A window of opportunity for India and the Philippines to deepen bilateral relations
A window of opportunity for India and the Philippines to deepen bilateral relations
WRITTEN BY JOSHUA BERNARD B. ESPEÑA
29 August 2020
The Philippines and India have been cautiously attempting to develop mutual trust with China through deepening economic ties. But as Beijing intensifies its efforts to revise the prevailing status quo in favour of its interests, Manila and New Delhi should upgrade their defence ties to protect their interests and preserve the existing rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Impetus for Bilateral Cooperation
Although bilateral diplomatic relations were established in 1949, India’s Cold War policy of nonalignment and the Philippines’ alliance with the US prevented meaningful defence cooperation for decades. In 2006, the two signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to deepen defence cooperation in training and education, exchange visits, and information exchange.
Since 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Act East policy has provided opportunities for both countries to cooperate. In 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Modi signed an MoU on Defence Industry and Logistics. In 2018, a high-level defence dialogue between Philippine Defence secretary Lorenzana and Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman occurred in New Delhi. Sitharaman recommended deeper navy-to-navy relations beginning with regular tabletop exercises, which could then develop into an actual naval sea exercise. This deepening cooperation bore fruit when the Indian Navy assisted a Philippine Navy ship that had caught fire in India in May 2020.
Like Modi, Duterte’s approach is based on caution and building mutual trust to avoid a wider geopolitical conflict, and setting aside territorial disputes in exchange for trade and investment opportunities. This policy has continued despite regular harassment of Filipino fishing vessels by Chinese coast guards.
During a state visit to Manila in October 2019, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind expressed India’s intention to participate in the Philippines' defence modernisation, a message that Duterte received warmly. In December 2019, Lorenzana announced the Philippines' purchase of India’s BrahMos (PJ-10) missiles for coastal defence operations. On 31 January 2020, the two countries conducted the 3rd round of Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) meetings. In June 2020, Duterte and Modi expressed their intention to work on defence cooperation as “vital partners in the region”.
Strategic drivers for cooperation
India's Act East Policy seeks to counterbalance China's bid for regional hegemony, including addressing maritime security concerns. In 2015, New Delhi released its maritime security strategy to establish its intention to shape its neighbourhood according to its interests, including maritime cooperation. The document signalled intensified efforts to protect chokepoints and the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The South China Sea was identified as a secondary maritime area of interest where security and freedom of navigation are of paramount interest. Protecting International Sea Lines is critical for India due to its dependence on “import and export of essential cargo, like crude and refined energy products, trade, and other commodities”.
On 16 July 2020, Indian External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava reiterated New Delhi's position that the SCS is "part of the global commons" and that they stand for freedom of navigation (FON) and unimpeded commerce under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This statement came after the United States denounced Chinese actions to treat the SCS as its "maritime empire," echoing the Philippines’ call for China to respect the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award.
Responding to the comments, Secretary Delfin Lorenzana reiterated that any country may navigate through the SCS. However, he worried that given long-standing Sino-Indian tensions, increased Indian presence in the region could further complicate the SCS dispute. However, this worry only reflects the Philippines' inability to recognise the important strategic role India can play to help shape an environment favourable for a rules-based order.
Philippines' National Security Policy (NSP) 2017-2022 identifies the territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea – Manila's claimed waters in the SCS – as the country’s foremost security challenge. Despite the NSP's guidance for an assertive stance at all levels, Duterte has pursued an appeasement policy vis-a-vis China. Like Modi, Duterte’s approach is based on caution and building mutual trust to avoid a wider geopolitical conflict, and setting aside territorial disputes in exchange for trade and investment opportunities. This policy has continued despite regular harassment of Filipino fishing vessels by Chinese coast guards.
However, Duterte's policy is unsustainable because of the Philippines-US alliance. The suspension of the 1997 Visiting Forces Agreement’s termination this year proved that Manila would not trade its alliance with Washington anytime soon. Moreover, there are diverging opinions in Duterte’s cabinet and the military about the US and China. Lorenzana agrees with the American position that there should be a rules-based order in the South China Sea and has labelled China’s historic rights as ‘imaginary’. Manila’s foreign affairs secretary Teodoro Locsin insists that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award with China is non-negotiable and that if China invades, he would tap the US for help. The Philippine Joint Chiefs of Staff Lieutenant General Gilbert Gapay also refuses to trade the country’s territorial integrity.
A way forward
Both India and the Philippines stand to gain from closer cooperation to meet the threat of a more assertive China. India’s experiences should serve as a warning to the Philippines about the need to balance economic benefits from cooperating with China against the risks it poses to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The NSP states that ensuring territorial defence requires developing capabilities and enhancing cooperation on maritime security and defence with other countries. Moreover, the NSP also emphasises the importance of soliciting international support for the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award. India can be a good partner for these strategic aims. Indian weaponry can not only help the Philippines develop its military capability, but the country can also be an important partner for naval exercises, and a legal multiplier to the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal award.
There are several avenues for deepening bilateral cooperation. Apart from increasing confidence-building through the JDCC and purchasing Indian weaponry, the two should also make concerted efforts to develop a shared strategic vision. This can be developed by intensifying information-sharing, increasing joint training and exercises to meet traditional and non-traditional security concerns, diversifying exchanges of technical working groups on defence, and conducting naval exercises in the high seas. The Philippines can also engage India in Quad-plus arrangements to diversify its strategic options against China where it can leverage its interests to influence major powers while protecting itself from external influence.
In summary
As China continues to increase its assertiveness to redraw the rules-based order, the Philippines and India confront a similar threat. Rather than worrying about India's hustle to the east, the Philippines should welcome this as a window of opportunity to diversify its defence partners to uphold a shared strategic vision.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author Biography
Joshua Bernard B. Espeña is a defence analyst in the Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He is currently taking his master’s degree in International Studies at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. He writes on Great Power politics in the Indo-Pacific, Philippine Strategic Culture, and ASEAN Studies. Image: Wikimedia
Disclaimer: The opinions in this article do not reflect the views of his affiliated office, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or the Philippine Government. All opinions expressed in this article are entirely the author’s and are offered for the purpose of academic debate only.