Beijing uses border villages to secure territorial claims
Beijing uses border villages to secure territorial claims
WRITTEN BY HARRY THURSBY-PELHAM
30 March 2023
Since the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2017, China has invested over CNY 30.1 billion (circa USD 4.38 billion) in the India-China border region in Tibet under the “Plan for the Construction of Well-off Villages in the Border Areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (2017-2020)” to build ‘xiaokang’ villages. These villages are primarily aimed at establishing permanent civilian settlements on the China-India border, and they also help the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to fortify the region against foreign incursions. But most importantly, besides strengthening defence, ‘xiaokang’ villages also serve to strengthen China’s judicial legitimacy as permanent infrastructure in the disputed Tibetan border region.
Unresolved border issues
Tibet’s history dates back to the 7th century, though for much of its existence it has been victimised by neighbours such as the Mongols, British India, and China, with the Qing Dynasty exerting varying degrees of control for nearly 200 years from 1717 to 1911. The India-Tibet border was largely unmarked for a long time, due to the inhospitable conditions of the region. In the 1914 Simla Convention, representatives of British India and Tibet agreed on the McMahon Line, which covered the most significant section of the Tibetan-Indian Border. (This line now forms the basis of the current Line of Actual Control (LAC) between Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India.) However, the Republic of China, being the suzerain of Tibet at the time, found the terms unacceptable and walked away from negotiations.
In 1950, the CCP brought Tibet under Chinese rule once again and refused to accept the McMahon Line, claiming that Tibet was not technically independent and therefore did not have the authority to make decisions about its border. India maintained that the treaty was legally binding, and consequently Arunachal Pradesh became one of the points of contention in the ensuing 1962 Sino-Indian War, though the status quo remained unchanged after the war. Nevertheless, the CCP regards Indian control over ‘South Tibet’, which encompasses most of Arunachal Pradesh, as an illegal occupation and still seeks to restore sovereignty over the region.
With India constructing roads and border villages leading up to the LAC in response to China’s construction, it looks like tensions on the border will continue in the foreseeable future.
Since the 1962 war, both India and China have developed nuclear weapons and large militaries. Owing to the increased risks of engaging in modern warfare, both sides have attempted to avoid repeating a direct military confrontation. Furthermore, the globalisation of the international community through organisations such as the United Nations has led to the establishment of more defined parameters under which a territorial claim can be considered legitimate. Such claims are usually defined by treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective control, history, uti possidetis (colonial boundaries becoming international after independence), elitism, and ideology. Both China and India could base their respective position on some of these grounds. Due to the legal obscurity of the issue, however, each side feels a need to reinforce its claims.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping took power in 2013, CCP policy towards Tibet shifted from concerns over internal security in the region towards territorial integrity. This has marked a significant ideological shift in the Chinese government, from former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of ‘biding one’s time’ (tao guang yang hui) to proactively asserting itself on the world stage. For this reason, we have seen tensions reignite on the Sino-Indian border since Xi’s accession to power, with official data from the Indian government suggesting that Chinese incursions on the LAC have increased since 2018. Considering Xi’s more assertive foreign policy, the ‘xiaokang’ border villages resemble an implementation of hard power through the construction of infrastructure.
Border villages serve territorial claims
In 2017, after Xi Jinping demanded “Chinese people [...] to work in remote and border areas with the ethnic minority population”, the TAR government rolled out the border village construction plan as part of its rural revitalisation programme. It involved building 628 border villages in 112 border townships across 21 border counties in Shigatse, Lhokha, Nyingchi, and Ngari Prefectures. Shigatse has built 354 of these 628 villages on the border with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and Ngari Prefecture has constructed 37 border villages. By the end of 2021, all villages near the Indian border had finished construction. Given the mountainous nature of the terrain, the exact location of the border is unclear, and many of these villages are located right on the LAC or even within areas claimed by both sides.
These villages include housing, roads, public service facilities, and small rural industrial construction. The 628 administrative villages are categorised by relative proximity to the border: 427 are first-line, and 201 are second-line villages. Though the exact locations of these villages are not publicly available, the Indian Foreign Ministry has revealed one first-line village to lie 4.5 kilometres within India’s claimed territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Most of the villages are connected to national and state highways through feeder roads. China has also successfully relocated many Tibetans and Han Chinese into these border villages from deeper within the Tibetan province by offering economic incentives. According to the Global Times, party cadres in these new areas receive favourable pay and new residents receive subsidies, which amount to CNY 12,000 (circa USD 1,788) per adult per year.
Border villages primarily act as border posts on the disputed border with India, supporting troop mobility and monitoring activity close to Chinese-controlled territory. Besides this, the Chinese government is also using civilian developments to create permanent infrastructure on the border, which would build its judicial muscle in territorial disputes. Beijing has adopted a similar strategy in the South China Sea after it lost to the Philippines in the 2015 Hague Tribunal. Under this ruling, for an island to have an Exclusive Economic Zone (and therefore judicial legitimacy in its territorial claims) it must include the ability to generate a self-sufficient food supply, have a permanent population, and have access to fresh water and electricity. Thus, since 2020, China has developed sand-to-soil techniques, succeeding in growing 1.5 tons of vegetables that year on Woody Island, the largest of its newly constructed islands in the South China Sea. Furthermore, Beijing has also provided economic incentives and housing projects for civilians on these islands.
Similarly, by building permanent settlements and encouraging Tibetans to move into these villages, China is giving legal cover to its claims on the disputed territory. Once the permanent settlements are established, it is difficult to change the status quo on the ground, since it raises the stakes for civilian casualties in the event of armed conflict in the border areas.
Villages raise tensions
By building these border villages, China has cemented its claims in the region, which weakens India’s position. The settlement of a permanent Tibetan and Han Chinese population in these border villages makes it possible for China to change the facts on the ground and reinforce its control over the border. This is an escalatory move, as it could force India to accept a new status quo dictated by Beijing. This is because the border is not clearly marked and permanent civilian settlements make a claim much harder to dislodge, effectively making India lose ground in disputed areas along the border with Tibet. Until now, Beijing and New Delhi have avoided war through the ambiguity of the situation. With China changing the status quo to India’s disadvantage, the risk of clashes between patrols and rising tensions increases, given that both sides remain unwilling to give up their claims.
Permanent civilian settlements also strengthen the Chinese case from an international law perspective. They reduce the risk of another embarrassment in front of the courts, as was the case against the Philippines. Border villages also create natural watch posts on the border, limiting cross-border activities and laying down infrastructure that the CCP could use should it decide to re-establish its claim to ‘South Tibet’ by force in the future.
In February 2023, in response to China’s village constructions, the Indian Union Cabinet approved a “Vibrant Village Programme” in order to enhance security along the Sino-Indian border. The Indian government has allocated INR 48 billion (circa USD 580.7 million) for this initiative, and it closely resembles the Chinese border villages programme. By investing in its border regions, the Indian government both strengthens its position militarily, as over half of the allocation will be used for road construction, and also shores up support among its citizens in the region by raising the standard of living and preventing the outflow of citizens in recent years.
With India constructing roads and border villages leading up to the LAC in response to China’s construction, it looks like tensions on the border will continue in the foreseeable future. Just as in the 2020 Galwan Valley tussle which resulted in the death of 20 Indian and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers, the upgrading of infrastructure on both sides in such close proximity increases the probability of an accident leading to an unintended escalation between the two major powers.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Harry Thursby-Pelham is a researcher working on Tibet and Xinjiang. Besides English, he is proficient in Russian, Spanish, Japanese and currently studying Mandarin at National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Antoine Taveneaux.