Beijing’s ambivalence about the coup in Myanmar
Beijing’s ambivalence
about the coup in Myanmar
WRITTEN BY MURRAY HEIBERT
7 May 2021
Beijing’s reputation has faced substantial damage in Myanmar since the Tatmadaw toppled the popularly elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February. The massive protests that engulfed the country in the wake of the coup included rallies in front of the Chinese Embassy in Yangon, particularly during the first few weeks. Demonstrators charged Beijing with helping the new junta restrict the internet access used to organise the protests and providing soldiers with weapons to crackdown against the rallies.
The toppling of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government and the ensuing turmoil threaten many of the billions of dollars of infrastructure projects that China had painstakingly negotiated with the civilian government. These include a port on the Indian Ocean at Kyaukphyu that would provide access to the sea for landlocked Western China. Beijing fears possible sabotage against its oil and gas pipelines from Kunming to the Indian Ocean, prompting a request to the Myanmar military to protect them. A number of Chinese-invested factories in Myanmar (the numbers cited vary from a handful to 32), many of them garment factories that employed hundreds of workers, were partially or fully destroyed when they were set on fire by pro-democracy protestors.
Beijing is unlikely to step up its role in Myanmar unless there is a sudden and massive outpouring of refugees across the border into China or opponents of the junta begin threatening Chinese infrastructure in the country.
The junta’s crackdown on demonstrators and its offensive against ethnic armed groups along Myanmar’s border with China threaten to provoke a humanitarian exodus, forcing internally displaced persons (IDPs) to flee into Yunnan province to escape the fighting. In the worst-case scenario, skirmish and airstrikes between the military and the ethnic armies or attacks by the junta’s air force planes near China’s border could spread into China proper with food shortages and hunger resulting in a refugee crisis on Myanmar’s northern border.
“Not what China wants to see”
Beijing characterised the military takeover as a “major cabinet reshuffle”, and in cooperation with Russia, blocked efforts by the UN Security Council to condemn the Tatmadaw’s actions. But as anger mounted against Beijing on the streets, China’s ambassador to Myanmar told journalists in Yangon that recent developments were “absolutely not what China wants to see”. As the protests and turmoil continued in Myanmar, Beijing began blaming western support, particularly from the United States, for exacerbating civil disobedience. Beijing also joined the junta in targeting accusations at the George Soros founded Open Society Foundation for allegedly illegally exchanging over $1 million into local kyat to support opposition to the military rule.
Nonetheless, Beijing is growing more concerned about the increasing violence and turmoil that the coup and its aftermath have unleashed, according to some analysts. China, like Myanmar's Southeast Asian neighbours, has come to realise that the protests in urban centres, the military crackdown, and the standoff between the junta and large chunks of the civilian population will likely continue for some time. Before the coup, China seemed to have better working relations with the civilian government than it had with the military. But now Beijing seems to have resigned itself to working with the junta. “China’s own opposition to western intervention based on human rights concerns”, particularly in proximity to its border, prompts Beijing to “accommodate” the Myanmar military, says Yun Sun, an expert on China’s relations with Myanmar at the Stimson Center in Washington. Fundamentally, Beijing believes the “military plays such a critical and intertwined role in the country that it is impossible for any democratic movement to squeeze it out of politics”, Yun adds.
Many analysts agree that Myanmar takes a back seat to tensions with the United States when it comes to Beijing’s foreign policy priorities. “That’s why Beijing has not put much focus on it, but rather lets ASEAN take the leading role”, says Enze Han, a politics professor at Hong Kong University, referring to Myanmar's neighbours in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “This indicates that Myanmar is not that important for China's foreign policy concerns at the moment, their focus is on the US or COVID etc. in other parts of the world”.
Shortly before Aung San Suu Kyi and her party overwhelmingly won Myanmar’s first democratic election in 2015 after 50 years of military rule, China stepped up relations with the incoming civilian government. Beijing’s relations with the Tatmadaw had cooled following irritations caused during the military’s dependence on China due to years of international sanctions (including by the United States). Aung San Suu Kyi, now under house arrest and facing various criminal charges, took her first overseas trip to China during her first year in office.
Beijing provides a diplomatic lifeline
Myanmar’s military, which is now looking for international diplomatic cover, has long had strained relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After a brutal military crackdown against pro-democracy protestors in 1988, following which many western countries imposed economic sanctions against the junta, China provided a lifeline for Myanmar. Beijing supplied aid, trade, military equipment, and diplomatic backing at the UN as many democratic nations worked to isolate the regime in Yangon.
However, intense nationalism and widespread popular anti-China sentiment have long made Myanmar a tough place for the CCP to operate. Many citizens saw investments during the earlier military reign as mostly benefitting China, damaging to the local environment, and failing to adequately compensate villagers who lost their land. In addition, Beijing provided weapons to the ethnic armed groups fighting the central government along its border and got first dibs at the jade and logs from the border regions controlled by de-facto independent ethnic armies.
When the quasi-civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi took office in 2016, Beijing offered projects to bolster Myanmar’s crumbling infrastructure, but many officials were wary about the CCP’s objectives in the country. After the international community condemned the government’s brutal abuse of its Rohingya Muslims in 2017, which prompted over 700,000 to flee to Bangladesh, China came to the country’s diplomatic aid. Beijing invited Myanmar's civilian and military leaders to visit China and Aung San Suu Kyi eventually agreed to scale back visions of the Kyaukphyu Port and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. The coup, of course, has plunged these critical projects back into a deep freeze.
Bracing for the long game
China appears to have accepted ASEAN’s role as a mediator to try and seek an end to the turmoil in Myanmar, although based on the outcome of the first meeting held in late April, Beijing is probably not very optimistic about a speedy resolution. Interestingly, an official at China’s embassy in Yangon reached out to the CRPH in early April, a grouping of ousted parliamentarians including many from the overthrown NLD, who are trying to oust the military and reinstall a civilian government. To be sure, a phone call from an embassy official in Yangon has much less diplomatic heft than a meeting in person or communication from Beijing.
As Yun notes, “What worries China now is that even suppression and coercion are not enough to generate stability”. Beijing is unlikely to step up its role in Myanmar unless there is a sudden and massive outpouring of refugees across the border into China or opponents of the junta begin threatening Chinese infrastructure in the country. As it has in the past, Beijing is again bracing for the long game in Myanmar.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Murray Hiebert is a Senior Associate of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Some of the analysis in this article is adapted from his book, Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia’s China Challenge, published by Roman & Littlefield, 2020. Image credit: Wikimedia.