In Dialogue: Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy and William Yang on Taiwan
13 May 2024
All eyes were on Taiwan in January as it held presidential and legislative elections, and we are just days away from the official inauguration of president-elect Lai Ching-te, scheduled for Monday, 20 May.
Here, 9DL’s Head of Associates Network, Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy discusses the impending transition and the new administration’s likely foreign policy priorities with William Yang, a freelance correspondent for Voice of America.
Zsuzsa: Beijing’s reaction to a third and unprecedented DPP term has been more low-key and somewhat muted compared to previous elections. Looking back at 2016 and 2020 — those were different times, China and Taiwan were very different. How do we make sense of Beijing’s handling of Taiwan, and what (if anything) could this tell us about the future?
William: This time around Beijing started with one of the most traditional ways of pressuring Taiwan – poaching another diplomatic ally. Two days after Lai’s election victory, Nauru announced it was ending its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We’re seeing a new pattern of Beijing trying to use legal means to erase Taiwan's sovereignty and the status quo across the Taiwan Strait by announcing a change to the flight routes along the Strait.
They cancelled the offset measures of the M503 flight route and said they would resume the original flight route that is basically right next to the median line of the Taiwan Strait, while announcing three new flight routes that would go west to east along the Taiwan Strait. This is China trying to challenge Taiwan exercising its sovereignty. Previously, during more peaceful times, China would try to resolve this kind of dispute through negotiations with a government that they approve and recognise. But we can see that they have no intention of trying to settle these cross-strait disputes or arguments through negotiations with a Lai government.
Rather, they want to unilaterally set new rules across the Strait and then present the situation to the international community, suggesting that Taipei has no agency to push back against how the new flight routes should be developed. I think this is a strategically smart move from Beijing to impose a very difficult issue for the incoming government to handle, and at the same time, continue encroaching on the status quo since Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit.
Zsuzsa: Beijing using international legal means to erase Taiwan's sovereignty suggests an evolution in tactics, although not without precedent.
William: Right, it's not completely without precedent. They have already used similar tactics but in different ways. For example, they have banned or blocked Taiwan from participating in the World Health Assembly — during the pandemic — even though Taiwan supposedly is still an observer to the organisation. That's one way to basically undermine Taiwan's sovereignty.
Zsuzsa: Everything Beijing does, seeks to undermine Taiwan's sovereignty. The question is, what means do they use to achieve that?
William: The International Civil Aviation Organisation — the UN organisation that handles such international disputes — did not weigh in and reject Beijing's unilateral decision of opening and changing these flight routes. Beijing can use such silent approval, or the lack of rejection from an international organisation to justify that Taiwan has always been part of China and legitimise its unilateral action across the Taiwan Strait. This is just another example of China using its influence in the UN, knowing that democratic countries cannot form an effective pushback within these areas because in essence China's unilateral decision of opening up these flight routes did not directly violate the terms of the ICAO's decision. So, I think it's both a legal way to undermine Taiwan's status as a sovereign country, but also a grey zone operation.
Zsuzsa: Beijing is quite skilled at using grey zone tactics. How did Taiwan respond to Beijing’s move?
William: Taiwan issued a protest and urged Beijing to immediately resume bilateral negotiations, but obviously this is not going to work. By hosting former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou just last month, Beijing again tried to show what kind of leaders they are willing to have bilateral talks with. While in China, Ma repeated the rhetoric of both sides of the Taiwan Strait sharing the same cultural roots and belonging to the Chinese nation despite having developed under different systems. Ma also visited anti-Japanese revolution monuments. Beijing is making clear that they will only interact with Taiwanese leaders if they are willing to fulfil these criteria.
Zsuzsa: Ma's visit also fits into the grey zone warfare that China is employing against Taiwan because by hosting Ma, Beijing has yet again interfered in Taiwan's political system at a strategic point in time — after the elections and before the inauguration. This gives a taste of what to expect from Beijing once Lai becomes the new leader.
William: Right, I think the significance is that China is setting out very clear red lines. The use of Ma as a puppet is somewhat of an evolution in how China interferes in Taiwan's domestic politics. Beijing is relying on a Taiwanese political figure to help lay out their terms and repeat their red lines, which also helps deflect strong Taiwanese opposition towards this kind of rhetoric.
Zsuzsa: I think it is important to highlight this evolution. Beijing tried to interfere throughout the campaign — before and after the elections — by amplifying domestic polarisation in Taiwan’s open information space. And I think Ma's visit fits right into this.
How do you think the international community is viewing these cross-Strait dynamics? Coming from Europe and having closely followed the recent evolution in EU-Taiwan relations, I think we are now in a different reality than before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the pandemic, Hong Kong, and China’s shopping spree and high-profile acquisitions in Europe, all of which has occurred in the past decade. Fast forward to 2024 — we definitely have a Taiwan narrative taking shape in Europe.
It's interesting for me to see how that narrative has unfolded and changed over the years. Concerning the January election, the EEAS spokesperson’s statement was very much on the soft side, worded in very vague terms. So that was the EU-level reaction. I was not too surprised by this, because, although things are different today, Europe remains cautious vis-à-vis Taiwan, and it is likely to continue on this path. What is your reading of the European approach?
William: I think there's a clear internal consensus that when it comes to the EU as a whole, the issue of Taiwan will always remain sensitive. And I think that the EU is cautious, especially when it comes to public gestures and statements involving or addressing issues related to Taiwan, because even though Brussels now views Beijing more firmly as a systemic rival, that is more about the trade and economic relationship, and Beijing’s influence over the EU as a whole. It is probably going to be one of the most sensitive and difficult issues to come up with an evolutionary approach towards balancing relationships with China and Taiwan in the near term, there's always going to be pushback and compromises that will have to be made along the way.
Zsuzsa: There's an internal dynamic that is unavoidable because the EU is 27 countries. So, the limitation comes from member states' different views and relationships with China, even as member states agree that there needs to be a shift because China has changed.
I agree with you, Taiwan will remain sensitive, and Brussels will be working around Beijing and Taipei. With the EU election coming up in early June, we will have to see where things go. The current European Parliament has been vocal on Taiwan, we don’t know how vocal the next one will be. But I think China itself remains the biggest element of uncertainty. Beijing knows how to adjust its approach to Taiwan, and the aim is always the same — to undermine and intimidate its people. Also, we've seen a mix of incentives and coercion, and mixed messages vis-à-vis Europe. I think how Europe can go forward with China does not only depend on Europe (and its political will) but also on China’s behaviour. I want us to talk a bit about how the new government in Taiwan is taking shape.
William: I think most people were very surprised by some developments, including the unexpected new foreign minister. To me, the appointment of Lin Chia-lung, former Taichung mayor, and former transportation minister, is very controversial. It is the result of an internal DPP faction power play pulled by Lai Ching-te because he clearly disappointed his faction when he revealed the first batch of his cabinet members because they had expected Lin to at least be a vice premier, if not a premier. Not appointing Lin in the first round immediately triggered a lot of internal unhappiness. I think when Lai Ching-te looked at the remaining positions within the cabinet, he realised that his vice president, Hsiao Bi-khim, would be Taiwan’s de facto top diplomat given her reputation, abilities, and recognition. As a result, compared to the last eight years under Tsai Ing-wen, the foreign minister’s role is probably going to be less instrumental for his administration. Lin clearly also knows that given his experience and qualifications, it will be difficult to convince even some people within the DPP, let alone the opposition party. That’s why he has been so reluctant and needed a lot of convincing to accept the position.
Zsuzsa: Looking at the next administration, what do you think the foreign policy priorities will be?
William: I would imagine that the incoming Lai administration’s first big foreign policy task is to calm the Taiwan-US relationship, regardless of who wins the election in November. Hsiao will have to fully focus on that. My concern then is whether Hsiao will have the bandwidth to cover other important areas, such as the Taiwan-EU relationship, which has really flourished over the second Tsai administration. Rather than a person with such questionable experience serving as foreign minister, if it were one of the names that had been floated before the election, I think we would feel more confident about Taiwan-EU relations staying the same course and being handled with maturity. So, I think there's going to be a period of some ups and downs.
Zsuzsa: Considering the transition to this new administration, we can see Hsiao's recent visit to Europe as an attempt to engage different partners in different countries, and perhaps, through parliamentary diplomacy, signal that Europe will remain important for Taiwan under Lai. But Lai will have enough to worry about closer to home, like Southeast Asia, right?
William: Indeed, in terms of trade, there have been some concerning signals coming out of the CPTPP progress, which is being chaired by Canada this year. Recent reports suggest that some CPTPP member states have already pushed back against considering Taiwan's membership because of political concerns about pressure from China. So on CPTPP, I don't think there's much to look forward to unless there's going to be some breakthrough. And that's going to be one of the biggest challenges for the Lai administration. Other bilateral trade talks are also not going anywhere. The only somewhat promising discussion where there has been some progress is the Taiwan-UK one. But again, London no longer has the same level of overall international participation, especially due to the UK’s economy. I think ASEAN will continue to be a very tough nut to crack for Taiwan.
Zsuzsa: We covered lots of challenges. To end this on a positive note, what about opportunities for Lai Ching-te as the new president, for Taiwan as an economy that has a much more elevated profile internationally and has more friends to count on?
William: I think the most exciting example will have to come with TSMC's global expansion in Arizona (confirmed by the US Congress) and Kumamoto, Japan, as well as starting construction at the site in Dresden. Recently, it was also announced that the Czech Republic is going to be the first country to receive a semiconductor training centre set up by Taiwan. Perhaps semiconductors can serve as an ice-breaker for Taiwan to overcome the usual political obstacles that it will face when it wants to deepen bilateral economic exchanges with certain countries.
Zsuzsa: Certainly, from Taiwan's perspective, semiconductors open up opportunities for collaboration because there is such a global need for Taiwan-made semiconductors. Semiconductors, especially the most advanced ones, entail such an integrated ecosystem that everyone needs the other, including American R&D, European machinery and equipment, Taiwanese know-how etc. Investing in its trusted partners is an opportunity for Taiwan to remain a vital part of the process and strengthen its position.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the discussants and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biographies
Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is head of the Associates Network at 9dashline and Fellow at Agora Strategy Institute. Based in Taiwan, she is Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National Dong Hwa University, and conducts research on EU-Taiwan relations, China and emerging dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. Between 2008 and 2020 Zsuzsa worked as a political advisor in the European Parliament.
William Yang is a journalist based in Taiwan. He has been covering issues related to China for several international media outlets since 2016. He was previously the East Asia correspondent for Deutsche Welle and is now a freelance correspondent for Voice of America.