Maritime monitoring — AIS implications of China’s new data policy

25 January 2022

In early November 2021, China enacted two new data privacy laws that, reportedly, directly affect the availability of ship Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmission data. The laws — the Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law — seek to restrict foreign access to any critical data regarding China’s national security or key infrastructure. When it comes to AIS, the Data Security Law (DSL), in particular, has the potential to restrict foreign access to the data collected by terrestrial AIS receivers based in China, making it increasingly more difficult to monitor ship and other maritime activity in, or around, Chinese territorial waters. However, a more in-depth understanding of AIS demonstrates that the data policies are unlikely to negatively impact maritime monitoring in the region over the long run.

Understanding AIS and maritime monitoring

In recent years, monitoring of maritime activity in East Asia has grown into a popular method for tracking and analysing issues of international security concern. Numerous international security think tanks and government organisations have increasingly been relying on maritime data and AIS in their analysis to detect a wide range of activities, from naval and trade issues to weapons proliferation activity. For this reason, to effectively assess the potential implications of China’s new data privacy law vis-à-vis AIS, it is crucial to first understand what AIS is and how it can be applied to international security analysis in East Asia. AIS is a common phrase used throughout the maritime industry, especially in the fishing and shipping sectors. Essentially, AIS are transponders designed to transmit a ship’s location and relevant identification information to other ships and coastal authorities.

AIS was originally designed to prevent vessel collision, and in 2004, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) implemented legislation requiring ships over a certain size to regularly transmit AIS. Both government and private sector organisations can collect a ship’s AIS data through ground-based (ie, terrestrial) or satellite receivers. Some governments, such as Norway, make collected AIS data publicly available. Proprietary data platforms such as MarineTraffic allow for freely and publicly available AIS access, while other platforms including IHS Sea-web and Windward provide extensive AIS data and other maritime information through subscription access. Notably, as AIS analysis expands, so too will the number of private-sector AIS data providers, with more and more companies beginning to offer AIS data and information.

If Beijing categorises AIS as a data type subject to DSL, it should issue a clarification on how it plans to collaborate with the IMO and other international organisations on issues of AIS data.

AIS is most commonly used in the shipping industry and is often relied upon for supply chain analysis to ensure goods end up where they are supposed to. However, increasingly, international security analysts have also been relying on AIS and maritime data, especially in the East Asia region. Perhaps most indicative of this increased reliance on maritime data are the reports from the Panel of Experts to the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime on North Korea. Specifically, the Panel of Experts reports rely on AIS data to investigate and demonstrate how North Korea evades UN sanctions in the maritime domain. By using AIS, the Panel can effectively show when North Korean tankers and cargo ships conduct prohibited activity, such as unloading sanctioned cargo (ie, oil and coal) in foreign ports.

Non-governmental organisations have also increasingly relied on maritime data to bolster their international security analysis. For example, analysts at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies and the Royal United Services Institute have published reports with extensive details on how to identify and track suspicious North Korea ship behaviour using open-source AIS information. In the context of tracking China’s maritime activity in the South China Sea, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies Maritime Transparency Initiative notes Beijing’s use of ships that are “ostensibly engaged in commercial fishing but which in fact operate alongside Chinese law enforcement and military to achieve political objectives in disputed waters”.

China’s new Data Security Law

It is clear AIS has an integral role in the future of international security analysis in East Asia; a role that China’s new DSL might potentially negatively impact with respect to data availability. In the wake of the new law’s enactment, VesselsValue, a global maritime market company, reported that from October to early November, AIS signals in Chinese waters dropped from 15 million per day to just 1 million. Similarly, at least one Chinese AIS data vendor has confirmed that it has stopped selling AIS data to foreign parties in light of the new law. Because neither the DSL nor the Personal Information Protection Law directly mentions AIS specifically, it is unclear if this drop in transmissions was directly caused by the enactment of the new laws; however, there is clearly a correlation between the laws’ enactment and decreases in Chinese AIS availability.

To reiterate, neither of the passed data laws directly mention shipping or AIS data. The DSL is arguably more applicable to issues of AIS than the Personal Information Protection Law, as it deals directly with data generation and distribution. The DSL provides a framework for categorising data and provides an additional specification of requirements for various data management issues including data localisation and transfers, downstream data handlers, and data security. Each of these new provisions could potentially affect AIS availability in China. The DSL categorises data as ‘core data’, or data concerning Chinese national and economic security, and as ‘important data’ with a formal and specific definition forthcoming from Chinese officials. Because AIS can be used for economic purposes, AIS could be categorised as ‘core’ or ‘important’ data. However, confirmation of AIS’ categorisation will likely not be available until China issues additional clarification determining what defines and differentiates core and important data.

With respect to data management, the DSL prohibits providing any data stored in China, regardless of its categorisation and whether it was originally generated in China, to foreign law enforcement agencies without prior Chinese governmental approval. This could impact Chinese AIS availability for official governmental maritime investigations. Finally, and more broadly, the DSL stringently regulates third-party intermediary data services and data security systems; regulation that could impact the general availability of AIS produced and stored in China.

Possible AIS implications

A first glance at China’s new DSL may be worrisome from a maritime monitoring perspective, as a lack of data availability might hinder growing AIS analysis efforts and introduce additional ambiguity into the situational awareness of activity in the region. However, it is important to view these changes, and any additional future implications, from a pragmatic lens. First, the DSL only affects data produced, transferred through, and stored in China. In application to AIS, this means it would likely only apply to terrestrial AIS receivers based in China.

While Chinese terrestrial stations can improve the overall AIS data landscape by providing a more high-quality look at activity in an area, they are not the only type of AIS data receiver. So, regardless of the DSL’s applicability to AIS, AIS from non-Chinese, regional terrestrial receivers and non-Chinese satellite receivers would presumably continue to be available in East Asia, thereby making AIS monitoring feasible, albeit potentially to a less comprehensive degree. Second, the applicability of the DSL to Chinese-based AIS receivers will in large part be determined by Chinese regulators. Because of the steep fines associated with the new law, the drop in AIS signals identified in November may simply be indicative of companies taking proactive legal steps.

AIS activity will likely resume once the laws have been in place for longer and if AIS data generation is deemed to comply with the new legislation. However, until China releases additional documentation clarifying its conceptualisation of the relationship between AIS and data privacy under the umbrella of the DSL, it will remain unclear if AIS data is categorised as core or important data. Because clarification will take some time to publish, it is unlikely that Chinese organisations that halted data-sharing efforts in light of the new laws will resume distributing AIS data in the short term.

Finally, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “AIS stations along Chinese coastlines that are legally constructed in accordance with international treaties ‘have not been shut down’ and ‘are operating normally’, [as are p]ublicly available AIS platforms”. From this, it is clear that Beijing is nominally not purposefully attempting to make the analysis of its territorial waters any murkier than it already was. However, just because the AIS platforms and stations are operating does not mean that audiences outside of mainland China will get access to their data. While the DSL will not stop AIS data generation, including AIS data generation regulated and mandated by the IMO, access to said data might grow increasingly more controlled with respect to availability and distribution. If Beijing categorises AIS as a data type subject to DSL, it should issue a clarification on how it plans to collaborate with the IMO and other international organisations on issues of AIS data.

While China’s new DSL might not negatively impact AIS and maritime monitoring to the degree that initial news media reports suggested, it does bring to light the growing importance of maritime monitoring in East Asia. Clearly, AIS analysis is an important emerging method for international security research, and continued access to Chinese AIS data would help ensure that AIS analysis in East Asia is as comprehensive as possible. In addition to issuing additional clarification on the applicability of the DSL to AIS, China should continue to work with international organisations by providing AIS data, helping to improve transparency in maritime monitoring in East Asia.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Jamie Withorne is a Graduate Affiliate and Research Assistant at the Oslo Nuclear Project and a master’s student at the University of Oslo. Her research primarily focuses on North Korea, nuclear nonproliferation, and emerging technology. She can be reached via LinkedIn. Image credit: Flickr/Official US Navy Page.