In Conversation: James Borton on 'Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground'

IN CONVERSATION WITH JAMES BORTON

3 May 2022

9DASHLINE recently sat down with James Borton to discuss his fascinating new book Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground, in which he argues that the South China Sea can become a body of water that unites, rather than divides.

In your book, you mention concerns over environmental degradation and conservation efforts in the South China Sea (SCS). What room is there for cooperation regarding environmental protection in the region? Could such environmental cooperation be a conduit for more peaceful interstate relations in the South China Sea?

JB: We are at a tipping point in the conservation and sustainability of oceans, especially so in the South China Sea. The impact of continuous coastal development, climate change, fishery collapse, increased maritime traffic and reclamations have brought about a rising chorus of scientists from the region and outside, who view the sea as an ideal platform for promoting regional cooperation. As marine ecosystems continue to be damaged and overexploited, there is much room for expanding marine protected areas to conserve biodiversity, protecting natural resources from overexploitation, and halting reef destruction.

Naturally, there is no quick fix for addressing sovereignty claims in the region, yet we see compelling evidence that unless there is an agreement reached on overfishing, the ongoing disputes over fishing rights will result in further conflicts. So, while the use of marine protected areas (MPAs) as fisheries management tools remains challenging, the engagement of stakeholders, especially from all coastal communities, makes no-take zones attractive. Without these recovery zones, there will be a looming food security issue for all.

The central question is how do we govern and manage the ocean inside and outside national jurisdictions to use it responsibly? I am optimistic that the SCS appears to be bringing together more marine scientists, who share a common language that cuts across political, economic, and social differences. While the focus on the environment does not eliminate all shades of nationalism, it does diffuse tensions and allows the SCS to become a body of water that unites, rather than divides.

While the Nine-Dash Line is an oft-mentioned feature of the SCS dispute, you highlight the fact that “Beijing has been careful not to clarify exactly what the line means”. Would you say this ambiguity over the Nine-Dash Line helps or inhibits peaceful relations in the SCS region?

JB: For sure, historians and scholars alike remain conflicted about the “ambiguity” over the dash line. It leads some policy experts to subscribe to the belief that the ocean, islands and reefs all belong to China and that China has sovereign rights. But because it is discontinuous, it means that other countries can pass through the lines freely.

I am not a legal scholar on what constitutes maritime features, nor a specialist in international law, but this ambiguity offers pause for ongoing diplomatic conversations about conflict prevention and conflict management, and this includes especially ‘historical’ rights. However, as a sailor and tidesman, I understand that international law makes no distinction between the navigational freedoms enjoyed by naval ships and civilian vessels in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the high seas. For now, the charts or so-called ‘lines’ offer geopolitical pathways and conference opportunities to examine territorial and maritime claims. As a participant in SCS-related programmes, I believe that these so-called ‘dash-lines’ do advance ideas to contain or even resolve conflicts before they escalate.

After all, peace is a continuum between on-sea fishing skirmishes, non-diplomatic rhetoric, and lulls. Of course, a successful mariner needs to use all the available navigational tools to avoid running aground or worse. For example, the cross-Strait ties between Taiwan and the PRC have avoided head-on confrontation on the ‘One-China principle’ through ambiguity. So perhaps the “ambiguity” allows more latitude for divergent views and purposefully tilts towards a stable peace as opposed to war.

Food security, ecological harm and geopolitics intersect sharply in the South China Sea, as you note. What steps must countries in the region urgently take to privilege environmental security? Are there already countries leading in this regard?

JB: Claimants must support and reach a consensus on a prescribed code of conduct in a reasonable period. Time and tides wait for no one, and it is running out in the SCS. Even without a code of conduct, claimants should cease any further reclamation on unoccupied reefs and synchronise efforts to save threatened marine species like green and hawksbill sea turtles and other marine life.

Both Vietnam, and surprisingly, China have recently been engaged in a series of in-person environment-focused conferences and workshops to mitigate the ecological challenges in the SCS. Despite the challenges from Covid-19, China hosted a two-day international ocean governance programme in November 2020 with a roster of speakers from the US and SCS claimant nations. From my perspective, this signals that the tide is lifting science-research surveys above the din of politics and sovereignty claims. It brings to the fore more central solutions for the region’s long-term peace and sustainability.

To be clear, there are additional necessary steps that all the SCS claimants can take. This includes marine data sharing. Open access to marine information sharing in the SCS can benefit all claimant nations, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, in the form of ocean governance and fisheries sustainability. The good news is that the Philippines and Vietnam have agreed to resume joint marine scientific research expeditions in the SCS this year. The two nations began collaborative science surveys between 1996 and 2007, which led to four completed surveys that included studies of the biomass of fish species and coral reefs in the SCS’s southern part.

You note that the Antarctica Treaty may be a possible model for the SCS. Could you briefly explain how so?

JB: The 1959 Antarctica Treaty, signed by twelve nations, has been recognised as one of the most successful international agreements. The Treaty set aside differences over competing claims, banned militarisation, prohibited mining, and prioritised the region for peaceful conduct and scientific research. Of course, some critics and SCS policy experts claim that it is too late to adopt this as an SCCS paradigm since China has already militarised its reclamations and even US Navy warships sail regularly through the disputed waters. Nevertheless, Antarctica is inextricably linked with scientific inquiry and international governance cooperation. The Treaty ensured the sharing of scientific data and information.

I argue that while the SCS places intense geopolitical pressures on sovereignty claims, increasing numbers of SCS scientists, including the Chinese, subscribe to the same Antarctica principle, that science can safely remain detached from nationalism or geopolitics. With all oceans under increasing threats from climate change, plastics pollution, fisheries collapse, and the exploitation of minerals, the Treaty reinforces trust in international law and goodwill. Naturally, no one fragile treaty can address the face of national expansion. With 54 nations now contributing to the governance of Antarctica, it is a wonder that there have not been serious disruptions or incidents. China, a relative newcomer to Antarctica as a consultative member in 1985, does have a history of disregard for environmental requirements and is reluctant to share ocean observatories data. Yet, with four Chinese Antarctica research stations and a fifth soon to be completed, the hope is that science will supersede maritime ambition and resource extraction.

While the ice is fast melting, I believe that polar science collaborations are the building blocks that are informing policy and the public about the need to protect the region. The flags of the initial 12 nations unfurled in front of the Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station offer hope that the Antarctica Treaty is more than just a pragmatic SCS model, but that it serves as a triumph of international cooperation.

The Mekong River has been called the “new South China Sea” for regional disputes, especially because of China’s control of the northern parts of the river. What are the similarities and differences between how geopolitics plays out over the Mekong River and the SCS? Would you say that tensions over the Mekong River have the potential to become more serious and intense than those over the SCS?

JB: The Mekong is shared by China and five downstream nations: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Upstream dams affect fish migrations, river hydrology, sediment transfer, and increase drought cycles in the delta. To be clear, the River supports the livelihoods of over 350 million people. Dam operations drive hydrodynamic changes. Regional cooperation is needed for addressing these ecological problems, much as in the SCS.

Beijing’s ‘run of the river policy’ means that water should never be shared without China using it first. This is punctuated by China’s failure to sign any international treaties for its transboundary rivers. It was most evident in Beijing’s failure to accept international law as it applies to the SCS and its rejection of the 2016 international tribunal decision in The Hague. The upstream Chinese dams reinforce Beijing’s belief that the Mekong River is a sovereign rather than a shared resource, placing the downstream governments’ needs to secure free access to international water resources, biodiversity conservation, and food security at risk.

The rising tensions associated with China’s control of the river and its control of the SCS are worrisome. Food and water security are at the centre of troubles in these waters. It is difficult to separate these two environmental security challenges since the Mekong River flows through the steep canyons of China through the lower downstream basin countries, before emptying into the SCS from Vietnam’s lower delta. Nevertheless, I believe that the SCS offers greater potential for conflict over fishing disputes. This is especially true with the collapse of more fisheries and the threats to the livelihood of coastal communities.

Finding legal solutions and diplomatic agreements to promote sustainable development is often trumped by economic and territorial interests. You point to the positive role ‘science diplomacy’ can play. Could you briefly explain how this can help?

JB: The marriage of policy and science is essential to navigating the perilous geopolitical SCS. Science diplomacy can help, directly and indirectly, promote confidence-building among the parties involved in the SCS dispute. For example, China and ASEAN have cooperated in exchanging data on typhoons and tsunamis, which serves as an effective mechanism to establish trust and preparedness for increasingly severe weather associated with climate change. Certainly, regional disaster management belies the notion of national maritime borders since these fast-moving typhoons are territorially indiscriminate. Additionally, China and Vietnam have carried out bilateral maritime cooperation, including China-Vietnam sea wave and storm tide forecast cooperation and cross-border joint sea oil and gas explorations.

There is also increasing communication, cooperation, and recognition among marine biologists in the region in setting up more designated marine protected areas. China has more than 270 MPAs, comprising about 5 per cent of its national waters. Vietnam has also served as a good model in its fast-tracking of MPAs as part of its national drive to strengthen food security. The region’s claimant nation marine biologists understand that these ‘no-take’ zones are vital to conserving marine resources.

While these actions do not solve the sovereignty claims or strategic competition among claimant nations, these signals of maritime cooperation help eliminate the trust deficits and translate into mechanisms for policy shifts that help reinforce the shared ‘global commons’. Science diplomacy promulgates sustainable development of maritime activities and, as a result, it bridges international policy frameworks for peacebuilding.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Biography

James Borton is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University/SAIS Foreign Policy Institute. His latest book ‘Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground’ is available here.