A new era dawns: Labour’s Indo-Pacific offer
A new era dawns: Labour’s Indo-Pacific offer
WRITTEN BY SAM HOGG
2 July 2024
When the UK goes to the polls on 4 July, the result will likely be the election of the first Labour government in over a decade, probably with a supermajority. Much attention will rightfully focus on the domestic challenges Labour will inherit and how it plans to improve them — but what about its foreign policy, and more specifically the Indo-Pacific?
The region has changed dramatically since Labour left office in 2010, including the very concept of what constitutes the ‘Indo-Pacific’ — a term not in vogue during their last time in Downing Street. There have been no fewer than 113 elections of varying democratic credibility across the Indo-Pacific since 2010, producing leaders such as Chinese President Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, Philippine President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr, and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to name but a few. A global pandemic and growing national security concerns coupled with creeping protectionism have changed supply chains. Rising regional GDP, the emergence of new technologies, and the reality that hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants are already living at the sharp edge of climate change are also front and centre. Most fundamentally, however, the Indo-Pacific has become a stage for great power competition between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in a way that a 2010 exiting Labour government could not have imagined. This has spawned new alliances and partnerships, ranging from AUKUS to the CPTPP, increased scrutiny on older groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Quad, as well as innovative bilateral agreements, such as those the UK has created with both South Korea and Japan.
Recognising correctly that the Indo-Pacific will be the point from which some of the world’s most difficult challenges emerge, and a driving force for global trade over the next century, Britain began its ‘tilt’ to the region under former Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Constant churn between his various successors certainly hasn’t helped, but under the Conservative Party, the UK has remained committed to the region, joining the CPTPP and sending naval vessels on patrol, among other initiatives.
Will Labour commit?
Over the last two years, various diplomats and officials I speak to have shared concerns about Labour’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific tilt. Their worries are twofold: first, will Labour want to carry on with a programme initiated by the Conservatives, and second, can they afford to? On both counts, Labour has made its willingness difficult to gauge.
Labour has chosen to keep its Indo-Pacific cards close to its chest. Success for a future British government in the region will require dexterity and a robust understanding of what regional players want.
Shadow Foreign and Defence Secretaries David Lammy and John Healey have criticised the Conservative’s push as “Thinly veiled code for ignoring the importance of our own neighbourhood”, referencing Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. But such comments should be read more as an opposition’s attack on the government, rather than as anything profound. Moreover, thinking has evolved since then. More recent rhetoric has signalled Labour is interested in the Indo-Pacific, not least through the CPTPP (included in the party’s manifesto), but also with an eye on its promised upcoming Strategic Defence Review.
However, friendly administrations such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan should push and pressure Labour to remain wholeheartedly active in the region. On a macro level, Labour needs to understand two things. First, any retreat from the region will put them at odds with both old allies and new partners, particularly in light of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions in the South China Sea. Second, the region’s nations are autonomous actors striving to further or protect their interests, and most likely do not want to be forced to ‘pick a side’. Any approach needs to be dexterous and built on realities, not projections.
So what should Labour do?
Given it seems more likely than not that Labour will retain and reform parts of the UK’s foreign and industrial policy in the Indo-Pacific, the question becomes: how will it do so? What can Labour offer the region, and what does it wish to gain? Unfortunately, Lammy won’t have the time to visit most of the nations in the region like his Australian counterpart Penny Wong in her first year in office, nor will Labour have a flourishing economy producing surplus capital to spend elsewhere. This means Labour will initially have to rely on British and allied partners to help them understand what Indo-Pacific nations are looking for, and be punchy and innovative on what Britain can offer and expect in return. But there are several fronts on which Labour can learn, and which it seems likely we will see some movement.
On the security front, clearly the PRC looms large over the region. Beijing’s belligerent actions in the East and South China seas have drawn intense criticism from the Five Eyes, the G7, and others, and brought South Korea and Japan closer together. A Labour government will likely carry on the current UK government’s approach of working within these groups to call out this behaviour when it arises. Regarding Taiwan, Labour should go further than the Conservative government and seek to push hard on British universities to create partnerships with their Taiwanese counterparts. A sensible Indo-Pacific policy is underpinned by people who actually understand the region: encouraging exchanges between Taiwan and the UK can go some way to fixing this deficit, and any successful models should be replicated with other countries in the region, such as India and Indonesia. Similarly, a Labour government will likely build on the work of its predecessor in encouraging private sector engagement with Taiwan on issues from off-shore wind to semiconductors — multiple British delegations have visited the island over the past two years. In terms of countering Beijing’s grey zone activities, the UK’s GCHQ could look to work with its Taiwanese counterparts on cybersecurity, or as the China Strategic Risk Institute has suggested, deepen cooperation by launching a cyber-security dialogue with Taiwan modelled on the 2023 UK-Singapore Cyber Dialogue.
Labour could also look to engage Indo-Pacific nations on other security-related issues, from policing (the PRC currently provides training and equipment for many regional nations) to illegal fishing, which is frequently raised in government-to-government meetings. Indeed, HMS Spey’s visits to the region are in part an effort to tackle this. On climate, Labour’s manifesto stated it “is the greatest long-term global challenge that we face”. Many of the smaller Pacific Island nations feel this already: for a Labour twist on the Indo-Pacific offering, Starmer’s party may want to look at what technologies or expertise its promised Energy Independence Act can export to those most in need.
On global trade, Labour has said it is committed to ‘Securonomics’, a concept that ties together domestic, foreign, and industrial policies, with protectionist overtones copied from the US’ Inflation Reduction Act. Given that the Indo-Pacific will likely be home to three of the world’s five largest economies by 2050, Labour will need to flesh out how it can both encourage free trade and pursue this agenda in the region. Under Labour, the government may take a more focused approach to trade agreements tailored around specific needs, such as critical minerals or artificial intelligence. At the very least, a sensible policy would be to encourage further investment and exports in the UK’s non-sensitive sectors from CPTPP partners (over half of City of London exports destined to CPTPP nations are services-based) and continue to build trade goals into bilateral agreements like the Downing Street Accord.
As with almost all of their foreign policy ideas ahead of the election, Labour has chosen to keep its Indo-Pacific cards close to its chest. Success for a future British government in the region will require dexterity and a robust understanding of what regional players want.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform
Author biography
Sam Hogg founded Beijing to Britain, delivering weekly research notes to hundreds of government readers, politicians, embassies, and corporate clients on the evolving UK-China relationship. The company’s insights are read across 140 countries, reaching various governments, the FTSE100, and embassies. His work on strategic thinking in Government and building China capabilities has been published by the British Parliament. Image credit: Flickr/Keir Starmer.