Murky waters: What next for the AUKUS nations and their allies?

5 October 2021

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, like much else in the Anglosphere, the AUKUS agreement was made in China. Two key lessons emerge in the aftermath of one of the most significant security pacts in recent times, one for AUKUS’ detractors and one for its supporters.

First, those critical of the agreement must understand that the AUKUS countries do not act in a vacuum; China has agency, and its actions have consequences. Second, considering revelations such as those contained in the Pandora Papers, supporters of the agreement must understand that AUKUS members need to look beyond the traditional confines of international security and conventional ideas of nationhood. The members cannot address their glaring vulnerabilities to authoritarianism without also considering transnational channels of finance. That the AUKUS is a spectacular diplomatic failure for China is not in doubt. But if the pact is to become a success for the three countries involved and their allies, it simply must form part of a transformation of policy, rooted in the contemporary world as it is, rather than the Cold War world as it was.

Status and scrutiny

To the AUKUS pact’s detractors, I suggest that China’s growing status also means increased scrutiny. There has been no shortage of awkward statecraft that has alienated China’s potential international partners. One incident at the UK’s Conservative Party annual conference on 30 September 2018 typifies the party-state approach that has contributed to the environment in which AUKUS became viable. At a conference fringe event on Hong Kong under Chinese rule, Kong Linlin, a reporter for the state broadcaster CCTV, could no longer contain her patriotism and began heckling a speaker. When she was asked to leave, she slapped the delegate in front of her. The Chinese Embassy’s response was to condemn the organisers, calling on the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission to apologise to the reporter. The embassy went on to suggest that the incident called into question the UK’s commitment to freedom of speech.

One can build a strong case in favour of creating AUKUS, but a wider strategy that doesn’t address the transnational challenges of corruption, illicit finance, and corporate complicity, risks reinforcing the castle walls as the throne at the centre rots.

While this was a fringe event, the conference itself is where you will find the Chinese party-state’s most ardent supporters in the UK, the free-trade wing of the Conservative Party. Such was the ugly nature of the incident and ungainly response by the embassy that those who had previously backed better relations with China were immediately put on the defensive. In one fell swoop, the party-state had alienated a significant part of its support in the UK. This was not to be an isolated incident. Such events played out across the world with different actors and in different surroundings but with similar results.

Here lies the biggest threat to Chinese interests abroad — that the Party will always put its own interests above those of the country upon which it is perched. The typical response is to suggest that the Party is addressing its domestic audience, but one can say this only so many times. The problem that Chinese cadres might wish to consider here is the centralisation of power. The realisation of AUKUS begs the question, has the Party measured the costs abroad against the benefits at home? And how did a country once respected for its patient, firm, thoughtful diplomacy descend into the clumsy, belligerent, Trumpian missives emitted by its diplomats? In short, if this was ultimately Xi Jinping’s fault, who is going to tell him?

Old world, new world

To AUKUS’ supporters, I suggest that the pact is, in part, an old solution to a new problem. Attention has already turned to the repercussions of the pact. It is all very well to talk about another great game, but the game has changed. In fact, the security landscape has transformed in the post-Cold War world, most notably in the ways it has been shaped by the architecture of international capital. Borders between adversarial states are bisected by supply chains, transnational companies depend on access to authoritarian states, and capital flows largely unimpeded throughout. Old barriers between domestic and international, state and private, bleed into one another. Is it a security issue, for example, when a well-connected civil servant is handsomely paid to sit on the board of a company dependent on market access in an adversarial state? What about when an unpredictable oligarch owns extensive real estate across your country’s capital city?

AUKUS hints at a common problem for states — in their composition they are typically designed to solve yesterday’s problems and fight yesterday’s battles. In the UK for example, the Advisory Committee of Business Appointments (ACOBA) vets high profile appointments, MI5 is directed to protect British parliamentary democracy, and the Competitions and Markets Authority (CMA) is tasked with investigating mergers and acquisitions where there is a public interest national security consideration. Who will unbake the cake when these risks coalesce in the wake of globalisation?

What lies beneath?

The discussions of hypothetical military scenarios that have been prompted by AUKUS divert from a more concrete geopolitical shift. The development of global financial architecture in recent decades has transformed the transnational arena such that the old rules don’t necessarily apply. As the AUKUS announcement was being made, Russia’s political opposition was being undermined by groups including Google and Apple, who removed tactical voting apps for the country’s election. As attention in the US turns to the implications of growing Chinese power, the Chinese Embassy there can depend on Squire Patton Boggs, a lobbying firm in its pay. Included on the firm’s roster is the retired speaker of the House and one of the best-connected politicians in the US, John Boehner. Chinese leaders themselves are supported by a cast of western enablers who help secure their substantial fortunes offshore, most frequently in the British Virgin Islands.

One can build a strong case in favour of creating AUKUS, but a wider strategy that doesn’t address the transnational challenges of corruption, illicit finance, and corporate complicity, risks reinforcing the castle walls as the throne at the centre rots. The AUKUS countries and their allies have the ability to lead the international landscape towards transparency and accountability. While military capacity remains a significant part of the equation, the principal theatre of engagement between liberal democracies and authoritarian states lies elsewhere. It is in the boardrooms of transnational corporations; the elite capture of international organisations; the legislation governing who politicians and civil servants can work for; the transparency requirements for public and private institutions; and in the regulations around the movement of capital. No submarines, nuclear-powered or otherwise, can win this battle.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Martin Thorley is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the College of Social Science and International Studies, University of Exeter. His research explores international engagement with China, focusing on elite networks, financialisation and kleptocracy. Image credit: Flickr/Number 10.