Myanmar's election: The long game is better than no game at all

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Myanmar’s election: The long game is better than no

game at all


WRITTEN BY TEJ PARIKH

18 November 2020

While the National League for Democracy’s election victory five years ago created an international buzz around Myanmar, its latest triumph has been met with more cynicism. Back in 2015, the party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide, ostensibly ending decades of military-led rule. In 2020, it appears the NLD have stormed the ballots, winning 346 seats in Myanmar’s bicameral legislature, but this time against the backdrop of its controversial first term in power. 

Five years later, State Counsellor Suu Kyi’s star has fallen. With it, the excitement surrounding the Southeast Asian nation has dissipated. She is accused of standing idle while Myanmar’s armed forces, also known as the Tatmadaw, have committed atrocities against the Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine State and waged wars against an array of marginalised ethnic groups. Her efforts to revive peace talks with minorities have fallen flat, freedom of speech has deteriorated, and the economic growth and development promised in 2015 has failed to materialise.

Evolution is more than a one-term project

Where Time magazine predicted the “dawning of a New Democratic Era” in Myanmar five years ago, now the international community sighs at the country’s lack of progress toward liberal democratic norms. As western media continue to highlight the extensive human rights abuses in the country, the optics of any ties with Myanmar have become increasingly treacherous for governments and businesses alike. The European Union is mulling trade sanctions for the Tatmadaw’s belligerence. The United States’ general disinterest under outgoing US President Donald Trump has only shifted the country further into the arms of China. 

Myanmar has strayed far from the West’s idealised path. It is finally becoming clear to many that the country’s evolution is more than a one-term project — and beyond the capabilities of a single individual. Indeed, while high expectations followed the NLD’s victory in 2015, realism should guide the international community in 2020. Though giving up on the country and castigating it from afar may be tempting, engagement remains more important now than ever.

On humanitarian grounds alone, the West’s continued engagement remains vital. Myanmar has grown at breakneck speed economically since the junta allowed the first wave of liberalising reforms in 2011. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has sent its nascent economy, worth $76 billion, into paralysis with GDP growth crashing from 6.8 per cent seen last year to 0.5 per cent in 2020. Almost 1 in 4 in Myanmar live below the poverty line, with many vulnerable falling back into deprivation as COVID-19 tears into the country’s garment, tourism, and informal sectors. Citizens have even reportedly been eating rats to stave off hunger. Living conditions are even tougher for ethnic minorities in the country’s war-torn peripheries, with the 700,000 Rohingya displaced across the border in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh continuing to live a precarious existence according to relief agencies.

Developing a twin-track process of economic support and civil society engagement is a substantial challenge as trust in the international community within Myanmar is low. It remains hard for outside players, especially Western actors, to exert influence in the country’s peace process, legislation, and ministries.

In June the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided $356.5 to bolster the government’s response. Ongoing financial aid will be important to help lift many out of destitution, particularly while Myanmar lacks a social safety net. Any sanctions for human rights abuses will also need to be assessed against its impact on the basic economic rights of Myanmar’s everyday citizens. Beyond helping to tackle impoverishment in the country, foreign policy considerations should also be an important factor in the international community’s ongoing support for Myanmar’s economic development.

This is especially in the context of China’s role in Myanmar, which has become a key donor and the number one investor in the country. Several major infrastructure projects already underway between Beijing and Naypyidaw will tie Myanmar into China’s One Belt One Road Initiative. The fear among analysts, however, is that China’s easy money and growing influence may push it further away from democracy and into high levels of indebtedness, with 40 per cent of Myanmar’s international debt already owed to Beijing. This growing imbalance makes the West’s continued role in the country all the more significant. 

Above all, shifting the dial on democracy will take patience. An Asia Barometer Survey this year showed that around two-thirds of Myanmar’s citizens find democracy ineffective for economic growth and in maintaining social and political order. The West’s image, and that of democracy, in the minds of the country’s 54.5 million people will only suffer further if the volume of criticism of the country begins to outweigh whatever support or engagement is provided by Washington, Tokyo or Brussels.

The challenge to reform

The international community will need to refresh how it manages relations with Myanmar. Having a seat at the table will be essential if it seeks to help shape its future. The incoming Biden administration will need to regain credibility in the country, after an absence of relations under Trump. The EU likewise will need to consider if removing its preferential trading with Myanmar will do more to harm its long-term economic emergence and its own influence in the country. Japan too will also play an important role as an economic counterweight to China. Altogether, a balancing act that offers a helping hand while also calling out the country’s ills will be vital.

Technical assistance should form a key pillar of any ongoing support. Following decades of inefficient military governance, Myanmar’s bureaucracy is still largely inept, corrupt, and bloated. Indeed, effective governance of an already fragmented country is made harder by its weak political institutions. Developing civil servants’ skill sets and public finance management will go a long way. Suu Kyi herself is considered to be a major obstacle in the reform process, with many accusing her of ruling like an authoritarian and rejecting external advice on policy. 

If the international community is less able to work directly with her government, it has alternate channels to support Myanmar’s long-term democratisation. With the Tatmadaw’s strong grasp on key industries, ministerial portfolios, and parliamentary seats hindering the country’s transition, outsiders can do more to help squeeze the military’s power and give democratic forces within Myanmar an edge.

Targeted sanctions against the military’s business ventures — Myanmar Economic Corporation, and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited — and the firms that transact with them, can help squash its revenues, and limit funding for violent operations on ethnic minorities in Myanmar’s periphery. Playing an active part in enervating the Tatmadaw financially and highlighting the military’s role in the country’s maladies can help the NLD while it attempts to rewrite the 2008 constitution that enshrined the Tatmadaw so much power in the first place.

Direct economic support will remain crucial for the West to retain its influence. With high levels of inequality, particularly between the majority Bamar population and minority ethnic groups preconditions for long term democracy remain limited. The internal desire for democracy will rise only as the lived-in experience and wellbeing of Myanmar’s citizens drastically improve. Working with the NLD to develop the nation's start-up community and support corporates to invest and operate ethically within the country can help drive the jobs growth, innovation, and idea exchange that pushes economic and political development.

Building bridges with Myanmar’s civil society will also be critical. Given the strong vein of Bamar nationalism in the country, many have felt Western criticism was part of an attack on Myanmar’s sovereignty. The international community can do more to build support for democracy, human rights, and internationalism from the ground up by leveraging the country’s cosmopolitan youth. Over half the population are under the age of 30. Supporting political education, media development, and digital literacy for example can help nurture a democratic culture from within, that in time, may bear fruit.

The long game is better than no game

Developing a twin-track process of economic support and civil society engagement is a substantial challenge as trust in the international community within Myanmar is low. It remains hard for outside players, especially Western actors, to exert influence in the country’s peace process, legislation, and ministries. Criticism by diplomats will need to go behind closed doors, to rebuild ties, and rather than trying to intervene in major internal decisions, the West instead can help lay the foundations for economic growth and democratic lift-off. 

Success in this strategy will depend on Aung San Suu Kyi. Her aversion to nongovernmental organisations operating in the country, reticence to rebuild ruptured ethnic ties, and ambivalent support for free expression will impact the effectiveness of any external assistance. Either way, the international community can still play a role in loosening the Tatmadaw’s stranglehold, energising Myanmar’s youth, and bolstering the economy. 

Until the Tatmadaw’s power is diluted, a true political opening will remain a distant proposition. In the interim, outside players must not let their dismay with the country inhibit their continued efforts with it, otherwise, Myanmar’s democratic backsliding will become self-fulfilling. For the international community, the long game is better than no game.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Tej Parikh is a global policy analyst and journalist. He was previously an associate editor and reporter at the Cambodia Daily. Image credit: Judiethbluepool/Flickr