Taiwan: The DPP, China, and a reform agenda
Taiwan: The DPP, China, and a reform agenda
WRITTEN BY IAN INKSTER
April 15 2020
Is the recent electoral victory of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and the DPP also a clear victory for Taiwanese liberals who are pressing for the advancement of a social and economic reform agenda? Or are there indications of a regression in the movement towards further democracy and reform?
From 2018 there were definite indications of progress, perhaps exemplified by more open and critical discussion of major issues in which the DPP played a major part – the environment, indigenous culture and welfare, gay civil rights and urban renewal were all on the agenda. Improved democratic processes were similarly evident in the move away from simplistic two-party dualism with the growth of new political parties and some reduction of the ‘China question’ in which most political debate had long been mired without much evidence of resolution.
Liberals could only be hopeful of a DDP electoral victory in 2020. Ironically, during 2019 there was evidence of a loss of support for both Tsai and the DPP more generally. The reasons for this are not yet clear but might well have related to some perceived slowing down of actual reform combined with policy formulations coming from the KMT and regionally popular small-party leaders that offered promising alternatives.
In the event, the presidential election was an overwhelming victory for Tsai, with a reasonable performance for the DPP in the Legislature, yielding an effective majority. Would a reform agenda now accelerate given the huge presidential vote?
If we assume a continued Taiwanese provocation of China in the absence of an acceptable process of diplomatic negotiation or feasible political resolution, then short of actual war we might expect China to react over time in various ways compounding Taiwan’s commercial and soft power strategies.
I would argue that there is great danger of future domestic reform becoming buried in a combination of lower growth (stemming from the global recession which now beckons) and the much greater rhetorical focus on China and the question of Taiwanese status and independence. Spending energy on anti-mainland rhetoric is much easier than formulating expensive and radical solutions to basic Taiwanese social problems. The China question is, after all, precisely what ensured Tsai’s electoral success. Her vehemence in rejecting both the ‘one China two systems’ and the ‘1992 Consensus’ positions differentiated her clearly from her main opponents.
The last few weeks has seen more from President Tsai on China, Hong Kong and the coronavirus - all to the detriment of China - than precise domestic policy formation. If the provocation of China remains her main thread of power and popularity, then growth and liberal reform will suffer.
If we assume a continued Taiwanese provocation of China in the absence of an acceptable process of diplomatic negotiation or feasible political resolution, then short of actual war we might expect China to react over time in various ways compounded of both commercial power and soft power strategies.
The first and most immediate would be for China to place prohibitions or severe restrictions on entry of Taiwanese goods, services and investments. At present China is by far the major importer of Taiwanese goods and the export-import balance between the two nations is overwhelmingly in Taiwan’s favour.
Secondly, would be a likelihood of military and naval provocation beyond fly-bys and incursions of Chinese naval vessels into Taiwanese waters. Fitting within a wider strategy would of course be an increase of Chinese control or challenges over those South China Sea islands that Taiwan has some claim to or strategic interests in.
Third, of little cost to China would be an acceleration of its information banditry, aiming at Taiwan. Destabilisation and disinformation have for some time been claimed against China, the mainland’s general capability in such areas is clearly increasing if still lagging technologically behind the USA and Europe. More visible interference through formal media could be attempted, although increasingly the relatively inexpensive intrusion of persuasion and fear, as well as misinformation, through social media would now be seen as more effective.
Fourth, a weakening of Taiwan’s international status, long pursued, could with relative ease be deepened through the persuasive power of Chinese trade and investment in Asia and Africa, and, indeed, now within Europe. Belt-and-Road projects are already clearly seen as much in political as in economic terms, and Chinese influence in such projects and along such routes could strongly jeopardise any planned revival of the DPP’s Southward bound strategies.
If we assume only these four strategies as the principal responses of China to the continued postulates of the DPP, then if the DPP does continue in the same vein the negative impacts on the Taiwanese economy could be sufficient in themselves to harm any prospect of progressive social reforms.
In summary, this feasible series of relationships leads to a double detriment – a distraction of the DPP and consequently civil society away from progressive policies combined with a failing capacity to fund such policies as a result of threats to economic growth and welfare. Since 2012 the average annual growth rates in real GDP have been 2.3% for Taiwan, 2.8% for Hong Kong, 3% for South Korea, and 3.4% for Singapore. Exports to China for that same group for 2019 were, as a percentage of total exports, Taiwan 30.5%, Hong Kong 54.3%, South Korea 25.1%, and 14.4% Singapore.
Any significant loss of the China market would require very significant action in Taiwan towards either a more effective Southward policy or a significant increase of exports to its other main trading partners – Hong Kong, the USA and Japan. Unfortunately, Taiwanese trade with these three nations is nowhere as complementary as it is with China – in fact Taiwanese exports compete with those of the others. In addition, the commercial possibilities for both the USA and Hong Kong might well be hemmed in by continuation or even increases in political tensions – the US-China trade wars are hardly conducive to Taiwanese forward planning and Hong Kong’s problems seem nowhere near resolution.
We are not arguing here that Tsai and the DPP should abandon the independence project or lose sight of threats from China. We are arguing that rhetorical provocation is not worth much, even if it did propel Tsai herself into a stronger electoral victory in January. The implication, then, is that rhetoric could be better replaced with planned, public and transparent attempts by Taiwanese governance to forge and maintain negotiating diplomacy with the mainland. If such diplomacy is in fact underway and encouraged but is taking place through quiet and unknown channels, then that may well be an alternative, but is difficult to square with Tsai’s recent commanding narrative.
We have also suggested that provocations over the next few years could lead to Chinese reaction and Taiwanese economic downturn. This could be much the more dangerous if three processes combine – a multiform Chinese reaction that hinders the Taiwanese economy, global recession or downturn, and a fall in Chinese trade and investment as a result of the latter.
The outcomes of provocation and antagonism are rarely positive, but the value of loose ties can be strong. The loose ties and ambiguous arrangements between China and Taiwan have lasted a considerable time, well over one political generation. Continued provocation in the absence of a structured diplomatic program might destroy many of the gains hitherto associated with Taiwanese democracy and DPP progressive policy.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Ian Inkster PhD, FRHS, is Professorial Research Associate at the Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London; a senior fellow in the Taiwan Studies Program, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham; and the editor of the international journal, History of Technology. Since 1973 he has held professorial posts in the UK, Australia, and Taiwan. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan)/Flickr.