From equidistance to engagement: The evolution of Russia’s Korea strategy
From equidistance to engagement: the evolution of Russia’s Korea Strategy
WRITTEN BY ANTHONY V. RINNA
9 July 2024
After nearly a quarter century since his first trip to the DPRK, during which North Korea’s leader has visited Russia no less than five times, Russian President Vladimir Putin travelled to Pyongyang. There, North Korea and Russia officially upgraded their relationship to the level of “comprehensive strategic partnership”, a step up from their treaty on friendship, good-neighbourliness, and cooperation implemented during Putin’s last visit in 2000.
Revitalised North Korea-Russia ties have raised concern in the ROK over their potential significance for regional security. Yet any steps the Kremlin takes toward developing closer relations with the DPRK risk irreparably damaging its already-strained ties with South Korea. This would fundamentally contradict the Kremlin’s nearly three-decades-old strategy of diplomatic equidistance between North Korea and the ROK.
From Moscow’s perspective, Putin would be unwise not to take advantage of North Korea’s support for Russia since 2022. Nevertheless, Moscow has traditionally not been interested in a lopsided relationship in the Korean Peninsula. Given that both Russia and South Korea have mutually signalled their willingness to maintain cooperative relations where possible, there are two main developments to watch for in the context of Putin’s recent visit to Pyongyang.
As long as Russia refrains from taking any steps in its defence cooperation with North Korea that directly threaten South Korea, there is still a chance that Moscow can leave room for at least a partial restoration of ties with Seoul.
On the one hand, a desire to preserve relations with Seoul may act as a restraining force on the development of Moscow’s ties with Pyongyang to the maximum possible extent. Conversely, the aftermath of Putin’s visit could constitute a step toward the abandoning of Russia’s strategy of maintaining balanced diplomatic ties between the DPRK and the ROK.
Moscow-Seoul ties: From Nordpolitik to the present
Moscow-Seoul diplomatic ties were established in 1990 in the aftermath of major policy shifts in South Korea and the USSR, namely Mikhail Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk Declaration and Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik in the late 1980s. Under those policies, the Soviet Union pursued economic rapprochement with capitalist South Korea, while the ROK moved to reach out to North Korea’s traditional allies such as the USSR in an attempt to engage indirectly with the DPRK.
The following years, however, were a tumultuous period for the Kremlin’s Korea policy: North Korea-Russia relations collapsed, while South Korea held Russia diplomatically at arm’s length. As a result, Russia lost influence in the Korean Peninsula, which Russia’s policy elites today regard as a mistake. Russian policymakers devised the strategy of diplomatic “equidistance” between the DPRK and the ROK so that Russia could maintain influence in both Koreas amid the presence of major actors such as China and the US.
For the first three decades after the end of the Cold War, thanks in no small part to this equidistance, Moscow and Seoul were relatively free to pursue cooperative bilateral ties at the level of a strategic cooperative partnership.
Nevertheless, Russia’s relationship with South Korea declined significantly in 2022. In response to Seoul’s support for punitive economic measures, the Kremlin declared South Korea an “unfriendly” country. Meanwhile, amid international pressure on the ROK to provide lethal weaponry to Ukraine, the Kremlin has repeatedly stated that South Korea directly arming Ukraine would destroy the bilateral relations.
Russia’s renewed engagement with North Korea has raised fears in Seoul over the possibility that Russia could transfer weapons technology to North Korea, posing a threat to the ROK’s security. For this reason, former South Korean presidential secretary Cha Du Hyeogn argues that South Korea needs to implement its own red lines, similar to those Putin has issued to South Korea about weapons transfers to Ukraine.
Keeping the door to cooperation ajar
South Korea enjoys a degree of leverage in its relations with Russia, while Moscow has often been circumspect in its relations with Seoul even in the face of bilateral difficulties.
The Kremlin has long viewed capital-rich and technologically-advanced South Korea as a key partner in the development of the Russian Far East. A desire to maintain economic cooperation with South Korea may explain why the Kremlin was relatively muted — especially in comparison to China’s blistering response — to Seoul’s decision to deploy the US’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016.
Furthermore, given that Russia views South Korea as the weakest link in the US’ Northeast Asia alliance network, Moscow will welcome any distance between South Korea and the United States. Seoul was initially among the most cautious of Washington’s allies to criticise Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin understands that there may be chances to exploit any policy differences between Seoul and Washington, such as an engagement-friendly administration in Seoul calling for at least sanctions relief for the DPRK, but that this is best done when Moscow can present itself as an amenable partner for South Korea’s interests.
Russia’s strategy of diplomatic equidistance and the importance it places on ties with Seoul may explain why Putin has adopted conciliatory rhetoric towards South Korea. In late 2023, Putin described Russia-South Korea relations as merely going through a difficult period and expressed hope that relations could be normalised once again. In the summer of 2024, the Russian leader reaffirmed his openness to restore Russia-South Korea economic cooperation, which had once been a centrepiece of Moscow-Seoul ties. In 2021, Russia was South Korea’s 12th largest export partner. By 2024, Russia had fallen to 22nd place. The primary reason for the sharp decline in South Korean exports, according to the Korea International Trade Association, is South Korea’s application of economic sanctions against Russia.
Likewise, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev has issued several statements attesting to South Korea’s supposed desire to preserve working ties with the Russian Federation. Soon after taking his post as ambassador, he declared that the ROK continues to look for ways to maintain bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation, going so far as to call South Korea the “friendliest of unfriendly countries”.
Meanwhile, even as South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has been steadfast in his support for the West in its response to the war in Ukraine, including stepping up ties with NATO, Seoul has in many ways cautiously reciprocated Russia’s desires. Yoon Suk Yeol has expressed willingness to maintain cooperation with Russia where possible, particularly in the economic realm.
South Korea maintains economic ties with Russia in the energy field in particular. Although South Korea has significantly reduced energy imports from Russia, the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) still regards Russia as an important source of natural gas, in no small part because of Korea’s geographic proximity to Russia. Indeed, as one analysis of South Korea’s energy dependence on Russia shows, not only does South Korea continue to import steady amounts of Russian natural gas, but Russia also continues to supply between 20-30 per cent of South Korea’s coal imports.
Meanwhile, the longstanding belief that Russia has a role to play in Korean unification dies hard. Indeed, members of Seoul’s foreign policy elite have not been shy about their belief that the ROK should be free to chart an independent course in its foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia when doing so fundamentally benefits South Korea’s national interest.
Watchful eye, steady hand
Understandably, officials in Seoul said they were watching Putin’s visit to the DPRK closely. Even so, the ROK’s response to Putin’s June 2024 visit to Pyongyang was largely measured.
In response to confirmation of Putin’s trip to Pyongyang, South Korean foreign ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk stated that Russia and South Korea remain in contact over the situation on the Korean Peninsula and that Seoul’s willingness to cooperate with Russia where possible has not changed. Lim, however, also warned that any North Korea-Russia cooperation must take place within the confines of what is legally acceptable under UN Security Council provisions.
Even as it stands up for its interests, South Korea appears to have adopted a circumspect position toward the prospect of deepening North Korea-Russia cooperation. Indeed, Russia’s clear desire to maintain and even restore relations with South Korea makes sense in the context of Russia’s equidistance strategy, and it should come as no surprise if Moscow ends up using the 2024 Kim-Putin summit to develop ties with North Korea only to a modest degree.
Of course, in light of deepening North Korea-Russia defence cooperation, the South Korean government has stated that it is considering supplying Ukraine with lethal weapons. This, however, would likely only occur in response to irrefutable intelligence that Russia has conducted military technology transfers to the DPRK that directly threaten the ROK’s security. As long as Russia refrains from taking any steps in its defence cooperation with North Korea that directly threaten South Korea, there is still a chance that Moscow can leave room for at least a partial restoration of ties with Seoul.
Nevertheless, amid tectonic geopolitical shifts, the possibility that the Kremlin will abandon its Korean equidistance track cannot be ruled out, particularly if Moscow decides there is no hope in restoring ties with Seoul. To be sure, the Kremlin has long regarded the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula as part of its geopolitical periphery where it enjoys the least influence. Any decision it makes to abandon hope for rapprochement with South Korea is not one that Moscow will make flippantly.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Anthony V. Rinna is a Senior Editor at Sino-NK, a scholarly research website dedicated to analysis of the Korean Peninsula. A resident of South Korea since 2014, his views have been cited in outlets including CNN and the Wall Street Journal. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Presidential Executive Office of Russia.