What lies beneath the iceberg, delving deeper into #GotaGoHome

23 September 2022

Sri Lanka’s economic and political crisis made headlines globally with the #GotaGoHome protests gaining momentum earlier this year. The backdrop to this online and offline protest campaign was economic turmoil, hyperinflation, and a sovereign debt default of USD 78 million. As global supply chains for fuel were disrupted by the war in Ukraine, Sri Lankans had to suffer more due to the depletion of foreign reserves and purchasing ability to buy fuel for the country. Citizens who had to face daily power cuts which disrupted all economic activity were further troubled by having to queue up for basic necessities such as fuel, gas, and commodities.

There were also shortages of certain food items and products due to import restrictions and government-imposed controls over trade. Frustration and discontent over the government’s inability to provide relief led to peaceful protests taking a dark turn with aggressors damaging and looting public and private property. The outcome of the protests was the respective resignations of the cabinet, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (who are brothers), and the appointment of Ranil Wickremesinghe (a former prime minister) as president to serve the remainder of Rajapaksa’s term.

A globalised movement

A central theme of the protests was a demand from the public for Gotabaya Rajapaksa to step down as president. Sub-thematic areas of the protests were #GoHomeRajapaksas, which strongly signalled an end to family politics owing to mounting displeasure at the Rajapaksa family’s nepotism, alleged corruption, and luxurious lifestyle, which are in stark contrast to the majority of Sri Lankans who are suffering from the daily economic burdens. As protestors occupied the Presidential Palace in July, luxuries such as gymnasiums, pools, and sprawling properties were showcased to the public via the media. These images and footage are eerily resonant of a similar incident in Sri Lanka’s recent past, where luxuries sported by the Rajapaksas were showcased by the media in 2015 — Mahinda Rajapaksa suffered a major electoral defeat. It seems that the movement of people has taken a cyclic turn with the underlying motive of the protests aimed at creating political accountability in Sri Lanka.

Wickremesinghe is therefore in a clear dilemma as he is not only expected to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund for a sovereign debt bailout, debt restructuring, and economic recovery plan but to also appease Sri Lanka’s minorities and their broader calls for accountability.

With these protests, Sri Lankans around the globe also took a strong stand against corruption as embodied by the slogan and hashtag #returnourstolenmoney. This was an interesting facet of the protests as there were both reports and unofficial rumours of the Rajapaksa family dynasty’s offshore assets and bank accounts. For example, the undeclared wealth of the Rajapaksa family members was revealed with the leak of the Pandora Papers in 2021 and the Panama Papers in 2016. The allegations run deeper than just commissions obtained by the Rajapaksas and their cabinet ministers, extending to stealing from relief aid, and also from the offshore funds and gold recovered from the defeated Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Although the Rajapaksas rose to popularity within Sri Lanka for defeating the LTTE terrorist organisation and ending a civil war, numerous allegations were levelled at the family for war profiteering. According to different sources, including Indian intelligence services, the Rajapaksas’ had entered into a deal with former LTTE procurement leader Kumaran Pathmanathan (aka ‘KP’) to obtain the LTTE’s offshore wealth. It is ironic today to recall that the allegations over the LTTE gold issue were brought to light in 2016 by Ranil Wickremesinghe, who was then a major political rival of the Rajapaksas, calling for an investigation.

The #GotaGoHome protests were not geographically restricted to Sri Lanka but were spread across the globe among the Sri Lankan diaspora in parts of the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and also New Zealand. The language of these protests by elements of the diaspora shares many similarities with the protests against the Rajapaksas staged in the immediate aftermath of the civil war in 2009. A common aim of these diaspora protests was to seek the arrest of the Rajapaksas. The difference lies in the different kind of accountability which is demanded by these varying global protests: from accountability for war crimes which has transformed into a demand for accountability for all forms of corruption. The composition of the diasporic protests has also changed into a multi-ethnic one, as opposed to ethnically polarised protests such as those by the Tamil diaspora against the Rajapaksas — for example, the London Tamil diaspora protests of 2009 which cited Tamil genocide.

However, the demands for accountability for war crimes were not raucous at the #GotaGoHome protest site at the Galle Face Green (GFG) in Sri Lanka at the height of the movement. It was only the resignation and subsequent flight of Gotabaya Rajapaksa that emboldened parts of the diaspora to echo the Tamil genocide issue. Examples include recent media releases by the Oakland Institute and OnCanadaProject. Within Sri Lanka, calls for accountability for war crimes have recently emerged in Jaffna, manifested in posters displayed by the National Forum of Tamil Culture.

Ranil Wickremesinghe’s trajectory

Sri Lanka’s political developments are evoking general amnesia in the psyche of its political leaders. It was not long ago in 2018 that an irrational and paranoid President Sirisena sacked Ranil Wickremesinghe (who was then the Prime Minister), and unconstitutionally appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa in his place. This constitutional coup drew international attention when Prime Minister Wickremesinghe received international support and had the confidence of the parliament. The situation today is ironic as President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country amid protests over his decision to hand over the remaining period of his term to Ranil Wickremesinghe. As the latter assumes office — despite his widespread unpopularity for crushing the remaining elements of a dwindling protest, imposing emergency regulations, and making arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act — several incongruencies have emerged.

First, there is the issue of Wickremesinghe’s legitimacy to rid the country of widespread corruption and administrative malpractice in the government, due to his alleged involvement in the central bank bond scam of 2016. The second issue is regarding Wickremesinghe’s legitimacy to bring about political accountability due to his own troubled record on human rights. It is widely known that Wickremesinghe was investigated in a presidential inquiry regarding a torture camp operated in Batalanda in 1988 to exterminate socialist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) activists. Preconceptions about Ranil’s complicities in corruption and his unwillingness to uphold the rule of law were confirmed with a military-led crackdown on the GFG protest site, the continued imposition of emergency regulations, and arrests made under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act 1978 (PTA). Moreover, this leads us to the third issue of how Wickremesinghe discontinued his own legislative reforms which were initiated during his tenure as prime minister in the years 2015-2019. During these years he pressed the government to repeal the PTA and replace it with a new counter-terrorism law with better human rights guarantees. Today, there is an inherent contradiction in his behaviour as we observe Wickremasinghe reneging on matters he once stood up for.

Wickremesinghe is therefore in a clear dilemma as he is not only expected to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund for a sovereign debt bailout, debt restructuring, and economic recovery plan but to also appease Sri Lanka’s minorities and their broader calls for accountability. In the past, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s intervention secured a ceasefire agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2002. This was at a time when the government could not afford to carry on with the civil war and had to enter negotiations with the LTTE for a peace settlement mediated by the Norwegian government. Despite criticisms from rights groups and the diplomatic core over the crackdown on GFG protests, Ranil Wickremesinghe seems to command confidence from the international community as witnessed by some of the international support Sri Lanka had recently received. For example, the European Union’s press release in July in support of the government, and also the Norwegian government’s aid to UN specialised agencies to address pressing food security issues in Sri Lanka.

However, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s resilience will be tested in the near future with the anticipated announcement of an IMF economic recovery plan. If Wickremesinghe undertakes austerity measures to cut public expenditure in Sri Lanka such as privatising nationalised industries of petroleum and state-owned enterprises i.e. Sri Lankan Airlines, the Ceylon Electricity Board, and other sectors, there will be some domestic resistance. Part of the reform agenda proposed by economists to Ranil Wickremesinghe is to privatise or provide alternative solutions to loss-making state-owned enterprises, which have burdened the economy accruing cumulative losses of LKR 1.2 trillion over 2006-2020 (according to a study conducted by the Advocata Think Tank). The same study points out that “the combined loss per day [in 2019] of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, Sri Lankan Airlines, Sathosa and the National Water Supply and Drainage Board [was] about LKR 384,479,189”.

It is clear that should the government introduce austerity measures this would see consequences at the next election. Wickremesinghe's options are therefore restrained by unprecedented challenges and however he proceeds he is destined to feature prominently in Sri Lanka’s political history.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Nathasha Fernando is a visiting lecturer at the Metropolitan College in Sri Lanka and an independent analyst covering security and foreign policy issues facing South Asia. Image credit: Flickr/Nazly Ahmed.