Understanding the Philippines’ changing South China Sea policy: A Chinese perspective
Understanding the Philippines’ changing South China Sea policy: A Chinese perspective
WRITTEN BY ZHOU WENXING
10 July 2024
In the shadow of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian and Israel-Hamas wars the tense relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines due to their disputes over the Second Thomas Shoal (known as Ren’ai Jiao in China) in the South China Sea (SCS) has rapidly gained attention. The Shangri-La Dialogue concluded last month, the region’s preeminent defence summit held in Singapore, was another occasion in which Beijing and Manila’s rising tensions were on display.
During his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippine President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr said that the vision for the SCS as a “sea of peace, stability, and prosperity” envisioned by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been undermined by other actors, referring to China without naming it. He also warned that China’s “illegal” actions in the SCS could be an “act of war” should Chinese coast guard ships kill a Filipino with water cannons.
The Marcos Jr administration has dramatically changed course from its predecessor and has clearly aligned itself with Washington. Under the presidency of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte from 2016 to 2022, Manila adopted a policy of “strategic acquiescence” towards China, and managed the SCS issue well. The key question is why and how Manila shifted its generally conciliatory China policy, particularly regarding its policy on the SCS issue, within just one year of Marcos Jr’s administration taking office.
Rising tensions in the South China Sea
In the eyes of the Philippines and many Western observers, the recent tensions between the Philippines and China are mainly caused by China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels who are obstructing Philippine vessels’ ability to resupply the grounded Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Shoal. Some longtime observers may suggest the primary cause is the fallout from the South China Sea Arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013. Some scholars have even depicted China as a “bully”. However, this is not how Beijing sees it.
Beijing has long argued that the Philippines failed to fulfil its explicit promises to tow away the Sierra Madre, a military vessel which was deliberately “grounded” on the shoal in 1999. Instead, Manila has continued to send construction materials to repair and reinforce the rusty vessel on a large scale, in an attempt to permanently ground it on the disputed reef. As a response, the CCG has doubled down on law enforcement in the SCS to “safeguard national marine fishery rights and interests”.
The Philippine ruling elites need to realise that only political channels and diplomacy can realistically solve their disputes with China.
In return, the Philippines has been ramping up military operations in the disputed waters. President Marcos Jr urged the Armed Forces of the Philippines to focus on the SCS. Manila has also increased military and defence cooperation with Washington. In April 2023, for instance, four more military bases were revealed to have been granted American access. The US Army also deployed its nascent mid-range capability missile for the first time in the Philippines during its annual Salaknib exercise. In the same month, Philippine and US troops also held the largest-ever Balikatan exercise, another annual bilateral exercise between the two allies.
To make matters worse from Beijing’s perspective, the Beijing-Manila SCS dispute has become increasingly “internationalised” as more countries are getting involved. At a regular press conference on 3 June 2024, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning accused the US of “inciting and supporting certain countries in provoking China and infringing on China’s sovereignty and maritime rights”. Indeed, Washington has successfully persuaded its regional allies, including Japan and Australia, to play greater roles in the contested waters. In April 2024, the Philippines, the US, Australia, and Japan held their first joint military drills in disputed waters in the SCS. The four countries conducted their first joint patrol in the waters as well. The joint statement made by the defence ministers of the four countries following their military drills suggests that the joint military drills and patrols are likely to be institutionalised in the future.
Manila’s new approach to the SCS issue and Beijing’s countermeasures have contributed to a vicious downward cycle in bilateral tensions. The ongoing blame game only reinforces this. This begs the question: Why did President Marcos Jr shift his predecessor’s China policy?
Factors driving Manila’s new China policy
When Marcos Jr assumed office in June 2022, many Chinese scholars expected that the new president would continue his predecessor’s moderate China policy and manage the SCS disputes with Beijing through dialogue. Their belief was due to two main reasons. The first was, judging from his presidential campaign, Marcos Jr was the most China-friendly among the 10 candidates, and he spoke highly of Duterte’s China policy. The second is that it was Ferdinand Marcos Sr, Marcos Jr’s father and former president of the Philippines, who established diplomatic relations with China in 1975.
But the reality turned out to be the other way around. Several key factors on the individual, domestic, and international level contributed to Manila’s new approach.
The US factor is the most fundamental in driving Manila’s drastic policy shift. During his first state visit to China on 4 January 2023, President Marcos Jr agreed in a joint statement with his Chinese counterpart to enhance Philippine-China relations and appropriately manage differences through peaceful means. However, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin’s visit to Manila on 31 January 2023 brought the agreement to an abrupt end, completely reversing the new administration’s initial efforts to maintain a sound relationship with Beijing. His visit led to an agreement with the Philippine defence minister to deepen US-Philippines security and defence cooperation to counter China. US President Joe Biden’s reaffirmation of the US’ “ironclad” commitment to defending the Philippines in a potential SCS conflict with China made Manila more determined to alter its China policy.
However, the US factor on the international level cannot alone explain the policy change of the Philippines towards China. Factors on the individual and domestic levels are also at play.
On the individual level, Marcos Jr relies more than his predecessor on the Philippine Armed Forces, which prefers a pro-America policy while being tough on China. Given its traditionally cooperative relations with the US, the Philippine military has long maintained sound ties with Washington. In this case, the personality of Marcos Jr matters in the country’s foreign policymaking process, as does the military. It seems like the current president has failed to implement an independent policy towards China in the face of pressure from the military. This is quite different from Duterte, who as a strongman showed more autonomy vis-a-vis the military in terms of the country’s foreign policy. This also explains, to a large extent, why Duterte reversed his predecessor Benigno S Aquino III’s confrontational manner in dealing with China.
The prevalence of anti-China sentiment in Philippine society constituted a key domestic factor in changing the country’s China policy. According to SEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey issued in April 2024, the Philippines is the most pro-America and anti-China country in Southeast Asia. More than 83 per cent of Philippine respondents would choose the US over China if ASEAN were forced to align itself with one or the other.
It should be noted that Marcos Sr, who ruled the Philippines for almost two decades through the 1960s and 1980s, was a former dictator deposed by a nonviolent revolution in 1986. Despite Marcos Jr returning from exile in the 1990s and gradually resurrecting his family’s political ambitions, the Marcos family is still quite infamous in the Philippines. As the population is becoming increasingly anti-China, it seems to be a rationale for Marcos Jr to be tough on China. In doing so he caters to the public while building a better image for his infamous family.
Beijing’s efforts to de-escalate tensions
To de-escalate the tense situation in the SCS Beijing has adopted a series of initiatives. Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun’s participation in this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue and, more crucially, his first in-person meeting with his US counterpart Austin on the sidelines of the summit reveal China’s latest efforts in this regard. In Beijing’s view, high-level strategic communication between the Chinese and US militaries helps to stabilise ‘mil-mil’ relations and enhance mutual understanding. Beijing also maintains a dialogue with Manila amid their ongoing standoffs.
These efforts illustrate Beijing’s consistent SCS policy and principles, which, as the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson stated, include its firm defence of territorial sovereignty, and maritime interests and rights. China remains committed to properly handling maritime disputes and differences through negotiation and consultation with other countries, the Philippines included, and those that are directly concerned with the dispute, on the basis of respecting historical facts no matter whether other claimants agree or not.
However, whether China’s efforts will bear fruit depends largely on the mutual adjustment of policies between Beijing and Manila, and its US ally.
For Washington, it should manage its strategic competition with Beijing responsibly as it claims. However, Biden’s reaffirmation of the US’ “ironclad” commitment to Manila may turn the SCS into a new flashpoint. It should not be trapped, be it diplomatically or even militarily, by any of its commitments to the Philippines.
Manila should resist the temptation to make use of the growing American military presence and China-US strategic competition to solve its SCS disputes with Beijing. Elites in Manila should learn from the administration of Aquino III, whose tough China policy failed to earn any substantial benefits for Manila. They should also consider, as the abovementioned State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey suggests, that the majority of Southeast Asian countries are not aligning themselves with Washington. If the Philippines aligns further with Washington, it will inevitably undermine the cohesion and unity of ASEAN and hence weaken its role in the bloc.
The Marcos Jr administration should seize its role as chair of ASEAN in 2026 as an opportunity to change its China policy. It should return to President Marcos Jr’s views expressed in November 2022 during his meeting with his Chinese counterpart in Thailand that “relations between the two countries should not be defined by maritime issues and that both sides may further enhance communication in this regard”, and that Manila would “stay committed to an independent foreign policy, and will not take sides”. The Philippine ruling elites need to realise that only political channels and diplomacy can realistically solve their disputes with China.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Wenxing Zhou (周文星) is a tenure-track Associate Professor of International Politics at the School of International Studies, Nanjing University. His publications appear in the Journal of Contemporary China, China International Strategy Review, International Sociology, and Contemporary International Relations, among other leading English and Chinese-language peer-reviewed journals. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet.