of espionage. Motoki was bound, blindfolded, and subjected to questioning (which the Japanese government claims was coercive). The FSB then released a video of the diplomat’s “confession” before expelling him from the country. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno Hirokazu described this treatment of a government official with diplomatic immunity as “unbelievable”.
What more should be done?
Japan has not been intimidated by this bullying. Indeed, the government has announced yet more sanctions, including a ban on the export to Russia of 73 substances that could be used to produce chemical weapons. This enters force on 7 October. Furthermore, after Putin approved the annexation of four Ukrainian regions on 30 September, Kishida spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that Japan was considering further sanctions. This is much to Japan’s credit, yet there remains one area in which Tokyo has fallen short. This is liquified natural gas (LNG). Specifically, while many Western energy majors have withdrawn from Russia, Japan’s government urged Mitsui & Co and Mitsubishi Corporation not to relinquish their 12.5 per cent and 10 per cent stakes in Sakhalin-2. Indeed, when the Russian government announced the effective nationalisation of this energy project in June, Tokyo encouraged the Japanese firms to meekly apply to retain their stakes.
Most extraordinarily, Japan has kept the cabinet position of Minister for Economic Cooperation with Russia. The purpose of this incongruity is to signal to the Russian side that, despite the many sanctions, Japan remains committed to Russian LNG. This is an unconscionable failure and undermines much of the good work Japan has done. By continuing to purchase large volumes of Russian LNG, Japan is stuffing billions of dollars into Putin’s war chest and encouraging the Kremlin’s belief that Western countries care more about cheap energy than democracy, human rights, and international law. Of course, EU countries also still buy Russian gas, yet the European Commission at least has a plan to radically cut the union’s dependence within five years. The Japanese government has no comparable ambition. Indeed, in August 2022, the value of Japanese LNG imports from Russia were up 211.2 per cent compared with a year earlier. The purported reason for this timidity is energy security. Japan’s Trade Minister Hagiuda Koichi pleaded that Japan could not follow G7 partners in taking tough measures in the area of energy since “Japan has limited resources. It is difficult to immediately keep pace”.
It is certainly true that the Japanese archipelago is not blessed with abundant hydrocarbons, but, in 2021, less than 9 per cent of Japan’s gas imports were from Russia, in contrast to 40 per cent for the EU. That means that managing without Russian gas is clearly feasible, even if at some additional cost. A moment’s reflection is also enough to understand that continued dependence on Russia actually weakens Japan’s energy security. Moscow has repeatedly used Europe’s dependence on Russian energy for political leverage. It is only a matter of time before Russia does the same to Japan.
The Kishida administration’s record since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is impressive, especially compared to Abe’s pandering to Putin. Yet Japan needs to go one step further by rapidly cutting imports of Russian gas. Furthermore, Tokyo should end the absurdity of imposing unprecedented sanctions on Moscow while simultaneously maintaining the cabinet post of Minister for Economic Cooperation with Russia.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
James D.J. Brown is associate professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus. Image credit: Wikimedia.