Trump’s second chance to make a first impression in Asia

3 April 2025

Despite partisan division across nearly every area of US foreign policy, the importance of the Indo-Pacific — and the urgency of competing with China — still enjoys strong bipartisan support. While the second Trump administration has taken a few steps forward in support of US interests in the region, it has taken many more steps backward. And during his speech to Congress in March, President Trump missed a critical opportunity to lay out a clear strategy for dealing with Beijing as America’s greatest national security challenge.

While Trump has a chance to change the trajectory, there is no time left to waste. On the positive side of the ledger, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have conducted a flurry of engagements with their Indo-Pacific counterparts, most notably Secretary Rubio’s meeting on Inauguration Day with his Quad counterparts from Australia, India, and Japan. Yet just a few blocks away, Trump himself was already signalling a soft approach to China on his first day back in office.

Trump should decisively establish his administration’s approach to competition with China by issuing his own Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document and endorsing it in a televised speech from the Oval Office.

After trying to ban TikTok if the app could not find an American buyer in 2020, Trump started his second term by giving TikTok a legally dubious 75-day reprieve from the ban-or-buy law that passed Congress with a massive bipartisan majority. “I have a warm spot in my heart for TikTok”, he said, “because I won [the election] on TikTok”. Then, after claiming during the 2024 campaign that he might impose tariffs of 60 per cent or more on China, Trump instead placed an initial 10 per cent tariff on Chinese goods, all while brandishing even higher tariffs on most goods from Canada and Mexico, tightening steel and aluminum tariffs against other American allies and partners, and unveiling new plans for reciprocal tariffs against even more countries.

Squandering a second chance in the Indo-Pacific

Another term in office gives Trump a rare opportunity: a second chance to make a first impression with his foreign policy agenda. But he has already sent the wrong message by giving TikTok a lifeline and threatening a harsher trade war against America’s friends than its principal global competitor.

Trump only made matters worse with his 90-day pause on most US foreign assistance and near-total dismantling of the US Agency for International Development, which come as the administration should instead be assuring America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that the US commitment to the region remains strong.

Just last year, a large bipartisan majority in Congress voted to fund USD 2 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the region. But because Rubio took weeks to quietly exempt FMF for Taiwan and the Philippines from the foreign-assistance freeze after quickly exempting Israel and Egypt in just days, Indo-Pacific leaders must wonder where their partnerships with the United States rank in the new administration’s priorities.

Getting Indo-Pacific policy back on track

The administration must change course now to set its policy toward China and the Indo-Pacific on a better course for the next four years.

Trump can start by making clear that he will not give TikTok another extension; after years of brinkmanship, the platform’s fate in the United States must finally be resolved with either a ban or an American buyer. He can also endorse efforts on Capitol Hill to ban federal workers from using AI chatbot DeepSeek on government devices, as well as the ongoing Section 301 investigation into so-called “legacy chips” produced in China.

To bolster America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, Rubio should build upon Hegseth’s recent trip to the region with a trip of his own; the two officials should also brief members of Congress on what their teams are doing to send much-needed military aid to both Taipei and Manila without interruption. Then, they should publicly commit to hosting “2+2” meetings with their counterparts from India, Japan, and the Philippines in Washington as soon as possible this spring.

For its part, Congress must also assert its critical oversight role and refine the new administration’s approach to China and the Indo-Pacific. First, confirmation hearings for key regional ambassadorships, including in China, Japan, and New Zealand and Samoa, give the Senate Foreign Relations Committee an opportunity to press the Trump Administration for much-needed clarity on its Indo-Pacific priorities. Second, the appropriations committees should invite a range of Cabinet officials to testify together this spring about how the administration’s first budget request would strengthen American competitiveness vis-à-vis China. Third, in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act, the armed services committees should require the Department of Defense to develop a four-year roadmap for accelerated force posture improvements in the Indo-Pacific — including not only what the Department was already planning to deliver, but also the resources it needs to do more and go faster. Taken together, these early oversight actions will help Capitol Hill push the new administration to more clearly articulate US policies and priorities in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, Trump should decisively establish his administration’s approach to competition with China by issuing his own Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document and endorsing it in a televised speech from the Oval Office. While Cabinet officials can present the strategy in their own words later, recent history underscores that Trump must first do so in his own words. Trump’s March address to a joint session of Congress marked a missed opportunity, but the second-best time to lay out Trump’s vision for competition with China is as soon as possible.

The strategy should describe the scale and scope of the China challenge, including Beijing’s role in the so-called “axis of upheaval” with Russia, North Korea, and Iran. More importantly, it should identify policy priorities for competing with China, including the purpose of economic actions like tariffs, US alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, and beyond. Most importantly, the strategy must clearly state where Trump ranks China and the Indo-Pacific alongside his other aims, including US border security, an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, calm in the Middle East, and stability in the Western Hemisphere.

First impressions matter in foreign policy, and the early weeks of the second Trump administration have given many observers cause for concern about its approach to China and the Indo-Pacific. Fortunately, first impressions aren’t everything. Trump, his team, and Capitol Hill can take immediate action to change course from the past two months and set US priorities in the Indo-Pacific on a better trajectory for the next four years.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Chris Estep is the former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Special Advisor for National Security Communications to Vice President Kamala Harris, and Press Secretary for the House Armed Services Committee Democrats. Image credit: Flickr/The White House.