From bargaining chip to regional partner: Taiwan-US relations post 2020 election
From bargaining chip to regional partner: Taiwan-US relations post 2020 election
WRITTEN BY KUAN-TING CHEN
30 October 2020
The result of the upcoming US presidential election will undoubtedly reverberate across East Asia though the impact will be experienced particularly strongly in Taiwan, a country which — given its precarious international status — has relied heavily on Washington, especially for maintaining its ability to defend itself. As Taiwan’s security environment remains unsteady, it is imperative to understand the potential similarities and differences in how a Biden Presidency or second Trump term would engage Taiwan, and consider how Taipei should react to their respective approaches.
A new dynamic
Under the Trump administration, US-Taiwan relations have seen several new precedents set, which, as argued by President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) could be perceived as the United States and Taiwan reaching ‘their strongest point ever’. These new developments can be divided into three main categories: defence cooperation; the passing of pro-Taiwan legislation; and high-level visits and meetings.
The Trump administration approved seven large weapons packages to Taiwan, worth more than US$13 billion. Approved in May 2020, the sale of 18 heavyweight torpedoes provides a particularly large boost to Taiwan’s submarine program and our country’s broader strategy of building up asymmetric capabilities. It also marks a departure from a more hesitant approach to arms sales to Taiwan under the Obama administration, when the American defence industry was proscribed from competing for access to the Indigenous Defence Submarine program. Given that national security constitutes one of the cornerstones of US-Taiwan relations, Taipei has clearly benefitted from a White House which currently houses some of the biggest advocates for buttressing Taiwan’s military capabilities — including Robert C. O’Brien, the national security adviser, and Matthew Pottinger, his deputy.
Additionally, the passing of Taiwan-friendly bills is a positive indication for deeper US-Taiwan ties. In recent years members of the US Congress have become more active on the issue of Taiwan, introducing several bills aimed at strengthening relations — which in turn — has seen several key pieces of legislation passed into law. The 2018 Taiwan Travel Act constitutes a substantial upgrade to sub-diplomatic relations between Taipei and Washington, as it provides a legal basis for high-level exchange between officials. On the other hand, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI Act 2019) provides a window of opportunity for Taiwan to pursue more multilateral engagements with the support of the United States. This is particularly important in the context of the upcoming election, as Taiwan will likely remain able to benefit from these new legal frameworks (supporting further US engagement) irrespective of the final result.
Whoever occupies the White House after November has now clearly experienced first-hand that Taiwan can indeed help. With enough work already carried out here in Taipei, Washington has an unparalleled opportunity to elevate the status of this small but mighty nation to a regional leader — in line with its own goals for engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
In the last three months alone, Taiwan has witnessed more high-level exchanges (with the United States) than at any time since the termination of diplomatic relations in 1979. In early August, Alex M. Azar II, the US Secretary of Health and Human Services, met with President Tsai in Taipei. The primary objective of this meeting was to convey President Trump’s support for ‘Taiwan’s global health leadership’. Furthermore, in September, US Under Secretary of State Keith Krach visited Taiwan to attend the memorial service for former President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), frequently deemed the father of Taiwanese democracy. This uptick in high-level meetings — enabled by the aforementioned Taiwan Travel Act — illustrates a fundamental break with the past.
At the same time, US-Taiwan relations are still largely confined to the infamous Taipei-Beijing-Washington triangle — which renders them precarious. As scholars Richard Haass and David Sacks argue, the US has sown “seeds of doubt as to whether the United States would come to the aid of its friends and allies”. Thus, supporting the concern that Taiwan continues to be a ‘bargaining chip’ for the US and, therefore, merely just one aspect of the relationship between the United States and China. Despite Taipei and Washington growing closer under the Trump administration, Taiwan continues to face risks in its relationship with the US. Therefore, Taiwan needs to harness its potential to serve as a regional partner for the US in East and South-East Asia.
A way forward?
Regardless of the outcome of the 2020 US presidential election, Taipei ought to change the way in which it views its relationship with Washington. Rather than perpetuating a strictly bilateral relationship, Taiwan should consider how to brand itself as a reliable partner in multilateral cooperation.
Interestingly, both Biden and Trump have vowed to maintain strong ties between Washington and Taipei in the event of their respective electoral success. Despite initial criticism about his conspicious silence on the Taiwan issue (during his campaign), in a recent op-ed — published in the World Journal owned by the New Taipei-based United Daily News Group, Biden stated, he intends to:
'[Deepen] our ties with Taiwan, a leading democracy, a major economy, technology powerhouse — and a shining example of how an open society can effectively contain COVID-19’.
For Biden, in policy terms at least, this may seem like a course correction. Admittedly, earlier in his career, the presidential hopeful had defended the policy of 'strategic ambiguity', rather than 'strategic clarity' as promoted by several of Trump's advisers.
At the same time, Biden’s most recent expression of support for our island-democracy may also be understood as a convergence of Asia policy within the Democratic Party, which has previously demonstrated explicit support for pro-Taiwan bills in Congress. That said — the possibility of a Trump re-election is generally interpreted in Taiwan as a promise of a more consistent American policy towards the country. This remains the primary reason as to why Trump has been able to win ‘hearts and minds’ in Taiwan, which — according to a recent YouGov survey — is the only country in the region where a majority of respondents expressed a preference toward a Trump win, owing to a belief ties would further solidify under a second term.
In light of positive US attitudes towards Taiwan (on both sides of the aisle), it is unlikely Washington would weaken, not to mention withdraw, its sub-diplomatic support for Taipei. It is, however, high time Taiwan more effectively capitalised on the new legal framework in the United States that would enable it to position itself as a regional parter for Washington, rather than a bargaining chip in its dealings with China. For Tsai, it would also be consistent with her strategy of diversifying Taiwan’s global footprint.
The current administration’s quest to diversify Taiwan’s foreign relations beyond the infamous Taipei-Beijing-Washington triangle is best illustrated by the New Southbound Policy (NSP). Announced by President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in 2016, the NSP aims to “redefine Taiwan's important role in Asia's development” as a capable regional leader in the areas of economic and trade relations, science and technology, and culture; as well as sharing resources, talents, and markets.
Image Credit: European Commission
Ultimately, the long-term goal of the NSP is to develop a socio-economic community with ‘trust transcending national borders’, and, thus far, it has proved to be successful. Between 2018 and 2019, FDI from Taiwan towards NSP countries increased 16.16 per cent from the previous year to US$2.79 billion, while the number of overseas tourists from NSP countries to Taiwan also rose (last year) by 6 per cent. Given this success, Tsai’s administration should prioritise the New Southbound Policy not only as the country’s ‘regional strategy for Asia’, but also the quintessential tool of engaging with the United States Indo-Pacific strategy.
South-East Asia matters to the United States, and, this is precisely why the NSP should become a focal point of cooperation. Despite the insular nature of the 'America First’ foreign policy, the Trump administration’s engagement with the region has exposed a notable continuity between their Indo-Pacific concept and the Asia policies of previous adminstrations. Under Trump, the United States has continued to develop regional partnerships with South-East Asia by deploying tools such as regional networks for collective security, promoting economic prosperity, and encouraging good governance and shared principles.
It must be noted that the Democrats have displayed a similar commitment to the region. The 2020 Democratic Party platform states explicitly that they will seek ‘robust engagement with regional multilateral institutions like the ASEAN [to] promote the rule of law and sustainable, inclusive economic growth on both sides of the Pacific’. What is more, Biden himself has explicitly called for deeper partnerships ‘from India to Indonesia’ in his Foreign Affairs essay: Why America Must Lead Again.
The US is thus likely to maintain its interest in the region, and — given Beijing's increasingly assertive stance — protect the sovereignty of Indo-Pacific partners. Therefore, Tsai’s NSP is clearly the correct tool for simultaneously bolstering Taiwan’s engagement with the region while also engaging the US in a way which more resembles a partnership, rather than dependency.
New avenues
There are precedents for the US in engaging third countries in the Indo-Pacific — precedents which could be replicated under the NSP. JUMP, or the Japan-US Mekong Power Partnership serves as a case in point. Aimed at developing regional electricity grids with an initial US commitment of US$29.5 million, JUMP demonstrated that the United States is willing to work with new regional partners — including foreign governments — in addition to the private sector across South-East Asia for common interests.
Building on the idea of energy partnerships, one of the many fields in which the US and Taiwan could collaborate in South-East Asia may be in mobilising investment in green sectors such as renewable energy or energy efficiency where Taiwan has already proven itself. The recent Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) project in the Marshall Islands serves as a perfect example. In providing the people of the Marshall Islands with clean, reliable and affordable electricity, this infrastructure project will enable the island nation to meet its ambitious goal of achieving a 50 per cent improvement in energy efficiency in households and 20 per cent renewable energy generation by 2020. Alongside the NSP strategy, the promotion of green energy fits like a glove in seeking to stimulate regional economic growth while working towards a higher degree of complementarity between Taiwan and its South-East Asian partners. Such an arrangement would also align well with Taiwan’s strategy for domestic economic growth – Tsai’s flagship 5+2 Innovative Industries Plan explicitly names green energy as one of the core industries for fostering innovation, employment, and equitable distribution.
Earlier this year, ‘Taiwan Can Help’ became the leitmotif of Taiwan’s diplomatic offensive. Although the phrase was initially deployed to promote Taiwan’s medical diplomacy and achievements in combating the spread of COVID-19, it can — and indeed should! — be scaled up to other areas of international cooperation. Whoever occupies the White House after November has now clearly experienced first-hand that Taiwan can indeed help. With enough work already carried out here in Taipei, Washington has an unparalleled opportunity to elevate the status of this small but mighty nation to a regional leader — in line with its own goals for engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform
Author biography
Kuan-Ting Chen (陳冠廷) is the Chief Executive Officer of Taiwan NextGen Foundation, a policy think-tank headquartered in Taipei and Chiayi. He earned an MPP from the University of Tokyo and a BA in International Studies from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Before joining NextGen, Kuan-Ting served as the Chief Research Officer and Deputy Spokesperson of Taipei City Government, and a Research Associate at the National Security Council, Taiwan. Image Credit: Flickr/Ken Walton