China won't shape the Indo-Pacific in the post-COVID world
China won't shape the Indo-Pacific in the post-COVID world
WRITTEN BY AADIL BRAR
11 February 2021
As COVID-19 rages across the US, China has sought to further exert its influence over the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing has closely watched the Biden administration's early moves to gauge the trajectory of the United State's policy toward the Indo-Pacific.
"It is hoped the incoming Biden administration will show political wisdom and courage and throw the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy and its entrenched Cold War mentality into the trash can of history," said an editorial in China Daily on 17 January 2021. Statements’ from the Biden team in support of Taiwan and Japan have made clear to China that they intend to continue the broader trends of the previous administration. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has reassured his counterparts in Asia that the Biden administration will also continue to support the Quadrilateral Dialogue.
More of the same for the Indo-Pacific
While there is no dearth of opinions about the impact of COVID-19 on international relations, some experts have suggested that it will be the seismic event that upends the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. But a close reading of the first weeks of 2021 indicates that during the coming year we may witness a continuation of the security-oriented dilemma across Asia. With the growing shadow of securitisation shaping relations between countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chains, scrutiny of investment and access to vaccines have become subjects deeply impacted by security concerns.
Amid a destabilising security environment, China has limited opportunities to provide a different model for the region and the growing involvement of European powers in the Indo-Pacific will only further complicate these plans.
The Trump administration sought to reinvigorate the US's engagement with Asia and counterbalance China through the Indo-Pacific strategy. Though the strategy had proposed an economic dimension — financing and investment by US firms — to engage with countries in Asia, the administration's defining legacy will be limited to the role of acting solely as a security provider. The internal rift in US politics due to ‘Trumpism’ may not allow the Biden administration to return to the helm of leadership in Asia (last seen during the Obama administration). Nevertheless, that does not mean that China will get to shape the region as they wish. In 2021, the India-China rivalry is likely to expand into other spheres and may shape a strategic competition beyond the conflict at the Line of Actual Control. India and China are currently competing to promote their vaccination programme to countries across the region. The vaccination programmes have not been spared by the securitisation dilemma faced by many countries across the region.
While China has long believed that the United States has seen India as a key component in its regional strategy, this, in turn, was confirmed by the recent declassification of their Indo-Pacific strategy documents. We are yet to learn how the Biden administration will reconfigure India’s role in their regional strategy. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's trip to ASEAN (before President Biden took office) was widely interpreted as China signalling to the region that it is willing to fill the gap left by the United States. Besides some success on existing projects — including the Belt and Road Initiative — no significant deals were signed with any of the ASEAN countries during the trip. While ASEAN countries may be willing to cooperate with China on investments in technology and trade, there is no consensus on accepting it as a security provider.
Beijing’s mixed scorecard
Nevertheless, China has had some success in promoting its venture capital investments in Southeast Asia. In 2020, China’s investment in Indonesia increased by 79 per cent and remains the second-largest source of investment in the country. In recent weeks, Chinese state media has tried to discredit India's vaccination programme with headlines such as "India ‘100 per cent unable' to achieve COVID-19 vaccination goal". It is, therefore, clear that China and India are now direct competitors in promoting their respective vaccine programmes across the Indo-Pacific.
At present, Indonesia and Cambodia remain the two ASEAN countries to have accepted China's Sinovac Biotech vaccine, with Cambodia only recently deciding to accept it after some initial doubts. Myanmar and the Philippines had initially expressed an interest in China's vaccine, but they have yet to receive the first batch. Meanwhile, Myanmar has started to administer a vaccine manufactured by India's Serum Institute. Notably, Nepal has also initiated a COVID-19 vaccination programme with a vaccine made by India's Serum Institute, all this while reports have emerged which suggest that China tried to pressurise Katmandu to accept its vaccine.
Same game — higher stakes
China's aggressive moves in the Taiwan Strait in the first few weeks of 2021 may have been an attempt to test the Biden administration's resolve. These include intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). In 2020, intrusions by the Chinese military reached a level last seen in 1996. "We will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defence capability. Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region" said Ned Price, the new US State Department spokesperson appointed by President Biden.
"They are solemn responses to foreign interference and provocations by Taiwan separatist forces," responded Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defence. President Biden’s support for the defence of the Senkaku Islands was another much-discussed response by the new administration (meant for China). President Xi Jinping's success with the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong has fuelled his ambitions with regard to integrating Taiwan. In attempting to destabilise Taiwan’s internal politics, China continues its efforts to influence the outcome of elections, nevertheless, Xi Jinping may simply resort to using brute force to achieve reunification.
The Himalayan frontier between India and China remains a tinder box that has the potential for limited military conflict. The 25 January skirmish in the Naku La region of India's Sikkim has brought to the surface military tensions between India and China that continue to simmer. China still expects that the Biden administration will take a different direction from the Trump-era policies, which has been the consistent demand made by many Communist Party commentators. President Biden's China team consists of experts who have hinted that they might cooperate with China on climate change even though the readout of Secretary Blinken’s recent call with the top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi didn’t mention this issue.
There are early signs that the Biden administration will continue to use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to crack down on China's investments. CFIUS reviews the critical foreign investments for any ties to a hostile nation-state. The Trump administration previously made extensive use of the CFIUS mechanism to review Chinese investment in the United States. A combination of domestic concerns and a focus on the need for economic recovery could overshadow the Biden administration's ability to engage with the Indo-Pacific during the course of their first year. In addition, many other Indo-Pacific countries will also be preoccupied with their financial recovery plans which could give China some leverage to solidify its gains.
A crowded future
Amid a destabilising security environment, China has limited opportunities to provide a different model for the region and the growing involvement of European powers in the Indo-Pacific will only further complicate these plans. To date, the United Kingdom has said that they will hold naval drills with Japan; France has committed to play a growing role in the Indo-Pacific and expanded cooperation with India, and Germany has formally adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy. That said, there are no signs that major countries in Asia wish to replace the US with China as the security guarantor for the region.
China is likely to have limited success in seeking to establish new military bases across the Indo-Pacific or the expansion of Chinese investment projects through the Belt and Road Initiative. The Biden administration’s early signalling indicates that China will have a tough time ahead with promoting a ‘China-friendly’ vision for the region.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Aadil Brar is a freelance journalist and an independent researcher. He was previously a digital journalist at BBC Monitoring’s China team. His expertise is in open-source analysis, conflict, and diplomacy. Image credit: Flick/Paul Kagame