The US-Japan Alliance and Europe: Furthering the existing web of trilaterals and minilaterals
The US-Japan Alliance and Europe: Furthering the existing web of trilaterals and minilaterals
WRITTEN BY ALICE DELL’ERA
25 November 2022
The US-Japan security partnership has long functioned as the cornerstone of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, this alliance has evolved, with Japan progressively assuming a greater share of the responsibility of securing regional peace and stability. Most notably, since the 2000s, the alliance has extended out of the traditional hub-and-spoke structure of the Cold War, reaching out to other regional actors with the aim of establishing a networked security structure that could better address the growing challenges of a more complex and competitive strategic environment. The two allies have both individually and jointly pursued this ‘bilateralism-plus’, through nurturing a variety of trilateral and minilateral regional mechanisms that extend out of their bilateral alliance.
So far, this has predominantly remained an intra-regional issue, involving actors such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India. In light of Europe’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, novel opportunities to further US-Japan Alliance-centred networks are emerging. Developing trilateral and/or minilateral consultative mechanisms that create connections between Europe and the US-Japan Alliance could open up new avenues for practical cooperation among these actors. This goal resonates well with the Biden Administration's objective to “create ‘greater connectivity’ among democratic partners and allies of the United States, one that goes beyond regional coalitions”.
Building networks with Europe
Exploring avenues for trilateral and/or minilateral cooperation with European partners does not need to start from a blank slate. Such informal liaisons with Europe could be built out of the existing structures that Japan has established over the past two decades. Through its diplomatic outreach, Japan has progressively deepened its relations with European countries — mainly France, the UK, and Germany. Attempts to engage with Europe intensified during the first Abe Cabinet, under the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity Initiative’. While this initiative advocated constructing an ‘arc’ of democracies along the outer rim of Eurasia, the Japanese government also conceived it as a means to build a ‘bridge’ between the US and Asia through Europe. Once Abe returned to power in 2012, he renewed his efforts in developing Japan’s ties with European partners.
In light of Europe’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, novel opportunities to further US-Japan Alliance-centred networks are emerging.
In 2013, Japan and France issued a roadmap that aimed to develop political, security, and defence dialogues and cooperation. The following year, the two held their first 2+2 meeting. Similarly, London and Tokyo asserted their “dynamic strategic partnership” in 2014, and later launched their own 2+2 in 2015. Over the past eight years, Japan-European relations have further matured. Cooperation between Japan and France deepened as Paris developed its Indo-Pacific strategy — the first European actor to do so. In 2019, the two partners updated their cooperation roadmap, in which they pledged to strengthen their security cooperation across diverse projects. They also established new mechanisms, such as the Japan-France Comprehensive Maritime Dialogue and a Working Group on the Indo-Pacific.
In 2017, the UK and Japan elevated their relations to the level of a global strategic partnership and issued a joint statement on security. The two also worked on negotiating a historic Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which was reached (in principle) last May and, according to leaks, is set to be signed this December. This would be Japan’s third RAA and the first with an extra-regional partner. Progress in developing Japan-Europe relations has also extended to Germany. While relations between Tokyo and Berlin have traditionally focused on both political and economic dimensions, security and defence have emerged over the last few years as new areas for cooperation. In 2021, the two countries launched their first 2+2 — a historic event, given Berlin’s traditional resistance to such mechanisms. Recently, the two partners also agreed to negotiate an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement — a deal that Japan already shares with its two other European partners.
Tokyo has engaged with the three European actors in terms of defence, including through joint military training. While Franco-Japanese bilateral exercises had been taking place since the early 2010s, by 2018 they had expanded beyond “goodwill training”. A similar trend has been evidenced by British participation in more advanced joint exercises and port calls. Lastly, in 2021, after a 20-year hiatus, the German frigate Bayern visited Tokyo on its first Indo-Pacific deployment. Recently, Berlin also held joint air force exercises with Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF).
Some of these military exercises and training already involve the United States in either a trilateral, quadrilateral, and/or minilateral form. For example, Washington, Tokyo, and Paris held their first trilateral exercise in 2015 — which London joined two years later. The UK, Japan, and the US navies also signed a trilateral cooperation agreement in 2019. Other notable examples of joint exercises include the French-sponsored La Perouse and ARC21, as well as Germany’s participation in the US-Japan 2021 ANNUALEX. These minilateral exercises already entail some degree of coordination at the operational level. Nonetheless, other forms of joint political and security consultations could substantiate this cooperation.
Why US-Japan-Europe networks matter
Multiple analysts have pointed to the added value of trilaterals and minilaterals in the context of Indo-Pacific security. One argument is that their flexibility and informality enable consensus-building and the exchange of ideas. Some argue that such informal structures have the potential to encourage the “pooling of capabilities and resources”, thus facilitating additional divisions of responsibility and labour. These benefits extend beyond intra-regional mechanisms and are just as valid for cross-regional arrangements.
An extra-regional US-Japan Alliance-Plus approach could prove beneficial for all actors involved. Most importantly, mechanisms connecting European allies and the US-Japan Alliance could function as discussion forums to identify the crucial security challenges that intersect both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. Such platforms could prompt better coordination between the US, Japan, and European partners, as these actors could more directly compare notes on their unilateral and joint initiatives. This, in turn, could open new areas for collaboration among these like-minded partners.
From Europe’s perspective, these potential trilateral and/or minilateral consultative mechanisms could give European actors the space to voice their own outlook, ensuring that European viewpoints are incorporated into Japanese and American perspectives. For Washington, such forms of engagement could, in turn, provide the opportunity to identify and build on existing synergies with the European Indo-Pacific approach, while leveraging and balancing what many in Europe see as excesses of the American strategy. Last but not least, from a Japanese perspective, these mechanisms could help sustain European interest in the Indo-Pacific region, an objective that is very dear to the Japanese government.
A bumpy road ahead
A US-Japan Alliance-Plus engagement with Europe is certainly not devoid of challenges. First of all, such mechanisms would most likely encounter strong criticism from China, which has generally denounced regional US-led minilaterals as mechanisms aimed at containing Beijing and as tools reflecting Washington and its allies’ ‘Cold War mentality’. Second, a divergence of interests and priorities among European actors, the US, and Japan remains. This is evident if we consider Europe’s more cautious approach to the Indo-Pacific and China. For example, Europeans appear to be more interested in the mercantile rationale rather than in the strategic competition that animates US-Japan security relations. A carefully calibrated approach that keeps these challenges in mind is a must when exploring avenues for US-Japan-Europe trilaterals and/or minilateral collaborations. Even so, developing cross-regional consultative mechanisms that enhance connectivity among US allies should only be welcomed.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Alice Dell’Era is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs at Florida International University, and a Junior Fellow at the Centro Studi Geopolitica.info. Her research focuses on the US alliance network and security in the Indo-Pacific. Image credit: European Union, 2022.